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POSNER'S PRAGMATISM AND PAYTON HOME
ARRESTS
Matthew A. Edwards*
Abstract- In recent years, Richard A. Posner, a respected federal appellate judge and
prolific scholar, has been at the vanguard of a resurgence of interest in legal pragmatism.
Posner and other scholars have called for judges to expand their horizons beyond
conventional legal reasoning and to embrace interdisciplinary methodology and empirical
research in the legal decisionmaking process. At the same time, however, prominent
jurisprudential scholars have expressed both practical and philosophical objections to
Posner's controversial prescription for increased judicial reliance on social science research.
This Article seeks to explore the value and limits of Posner's pragmatism and empirical
inquiry in the context of home arrests. In Payton v. New York, the Supreme Court held that
police may enter a suspect's residence to arrest the suspect when there is "reason to believe"
that the suspect is at home. This Article surveys Payton's progeny and demonstrates that
judicial application of the Payton rule fails to act as a significant check on police authority,
in part because of judicial deference to the factual assumptions made by police who seek to
arrest suspects at home. In response to this problem, this Article proposes that the United
States Marshals Service undertake a study of home arrests that would provide courts with the
hard evidence necessary to evaluate police action in Payton cases. Although this data would
not answer the normative question of whether law enforcement needs or privacy interests
should prevail in particular cases, courts would be forced to make their Payton judgments out
in the open without reliance on potentially unwarranted factual assumptions.
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INTRODUCTION
During the last two decades, one of the widest, most influential, and
well-documented philosophical movements in legal academia has been
the resurgence of pragmatism.1 Theorists across the political spectrum
have, in one way or another, endorsed tenets associated with
pragmatism,2 leading some scholars to suggest, perhaps facetiously, that
the pragmatist movement embraces virtually everyone in the legal
1. See generally THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND
CuLTURE (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998) [hereinafter THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS];
Symposium, The Revival of Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1996) [hereinafter The Revival of
Pragmatism]; Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1569 (1990) [hereinafter Renaissance of Pragmatism].
2. Matthew Kramer summarizes three prominent forms of pragmatism as follows:
"Metaphysicar' or "philosophical pragmatism" has been defined as a relativist position which
denies that knowledge can be grounded on absolute foundations. Methodological or intellectual
pragmatism is a position that attaches great importance to lively debate and open-mindedness
and flexibility in the sciences, the humanities and the arts. Political pragmatism is a position
that attaches great importance to civil liberties and to tolerance and to flexible experimentation
in the discussions and institutions that shape the arrangements of human intercourse.
Matthew H. Kramer, The Philosopher-Judge: Some Friendly Criticisms of Richard Posner's
Jurisprudence, 59 MOD. L. REV. 465, 476 (1996); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 227 n.1 (1999) [hereinafter POSNER,
PROBL ATICS] (favorably quoting Kramer's definitions).
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academic community.' Nevertheless, despite the exuberant cries of
pragmatist hegemony, the pragmatist movement has faced several major
difficulties.
First, the meaning of pragmatism is incredibly unclear. Although
pragmatism usually entails some antifoundational or antiformalist
values, it almost seems that each scholar has a different, idiosyncratic
notion of what it means to apply pragmatism to law. Second, the plea of
some pragmatists for courts to utilize social science methodology and
data in legal decisionmaking is problematic. Numerous commentators
have expressed grave doubts whether courts can properly and fruitfully
incorporate non-legal materials into their decisionmaking and whether
law professors are capable of and willing to generate useful social
science information for legal decisionmakers.' Finally, many of legal
academia's most prominent jurisprudential theorists, including Ronald
Dworkin, emphatically claim that legal pragmatism is completely useless
to legal decisionmakersi These theorists argue that empirical inquiry,
however well intentioned, does not relieve judges from making the
normative political, moral, and ethical judgments necessary to resolve
highly charged constitutional debates. a The foregoing bleak landscape
may account for why empirical scholarship, which may be seen in some
cases as a form of "applied pragmatism," has faced significant hurdles
within the legal academy.
This Article will demonstrate how an empirical approach based upon
legal pragmatism can help resolve an important issue in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. By doing so, it advances the cause of
scholars who have called for a more empirical and pragmatic approach
to constitutional criminal procedure adjudication.' In particular, this
Article argues that sound social science should guide judicial review of
police entries into the home made under the authority granted by Payton
3. See Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 409-10 (1990).
4. See infra Parts I.C.1-3.
5. See infra Part I.C.4.
6. See infra notes 135-140 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part I.C.2.
8. See Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and
Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
733, 735 (2000) (calling for "a new generation of criminal procedure jurisprudence... that places
empirical and social scientific evidence at the very heart of constitutional adjudication" and "a
mode of judicial decisionmaking and academic debate that treats social scientific and empirical
assessment as a crucial element in constitutional decisionmaking").
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v. New York,9 which permits police to enter a suspect's residence to
serve an arrest warrant when there is "reason to believe" that the suspect
is at home.'1
Part I of this Article discusses empirical pragmatism as a model for
judicial decisionmaking. The foundation of this methodology will be the
version of legal pragmatism elaborated by Richard A. Posner" in his
provocative book, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory. Part I
will survey both the strengths and weaknesses of utilizing non-legal
materials, especially social science research, to resolve disputed legal
issues.
Part I of this Article provides the first comprehensive review of state
and federal case law applying the Payton rule since Payton was decided
twenty years ago. This discussion will show that courts reviewing police
home entries under Payton routinely engage in potentially unwarranted
conjecture regarding criminal suspects' behavior as part of systemic
deference to law enforcement agents who seek to arrest suspects at
home. This flawed process has led to a regime where courts have almost
never held that an entry into a suspect's residence to serve an arrest
warrant was unconstitutional because the police lacked reason to believe
the suspect was present at the time of entry. In sum, although the
protection of the home from unjustified state intrusion is a core purpose
of the Fourth Amendment and central to the American conception of
personal liberty,"2 it will be demonstrated that the Payton rule, as
applied, potentially fails to act as an effective check on police discretion
9. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
10. Id. at 603.
11. Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and Senior Lecturer, University of
Chicago Lav School.
12. See Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and
Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 588 (1996) ("In contemporary theory, the
home is still the place where the Fourth Amendment provides the most protection for privacy and
liberty."). Cloud's observation does not contradict the statement found in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967), that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," but recognizes, as
the Supreme Court has observed, that "the extent to which the Fourth Amendment protects people
may depend upon where those people are!' Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998); see also
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("'At the very core' of the Fourth Amendment
'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion."') (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)); Wilson
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999) (observing that "[t]he Fourth Amendment embodies [a]
centuries-old principle of respect for privacy of the home.. .") (referring to Senayne's Case, 77
Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1602) and 4 WI.LIAM BLACKSTONE, COmmNTARiES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 223 (1765-1769)).
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and certainly leaves unresolved whether Fourth Amendment rights are
sufficiently protected. 13
Part Ill addresses the rare attempts of courts to give meaning to
Payton's reason to believe language, by comparing it to a better-known
Fourth Amendment concept-probable cause. This Part will analyze the
potential relationship between reason to believe and probable cause,
paying close attention to cases that have applied a probable cause
standard to the question of a suspect's presence at a particular residence.
It will be demonstrated that efforts to understand or define the Payton
standard by comparing it to probable cause are misplaced and further
illustrate the constraints of traditional legal reasoning in this context.
Finally, in Part IV it will be argued that empirical pragmatism
provides a promising start for the resolution of the problems courts have
faced in applying Payton--even if we accept the validity of the
criticisms levied against pragmatism by its prominent critics. This Part
endeavors to demonstrate that judges who apply Payton would be well
served by eschewing the rote application of Payton precedent, and
instead should adopt a pragmatic empirical approach that explicitly
relies upon social-science research. Although empirical study cannot
determine whether police officer entries pursuant to Payton should be
held constitutional, Part IV shows how empirical study can clarify the
normative issues faced by the courts reviewing these police actions. This
process of "transparent adjudication"' 4 permits the courts and society to
get on to the more difficult normative endeavor of determining when
police entry should be permitted under Payton, given the suspects'
interests in privacy and law enforcement needs.
I. EMPIRICAL PRAGMATISM
A. The Pragmatic Movement in Legal Academia
Over the last two decades, one of the most fascinating stories in legal
academia has been the resurgence of "a loosely connected collection of
13. The term "unresolved" is used intentionally in this context. Parts of this Article strongly
suggest that Fourth Amendment rights are being insufficiently protected in many cases. However,
this Article refrains from arriving at a final normative judgment on that score. Rather, the thesis of
this Article is that the decisionmaking process is flawed. See infra Parts II & 11.
14. See generally Meares & Harcourt, supra note 8.
Vol. 77:299, 2002
Posner, Pragmatism, and Payton
antifoundationalist views"15 known as pragmatism.16 Implausibly diverse
groups of scholars-all across the political spectrum-have in one way
or another endorsed pragmatic principles,17 leading to the impression
that the pragmatist movement "arguably encompasses everyone but the
15. Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First Century,
1995 U. IL. L. REV. 163, 167 [hereinafter Farber, Reinventing Brandeis]; see also Kramer, supra
note 2, at 476 (defining metaphysical or philosophical pragmatism as "a relativist position which
denies that knowledge can be grounded on absolute foundations").
16. See generally THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEV ESSAYS, supra note 1; PRAGMATISM IN
LAW & SOcmTY (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991); The Revival of Pragmatism, supra
note 1; The Renaissance of Pragmatism, supra note 1.
17. See Michel Rosenfeld, Pragmatism, Pluralist and Legal Interpretation: Posner and Rorty's
Justice Without Metaphysics Meets Hate Speech, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 97, 99-100 (1996); Brian Z.
Tamanaha, Pragmatism in U.S. Legal Theory: Its Application to Normative Jurisprudence,
Sociolegal Studies, and the Fact-Value Distinction, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 315, 316 (1996) ("Prominent
representatives of the left, center, and right in U.S. legal theory-of critical legal studies, critical
feminism, critical race theory, law and economics, and of the mainstream---scholars who otherwise
hold sharply divergent opinions about law, have begun to assert that pragmatism points the way.")
(footnotes omitted); Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics Movement,
84 GEO. IJ. 2071, 2071-72 (1996):
Although the legal pragmatists are a diverse lot in many respects-embracing a wide variety of
ideologies from neotraditionalism to feminism to critical race theory-they share a general
theoretical perspective that weds Aristotle's concept of practical reason with various aspects of,
among other things, nineteenth-century utilitarianism, American pragmatism and
neopragmatism, and postmodem continental philosophy.
David Luban, Doubts About the New Pragmatism, in LEGAL MODERNISM 125, 125 (1994) (noting
diversity of today's legal pragmatists); Richard Warner, Why Pragmatism? The Puzzling Place of
Pragmatism in Critical Theory, 1993 U. ILL. L REV. 535, 535-36 (observing that "pragmatism's
popularity extends to theorists of various jurisprudential allegiances"); Craig Anthony (Tony)
Arnold, How Do Law Students Really Learn? Problem-Solving, Modem Pragmatism, and Property
Law, 22 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 891, 903 (1999) (reviewing EDWARD H. RABIN & ROBERTA
ROSENTHAL KWALL, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW (3d ed. 1992)) ("The past
two decades have witnessed a revival of intellectual interest in, and even enthusiasm for,
pragmatism. There has been an attempt to envelop many different legal theories, including feminist
jurisprudence, law and economics, and critical theory, into pragmatist thought, or at the very least,
the pragmatist label.") (footnotes omitted); see also Farber, Reinventing Brandeis, supra note 15, at
167-68:
Like most intellectual movements, legal pragmatism is not easy to define. It is part of a loosely
connected collection of antifoundationalist views, a category that includes believers in
Aristotelian practical reason, some feminist theorists, adherents to literary theories such as
hermeneutics and deconstruction, and students of the philosophy of language. Despite earnest
arguments among these groups, it is often unclear whether deep philosophical issues are really
at stake, or whether they are expressing similar perspectives in different vocabularies. Indeed,
the term legal pragmatism has sometimes been used as an umbrella for all of these groups.
(footnotes omitted).
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most rigid of formalists"'" in legal academia. 9
Despite this explosion of academic interest, as a method of
adjudication, pragmatism has generated criticism from those on both the
left and the right of the political spectrum. 20 In addition, the notion that a
philosophical perspective can cover such disparate political interests has
engendered the belief that pragmatism "must be empty of substance."'"
As one scholar summed it up: "pragmatism is a slippery beast-hard to
define and seemingly all things to all people."22
Thus, we are left with an odd predicament. Almost everyone claims to
be a pragmatist. But almost everyone has a different idea of what it
18. See Rosenfeld, supra note 17, at 99-100.
19. See Smith, supra note 3, at 410 ("[I]t seems only a slight exaggeration to suggest that a
movement which five years ago included almost no one today appears to embrace virtually
everyone."); Rosenfeld, supra note 17, at 99-100:
[I]f in philosophy pragmatism regroups such diverse figures as [Charles Sanders] Peirce,
William James, John Dewey, and Richard Rorty, in contemporary American legal theory it
arguably encompasses everyone but the most rigid of formalists. Consistent with this overly
broad sweep, pragmatism would appear to embrace any practical, result-oriented approach, as
opposed to any systemic approach rooted in fundamental principles. In the words of Cornel
West, the "common denominator" of pragmatism amounts to "a future-oriented
instrumentalism that tries to deploy thought as a weapon to enable more effective action."
(quoting CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM
5 (1989)).
20. See Farber, Reinventing Brandeis, supra note 15, at 163-64:
Critics on both the Left and the Right argue that pragmatism is bankrupt as a source of legal
theory. Opponents on the Left consider it a complacent ideology based on facile acceptance of
the status quo. Those on the Right scorn legal pragmatism as unprincipled and incompatible
with the rule of law. Thus legal pragmatism stands accused of being on the one hand tradition-
bound and on the other a source of unrestrained judicial activism.
(footnotes omitted).
21. Tamanaha, supra note 17, at 316 ("The most revealing aspect about this rush to pragmatism
is precisely the fact that it can accommodate such divergent positions. Anything which appeals to
the entire spectrum of political views must be empty of substance."); see also Farber, Reinventing
Brandeis, supra note 15, at 167-68; Rosenfeld, supra note 17, at 99-100 (observing that
"pragmatism radiates so far over the philosophical and legal landscape as to risk becoming devoid
of any determinate meaning").
22. Susan M. Wolf, Shifting Paradigms in Bioethics and Health Law: The Rise of a New
Pragmatism, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 398 (1994). An additional complication is that pragmatism
has many forms. Take for example, Michel Rosenfeld's astonishing article where he mentions, in
turn, pragmatism, comprehensive pragmatism, mere pragmatism, intermediate pragmatism,
philosophical pragmatism, legal pragmatism, mere legal pragmatism, scientific pragmatism,
pragmatic skepticism, neopragmatism, critical pragmatism, and constructive pragmatism. See
Rosenfeld, supra note 17.
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means to apply pragmatism to law.' Even more disturbing is the vague
sense, ever present under the surface of these discussions, that there is
no such thing as legal pragmatism.24 To avoid this definitional quagmire,
we shall investigate the value of pragmatism by utilizing the writings of




Richard A. Posner, the Chief Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, has gained respect for his contributions
to the law as both a scholar and as a federal appellate judge. One need
not endorse the view that Judge Posner was "the most extraordinary
academic lawyer" of the second half of the twentieth century26 or
consider him to be a personal hero27 to accept Posner's importance in the
legal community. It is enough to note that Posner is an influential and
23. See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory,
41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 208 (1993) ("Legal pragmatism has not been, and cannot be defined
precisely in a simple maxim. Disagreement even exists about the appropriate label for the body of
ideas comprising pragmatism theory.") (footnotes omitted).
24. See Smith, supra note 3, at 410 ("What exactly is legal pragmatism? This preliminary
question is particularly troublesome because there is an emerging suspicion that if we look too
closely for legal pragmatism, we might not find anything-or at least not anything worth
discussing.").
25. See Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation Matter? A Case Study, 94 Nw.
U. L REv. 1409, 1414 (2000) (referring to Posner as "the leading judicial advocate of legal
pragmatism").
26. Laura Kalman, Eating Spaghetti with a Spoon, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1574 (1997)
(reviewing NEIL DUXBURY, PATERNS OFAMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)).
27. As one scholar exuberantly proclaimed:
Richard Posner is one of my heroes. I mean, the guy has written 23 books, he's Chief Judge on
the prestigious 7th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, he was one of the most famous law professors
at the University of Chicago, and if he didn't invent it, he certainly did more to popularize law
and economics than any man alive. Perhaps it does not go too far to say that most late twentieth
century legal scholarship is really a dialogue with Posner, who has taken on virtually every
trendy theory in the legal academy, and found it wanting.
Stephen B. Presser, The Ordinary, the Exceptional, the Corrupt, and the Moral: What DID the
Impeachment of Bill Clinton Mean for America and Americans?, 17 CONS?. COMMENT. 149, 149
(2000) (book review of RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION,
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON (1999) [hereinafter POSNER, AFFAIR OF STATE]).
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extraordinarily prolific scholar, perhaps best known as the de facto dean
of the law and economics movement in the United States. He is also
considered by many to be a brilliant jurist, having served on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit since his appointment to the
bench by President Reagan in 1981.28
The publication of Posner's book, The Problematics of Moral and
Legal Theory,29 reflected the culmination of his academic writings and
lectures over the past decade on two related major themes. The first
theme is an extraordinarily intense' criticism of moral theory3 and,
more particularly, the application of moral theory to law.32
28. See Peter Berkowitz, Reduction and Betrayal, TE NEW REPUBInc, Aug. 23, 1999, at 38
(noting Posner's "staggering' output and "his reputation as perhaps the leading legal thinker of his
generation"); Rosenfeld, supra note 17, at 110 ("[Posner] is the preeminent exponent of the law and
economics school, and is one of the leading federal judges in the United States."); Sanford
Levinson, Strolling Down the Path of the Law (and Toward Critical Legal Studies?): The
Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1221, 1221-22 (1991) (book review of
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURIRUDENCE (1990)) (describing Posner's significance
within the legal academy and beyond).
29. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2. To avoid confusion, it should be noted that Posner
also published an article with the same title. See Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and
Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1638 (1998) (expanded version of Holmes lectures delivered at
Harvard Law School in October 1997). Posner's book, however, encompasses more than those two
lectures. See PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2, at vii. References to "PROBLEMATICS" will be to the
book. When necessary, the article will be cited to in full.
30. See A Case Too Far, THE ECONOMIST, at 8, Sept. 18, 1999 ("[T]he first part of this book
[PROBLEMATICS] is a near hysterical attack on Ronald Dworkin:'); Anthony J. Sebok, The
Flattening of Reason, Jurist: Books on Law, Oct. 1999, v.2, n.8, available at http:/wwv.
jurist.law.pitt.edu/lawbooks/revoct99.htm (book review of POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2)
(noting that Posner's "infamous Harvard Law Review article," which "mocked not only moral
philosophy, but a large number of its leading practitioners.... elicited responses from parties
offended by its tone and content, and for a while it caused a stir"); see also Ronald Dworkin,
Darwin's New Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1718 (1998) [hereinafter Dworkin, Darwin's New
Bulldog] ("Posner's Lectures are characteristically entertaining, hasty, picaresque, and punchy.
They are packed with a great variety of relevant and irrelevant excursions, references, and insults.").
The lively and enlightening jurisprudential debate between Posner and Dworkin later turned nasty.
Dworkin accused Posner of arguably violating the Code of Judicial Conduct by writing a book on
President Clinton's impeachment. See Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy and Monica Lewinsky, N.Y.
REv. OF BOOKS, Mar. 9, 2000, at 48-49 (book review of POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2, and
POSNER, AFFAIR OF STATE, supra note 27). Posner responded angrily by suggesting that it was
unethical for Dworkin to review a book written by his "enemy." See Neil A. Lewis, Watching 2
Legal Minds Square Off Over Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2000, at B9; see also Steven Lubet,
Ethics Clash of Two Giants, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 3, 2000, at A22. Posner summed up his relationship
with Dworkin as follows:
I have for many years now in books and articles been challenging Dworkin's pretensions as a
constitutional scholar and public intellectual, though I have been respectful of his contributions
to jurisprudence. He cannot help regarding me as an intellectual enemy and treating me
accordingly. Most journals don't give books to the authors' enemies to review, especially if the
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Posner's second theme is primarily33 constructive, rather than critical.
Posner has vigorously advocated utilizing a form of legal pragmatism, or
pragmatic adjudication,34 to resolve contested questions of federal or
constitutional law.3 In so doing, Posner has become the foremost
judicial and scholarly advocate of the application of pragmatism to law.
"enemy" is a principal target of criticism in the very book that he is being asked to review. If
scrupulous, a person asked to review an enemy's book turns down the invitation or, at the very
least, is "up front' about his relationship with the author. Dworkin's review acknowledges that
PROBLEMATICS criticizes him, but it does so in a flippant way that conceals the twenty years of
mutual intellectual enmity, punctuated by increasingly acrimonious exchanges, that has defined
our relationship.
Richard A. Posner, Dworking, Polemics, and the Clinton Impeachment Controversy, 94 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1023, 1032 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
31. For our purposes, it is not necessary to get into the particular types of moral theory that
Posner finds objectionable, or bow moral theory can be broken down into other sub-categories. See
POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2, at 5 ("My particular target is the branch of moral theory I
shall call 'academic moralism."'); see also Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, supra note 30, at 1721
n.11 (expressing difficulty understanding Posner's usage of "metaphysics," "moral realism," and
"right answers"); Richard A. Posner, On the Alleged 'Sophistication' of Academic Moralism, 94
NW. U. L. REV. 1017, 1017-18 (2000) (further explaining his meaning of "academic moralism");
Brian E. Butler, Posner's Problem with Moral Philosophy, 7 U. CHI. L SCH. ROUNDTABLE 325,
330 (2000) (referring to Posner's version of "moral philosophy" as a caricature to which no one
subscribes) (book review of PROBLEMATICS).
32. The critical aspects of Posner's work-his vigorous and spirited attacks on his philosophical
opponents-have engaged him in a debate with some of the nation's most prominent scholars and
jurists. See Charles Fried, Philosophy Matters, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1739, 1739 (1998); Anthony T.
Kronman, The Value of Moral Philosophy, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1751 (1998); John T. Noonan, Jr.,
Posner's Problematics, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1768 (1998); Martha C. Nussbaum, Still Worthy of
Praise,. 111 HARV. L REV. 1776 (1998); Richard A. Posner, Reply to the Critics of "The
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory," 111 HARV. L. REV. 1796, 1796 (1998) (praising critics
of his lectures). This Article will not address Posner's criticisms of moral philosophy. For two in-
depth analyses of Posner's critique of academic moralism, see Ryan Fortson, Other Rising Legal
Issues: Problems with Richard Posner's The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 27 WM.
MITcHELL L REV. 2345, 2349-59 (2001), and Laura Carrier, Note, Making Moral Theory Work for
Law, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1018, 1021-30 (1999); see also Butler, supra note 31, at 325-33.
33. "Primarily," because Posner's advocacy of pragmatism often contains elements of criticism
regarding non-pragmatic approaches.
34. Posner's version of pragmatism will be referred to herein as pragmatic adjudication,
Posnerian pragmatism, or empirical pragmatism. See Daniel A. Farber, Shocking the Conscience:
Pragmatism, Moral Reasoning, and the Judiciary, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 675, 682 (1999) (book
review of POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2) (using term "Posnerian pragmatism").
35. See, e.g., Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, supra note 29; Richard A.
Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998) (revised text of the James
Madison Lecture on Constitutional Law at New York University School of Law); Richard A.
Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1996) (adapted from presentation at "The
Revival of Pragmatism" Symposium); Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63
S. CAL. L REV. 1653 (1990) (from Renaissance of Pragmatism, supra note 1); see also RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 387-405 (1995). Posner recently renewed his call for pragmatic
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2. Identifying the Elements of Posner's Empirical Pragmatism
In Problematics, Posner initially defines his pragmatism in two ways:
negatively36 and by example.37 First, he strenuously articulates what his
pragmatism does not embody. Most notably, Posner' s pragmatism is not:
(1) philosophical pragmatism38 (although philosophical and legal
pragmatism may be related39); (2) judicial positivism;0 (3) academic
adjudication against the backdrop of the 2000 presidential election. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS 169-75,
185-89 (2001) [hereinafter POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK]. This Article focuses on
PROBLEMATICS because it reflects Posner's deepest and most sustained treatment of his version of
pragmatism.
36. One scholar has observed that pragmatism's tendency for defining itself negatively is not
unique. See Farber, Reinventing Brandeis, supra note 15, at 168 ("As with many intellectual
movements, pragmatism is partly defined in opposition to other views."); see also Cloud, supra note
23, at 214 ("[P]ragmatists frequently do not define their theory solely on its own terms. Pragmatism
often takes a form most clearly when used to criticize another theory, particularly one asserting
some absolute foundational theory or value."); Catharine Pierce Wells, Pragmatism, Feminism, and
the Problem of Bad Coherence, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1645, 1648 (1995) (book review of MARGARET
JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993)) ("It is sometimes easier to describe what
pragmatism rejects than to identify its affirmative claims.").
37. More recently, Posner has proffered a more concrete description of pragmatism.
All that pragmatic adjudication need mean, however-all that I mean by it-is adjudication
guided by a comparison of the consequences of alternative resolutions of the case rather than by
an algorithm intended to lead the judges by a logical or otherwise formal process to the One
Correct Decision, utilizing only the canonical materials of judicial decision making, such as
statutory or constitutional text and previous judicial opinions. The pragmatist does not believe
that there is or should be any such algorithm. He regards adjudication, especially constitutional
adjudication, as a practical tool of social ordering and believes therefore that the decision that
has the better consequences for society is the one to be preferred.
POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK, supra note 35, at 186.
38. See Posner, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2, at 227-28.
39. Several authors have explored the relationship between philosophical pragmatism and legal
pragmatism. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism?, 18 CARDOzO L. REV.
21, 42 (1996) ("[Llegal pragmatism can and should stand free from the philosophical commitments
that are generally understood to define pragmatism today, and from philosophically comprehensive
views more generally."); David Luban, What's Pragmatic About Legal Pragmatism?, 18 CARDOzO
L. REV. 43, 72 (1996) (expressing doubts that legal pragmatism can be "freestanding" from
philosophical pragmatism); Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 35, at 20 ("Philosophical
pragmatism does not dictate legal pragmatism or any other jurisprudential stance. But it may play a
paternal and enabling role in relation to pragmatic theories of law .... ); Rosenfeld, supra note 17,
at 103-10; see also BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 229 (1999) (describing the
relationship between philosophical and legal pragmatism as "loose, and at times no more than a
family resemblance"); Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV.
593, 596 (1999) (contrasting different forms of legal and philosophical pragmatism); Kramer, supra
note 2, at 478 (arguing that although philosophical pragmatism-as a doctrine about the status of
truth-may be consistent with methodological pragmatism, each form of pragmatism still remains
logically independent); Gene R. Shreve, Rhetoric, Pragmatism and the Interdisciplinary Turn in
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moralism, which Posner skewers in the first half of his book;4' and (4)
current Supreme Court jurisprudence,42 as exemplified by two Equal
Protection clause cases: United States v. Virginia43 and Romer v.
Colorado.4
Second, Posner provides examples of legal pragmatism at work. He
discusses how pragmatism has been already applied successfully by
academics in the cases of antitrust 45 and administrative law46 and
provides concrete examples of how a pragmatist judge would approach
several contested questions of federal or constitutional law. 7 In each
case, Posner attempts to contrast pragmatic and formalist approaches to
these issues. The primary lesson that Posner imparts is that the
pragmatist judge in each case takes into account the factual bases and the
effects or consequences48 of a particular judicial approach, while the
Legal Criticism-A Study of Altruistic Judicial Argument, 46 AM. J. CoMP. L. 41, 57 (1998) ("The
philosophical community has never arrived at a settled definition of 'pragmatism.' Nor have legal
scholars been able to agree what they mean when they appropriate pragmatism. Nor have scholars
been able to agree whether or how pragmatism in legal theory differs from philosophical
pragmatism.") (footnotes omitted); Arnold, supra note 17, at 903 (observing that "scholars have
distinguished between legal pragmatism-pragmatic legal analysis and adjudication-and
philosophical pragmatism-an antifoundational philosophical perspective").
40. See POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2, at 241.
41. See id. chs. 1&2.
42. See id. at 165-82. Posner's discussion of United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)
("V.M.L"), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), is infused with criticism that the Court's
jurisprudence is insufficiently empirically grounded and ignorant of "the social realities behind the
issues with which judges grapple." POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2, at 164. Thus, the
V.M.L/Romer section of PROBLemTICS complements Posner's examples of how pragmatism would
work in practice.
43. 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that the Commonwealth of Virginia violated the equal
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment by excluding female students from the Virginia
Military Institute, a public institution of higher education).
44. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down as unconstitutional, under the Equal Protection clause of
the U.S. Constitution, an amendment to the Colorado State Constitution that prohibited any branch
of the state government from providing legal protection to homosexuals).
45. See POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2, at 228-29.
46. See id. at 229-39.
47. Posner uses the following examples: (1) hypothetical jurisdiction, id. at 243-44; (2)
prospective overruling, id. at 244; (3) the Swift and Erie doctrines, id. at 245-46; (4) oil and gas
law, id. at 246-47; (5) surrogate motherhood contracts, id. at 247; and (6) homosexual marriage, id.
at 249-52.
48. This is why Posner is sometimes referred to as a "consequentialist." See, e.g., Louis Kaplow
& Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARv. L. REV. 961, 1020 n.114 (2001) (stating
that "Posner clearly endorses consequentialism"). Jeremy Waldron points out that Posner denies this
characterization. See Jeremy Waldron, Ego Bloated Hovel, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 597, 601 (2000)
(book review of POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2)).
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formalist judge is unconcerned with the potential costs-administrative
and otherwise-of his or her decisions. For example, in the case of
homosexual marriage, Posner argues that courts should be reticent to
recognize a federal constitutional right to homosexual marriage because
"[i]ts moorings in text, precedent, public policy, and public opinion
would be too tenuous to rally even minimum public support., 49 In
Posner's estimation, when the Supreme Court determines whether to
create a new constitutional right, part of the calculus should involve an
examination of the likely social or political reaction to the Court's
decision." Thus, Posner seems to argue that those in favor of extending
constitutional laws by judicial fiat bear a high burden of proving that the
decision is prudent. Therefore, Posner's argument rests on the proper
allocation of burdens of proof in the constitutional realm."
Posner rarely affirmatively describes the elements of his version of
pragmatism in Problematics,52 although, from the perspective of
adjudication,53 we can say that the pragmatist judge: 4
49. See POSNER, PROBLEMATICS supra note 2, at 249.
50. See id. at 250-51.
51. But see Deborah Jones Merritt, Constitutional Fact and Theory: A Response to Chief Judge
Posner, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1287, 1287-91 (1999) (arguing that Posner's critique of V.M.L is not
empirically based, but rather rests on a competing theory of equal protection jurisprudence);
Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REv. 4, 52 n.266
(1998) (criticizing Posner's "unabashedly utilitarian" analysis of V.M.L for giving "no weight at all
to the right of women to be free from sex discrimination").
52. This is not a criticism of Posner; difficulties defining pragmatism are connected to its very
nature. See Blake D. Morant, The Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Contract Theory:
An Intriguing Comparison, 50 ALA. L. REV. 63, 103 n.229 (1998) ("Pragmatism can be more
feasibly described than defined. It stresses faith in the need for community and seeks to supplant the
formalist conception of rules with more realistic interpretive practices. Pragmatist goals include the
fostering of some degree of social progress.").
However, Jeremy Waldron claims that "Posner's writing-like that of almost all self-styled
pragmatists-turns slippery and evasive (by analytical standards) when the time comes to explain
what 'pragmatism' amounts to." Waldron, supra note 48, at 600.
53. Discussing Posnerian pragmatism from the perspective of adjudication, or what a judge might
do in a particular situation, leaves open the possibility that pragmatism might mean something
different to another player in the legal system. For example, a pragmatic law professor might suggest
a solution to a legal dilemma, but a pragmatic judge might decline to implement the professor's
suggestion (pragmatic though it might be), given the judge's societal role. The potential cognitive
dissonance caused by a pragmatist deciding not to do something "pragmatic" for pragmatic reasons
will not be resolved here. See POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2, at 241 (explaining that a "rule
pragmatist" might think that the best results, system-wide, might be achieved if "judges did not
make pragmatic judgments but simply applied rules"); see also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC
Soclo-LEGAL THEORY 37 (1997) (explaining that a pragmatist might support some level of
formalism to serve the interests of a well-functioning system).
54. Elements two, three and four are arguably different facets of the same point.
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1. Demonstrates respect for, but not blind adherence to,
precedent;"
2. Is willing to look outside of traditional legal resources for
guidance in resolving truly novel or difficult cases;
56
3. Uses non-legal methods or information derived from
"economics, statistics, game theory, cognitive psychology,
political science, sociology, decision theory, and related
disciplines,"57 to resolve legal questions;
4. Seeks guidance from empirical research (hopefully
conducted by invigorated law professors59) to assist with
resolving legal issues;"0
5. Attempts to come up with a "decision that will be best with
regard to present and future needs;,,61
55. On precedent, Posner writes:
[The judicial pragmatist] wants to come up with the decision that will be best with regard to
present and future needs. He is not uninterested in past decisions, in statutes, and so forth. Far
from it. For one thing, these are repositories of knowledge, even, sometimes, of wisdom; so it
would be folly to ignore them even if they had no authoritative significance. For another, a
decision that destabilized the law by departing too abruptly from precedent might on balance
have bad consequences.
POSNER, PROBMATICS, supra note 2, at 242; see also Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency,
Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHi. L. REV.
573, 593 (2000) ("The pragmatic judge uses history as a resource, but does not venerate the past or
believe that it ought to have a 'special power' over the present.").
56. See POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2, at 242 (explaining that a pragmatist judge does
not depend on "precedent, statutes, and constitutional text!' to supply the rule of decision in a truly
novel case, but instead "looks to sources that bear directly on the wisdom of the rule he is being
asked to adopt or modify").
57. Id at 211. This Article expresses no opinion on whether game and decision theory are
empirical.
58. Posner recently published a book that builds upon the philosophical perspective enunciated in
PROBLEMATICS and explores the value of using various interdisciplinary approaches to resolve legal
problems. See RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY (2001) (including sections on
economics, history, psychology, epistemology, and empiricism).
59. See POSNER, PROBLMATICS, supra note 2, at 247 (observing that judges will have difficulty
assuming the pragmatist mantle "until changes in legal education and practice make law a more
richly theoretical and empirical, and less formal and casuistic, field").
60. See id. at xiii, 164, 216, 226; see also id at 213-17 (describing "incontestably valuable"
contributions by sociologists of law).
61. Id. at 242 (emphasis added); see also id. at 249 ("A pragmatist will be guided in this
decisionmaking process by the goal of making the choice that will produce the best results.").
I leave open the criteria for the "best results" for which the pragmatic judge is striving, except
that, pace Dworkin, they are not simply what is best for the particular case without regard for
the implications for other cases. Pragmatism will not tell us what is best; but provided there is a
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6. Is willing to rely upon intuition to arrive at a decision when
neither traditional legal materials nor extralegal research or
methods suggest the proper outcome;
62
7. Does not "look to God or other transcendental sources of
moral principle.
' 63
Posnerian pragmatism thus scorns grand moral theory and formalism,
and instead advocates fact gathering and empirical analysis in support of
Posner's general principle that "the only sound basis for a legal rule is its
social advantage, which requires an economic judgment, balancing
benefits against costs."' As David Luban explains:
fair degree of value consensus among the judges, as I think there is, it can help judges seek the
best results unhampered by philosophical doubts.
Id. at 262. The problem with utilizing a standard based on what is "best' is discussed infra Part
I.C.4.
62. Id. at 256-57. Posner's endorsement of judicial intuition is closely linked to his support of the
"outrage" school of constitutional interpretation, whose judicial practitioners, Posner asserts,
included Justices Holmes, Cardozo, Frankfurter, and the second Harlan. Id. at 147.
The school of outrage holds that for a court to be justified in stymieing the elected branches of
government, it isn't enough that the litigant claiming a constitutional right has the better
argument; it has to be a lot better. The violation of the Constitution has to be morally certain
([James Bradley] Thayer's position), or stomach turning (Holmes's 'puke' test), or shocking to
the conscience (Frankfurter's test) or the sort of thing no reasonable person could defend.
Id. Posner, however, readily acknowledges: "[I] cannot pretend that outrage or even self-restraint
furnishes much in the way of guidance to courts grappling with difficult issues.... I am also
mindful that one person's outrage is another's ecstasy." Id. at 148.
63. Id. at 256.
64. Id. at 208. Some authors have surmised that Posner's philosophy may have changed since
adopting the mantle of pragmatism. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional
Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535, 564 (1999).
In some writings [Posner] has championed the position that judges should so decide cases as to
promote wealth maximization. In his methodologically pragmatist work, however, Judge Posner
has argued much more abstractly that judges should decide cases in whatever way will be best
for the future... he specifically puts to one side the question of the criteria by which to
measure what would count as "best."..... Methodological pragmatism, then, is a theory distinct
from "wealth maximization" or from theories advancing other substantive claims under the
"pragmatist" mantle. It consists in the bracing, distinctly methodological, starkly negative claim
that judges are not bound by methodological rules.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, supra note 30, at 1735 (asserting
that Posner seems to have renounced community wealth maximization as a substantive societal goal,
without offering a "substitute account of proper social goals").
However, other scholars remain unconvinced. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Midas Touch: The
Lethal Effect of Wealth Maximization, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 687, 703 n.61 (observing that although
Posner has shifted towards using economic analysis as a tool of pragmatic reasoning, he still
supports a theory of wealth maximization and has not redefined his concept of wealth).
Posner, Pragmatism, and Payton
Posner's argument is this: Decisions at law, judicial or otherwise,
must be based on a realistic, empirically informed, unsentimental,
preferably quantitative comparison of costs and benefits (not
limited to monetary costs and benefits, however). Legal decisions
should aim at the public's well-being; doctrinal integrity or
intellectual elegance are desirable only if they contribute to that
well-being.6'
The antagonistic relationship between Posner's pragmatism and
formalism is crucial.66 In an earlier article on pragmatism, Posner
explained: "Legal formalism is the idea that legal questions can be
answered by inquiry into the relation between concepts and hence
without need for more than a superficial examination of their relation to
the world of fact. It is, therefore, anti-pragmatic as well as anti-
empirical."67 We thus see that Posner endorses empiricism as an
One should not be misled... by Posner's affirmation of pragmatism or by his new enthusiasm
for sociology. His interpretation of morality has not changed.... As always, he strives to
vindicate the economic analysis of law: his pragmatism affirms economics as the master
science, and his sociology provides some of the factual knowledge that economics
authoritatively interprets.
Berkowitz, supra note 28, at 41. For a less critical, but skeptical view, see BIX, supra note 39, at
230 (observing that "one would imagine that a devoted pragmatist would be more willing to look to
sources and resources other than economics more frequently than Posner seems to do"); see also
Butler, supra note 31, at 342 (explaining that the "blandness" of Posner's call for judges to do what
is best raises the "suspicion that Posner's pragmatism, like many other pragmatisms of the past and
present, serves only as a mask to cover an underlying set of substantive values").
65. David Luban, The Posner Variations (Twenty-Seven Variations on a Theme by Holmes), 48
STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (1996) (book review of POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 35).
66. We must keep in mind, of course, that other scholars may have a different take on formalism.
See DIJBURY, supra note 26, at 1 ('Terms like 'formalism' and 'realism' are rarely used in an
homogenous fashion: every expositor of American jurisprudence seems to have his or her ovm
personal slant on what these and other terms signify.").
67. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, supra note 35, at 1663-64.
68. A useful definition of empirical approaches can be found in Laurens Walker & John
Monahan, Daubert and the Reference Manual: An Essay on the Future of Science in Law, 82 VA.
L REV. 837, 848 (1996) [hereinafter Walker & Monahan, Daubert] ("An empirical approach is
often contrasted with a 'rational' one. A rational approach 'rests on the belief that people can
understand through reason and intuition alone.' An empirical approach, in contrast, 'begins with the
assumption that direct observation and experience provide the only firm basis for understanding
nature."') (footnotes omitted) (quoting JOHN M. NEALE & ROBERT M. LIEBERT, SCIENCE AND
BEHAVIOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO METHODS OF RESEARCH 2 (2d ed. 1980)); see also Roger M.
Young, Using Social Science to Assess the Need for Jury Reform in South Carolina, 52 S.C. L.
REV. 135, 152 (2000) ("Empiricism is a way of knowing or understanding the world that relies
directly or indirectly on what we experience through our senses .... In other words information or
data are acceptable in science only insofar as they can be observed or 'sensed' in some way ..
(quoting SELLrrZ ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL RELATIONS 22 (3d ed. 1976)).
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antidote to formalism, because once decisionmakers commit to looking
at the real world, they have rejected the confining universe of legal
concepts and theories.69 Thus, pragmatism's greatest strength is often
perceived as its robust role as a tool for criticizing formalist legal
reasoning.7"
If one places to the side his attacks on moral philosophers, Posner's
main prescription-a call for increased use of social science and
empirically-based theories to assist with the resolution of legal
problems-fits well within the mainstream of American legal thought.7
Beginning with the Legal Realists in the early part of the twentieth
century,7 and culminating with the interdisciplinary Law and Society
73
69. See Farber, supra note 25, at 1415 (noting that Posner's approach would be "heresy to
formalists"). Farber cites as an example Posner's statement that "a pragmatist judge would not
stomach a sentence of life without parole to a sixteen-year-old who sold a single marijuana
cigarette." Id. (citing POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2, at 258).
70. Some scholars have expressed doubt over the extent to which the type of formalism Posner
refers to ever reigned supreme. See Cloud, supra note 23, at 218-19 ("[Within the American legal
system today ideas about formalism are more likely to derive from a familiarity with the pragmatist
critique of formalism than from reading either the original works of scholars like Langdell and
Beale, or the judicial opinions of the formalist era.") (footnotes omitted); Ronald Dworkin,
Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True Banality, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW & SOCIETY, supra note 16,
at 368 (opining that battle against formalism, as defined by pragmatists, was "a famous victory over
straw persons"); Linda Ross Meyer, Is Practical Reason Mindless?, 86 GEO. L.J. 647, 649 (1998)
("[The 'formalist' account of legal reasoning-a syllogistic application of rules requiring no
discretion and only rudimentary rational ability-has become a straw man, never defended and
often abused."); Smith, supra note 3, at 428 (arguing that Posner is attacking "a straw man
formalism that no one actually advocates"); see also Butler, supra note 31, at 337 ("A caricature of
past legal thinkers as believing in law as a deductive science is put forward in order to create an easy
target to show off our analytical skills and progression toward real informed and enlightened
positions."). But see Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH.
L. REv. 1835, 1861-62 (1988) (asserting that formalism never truly died in the judiciary, despite its
repudiation by legal scholars, but that rather, judges have retained formalist analysis as a
"framework for legal reasoning, while modifying it in order to achieve normatively acceptable
results").
71. See Patricia Ewick et al., Legacies of Legal Realism: Social Science, Social Policy, and the
Law, in SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY AND THE LAW 1-9 (Patricia Ewick et al. eds., 1999) ("The
dream of enlisting social science in efforts to understand law and inform legal policy is not new.")
(tracing lineage of legal realism and law and society movements).
72. The connection between legal realism and latter "movements" such as Law and Society and
Law and Economics is obviously rather complex. See DUXBURY, supra note 26, at 301-02:
American legal theorists have hardly been hesitant to discern some sort of relationship between
legal realism and the emergence of economic analysis as a distinctive form of interdisciplinary
legal study. Yet the nature of this relationship remains unclear.... In modem American
jurisprudence, it appears, law and economics simultaneously represents realism fulfilled and
realism thwarted.
316
Posner, Pragmatism, and Payton
and Law and Economics movements74 of the latter part of the twentieth
century,75 legal scholars have often implored the courts and other
scholars to look outside of the realm of legal doctrine and case law to
find the most beneficial7 6 solutions to legal dilemmas. And since 1908,
when Louis Brandeis filed a brief in Muller v. Oregon7 7 filled with social
science data78 (the type of brief that now bears his name79), courts have
recognized the legitimacy of considering such extra-legal authority. 0
Posner's call for increased reliance on social science materials (if not
his harsh criticisms of moral theorists) thus seems rather tame. In fact,
many prominent constitutional law and criminal procedure scholars have
called for such an approach, even if not under the banner of pragmatism
73. The primary thrust of proponents in the Law and Society movement has been the use of the
social sciences to study the American legal system and its participants from an outsider's
perspective. See STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., LAW AND SOCIETY: READINGS ON THE SOCIAL
STUDY OFTmE LAW 1-8 (1995); see also JoHN MONAHAN &LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN
LAW, at v (4th ed. 1998) (contrasting, without criticism, Monahan and Walker's inside perspective
on the relationship of social science and the law with the law and society approach).
74. See Daniel T. Ostas, Postmodern Economic Analysis of Law: Extending the Pragmatic
Visions of Richard A. Posner, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 193, 202 (1998) (contending that economic analysis
of law "has a direct and obvious lineage to progressive realism"). But see POSNER, OVERCOMING
LAW, supra note 35, at 3 ("qhe law and economics movement owes little to legal realism ... ").
75. For an excellent collection of articles on the relationship between these two movements, see
Symposium, Law and Society & Law and Economics, Common Ground and Irreconcilable
Differences, New Directions, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 375. See also Marc Galanter & Mark Alan
Edwards, Introduction: The Path of the Law Ands, 1997 WIs. L. REV. 375, 376-78 (explaining
features common to the Law and Society and Law and Economics schools of thought, including the
desire to use science of differing types to uncover facts that can inform legal decisionmaking).
76. This is obviously a loaded term. For a discussion of the difficulties with determining the
"best" solutions to a problem, see infra notes 135-144 and accompanying text.
77. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
78. The quality of Brandeis's data seems suspect in retrospect. See MONAHAN & WALKER, supra
note 73, at 8 (noting that, "ironically," although his brief in Muller v. Oregon ushered in the era of
social science in U.S. courts, Brandeis's social science methods would not be considered as valid
social science today); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social
Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L REV. 91, 106 (1993) (acknowledging that
Brandeis's brief "was a brilliant break with the formalist tradition and had a significant impact on
legal thought," but arguing that it "would be assessed harshly as junk social science by today's
standards").
79. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 21 FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 5102
("[I]t is still common to refer to a brief which contains factual data as a 'Brandeis brief.'); Ellie
Margolis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in Appellate Briefs, 34
U.S.F. L REV. 197, 199 n.12 (2000) (explaining genesis of the term "Brandeis brief").




or any specific philosophical school.8 One might wonder why those in
the business of resolving thorny societal disputes82 should not attempt to
learn as much about the factual background of the disputes and the
potential consequences of their decisionsY Who could object to well-
informed decisionmakers? We now turn to potential problems.
C. Problems with Empirical Pragmatism
There are two major classes of problems with the empirical-pragmatic
approach endorsed by Posner. The first class of problems concerns the
efficacy of utilizing specific social science methods to assist with
analyzing or resolving legal issues. 84 We might say that these are
problems with the "empirical" side of empirical pragmatism. These
related problems include whether (1) empirical data can capture the legal
or social phenomena to be analyzed; (2) professors can generate the
empirical data necessary to aid judges in making legal determinations;
and (3) judges can understand and apply empirical data. Thus, the first
class of problems is concerned with the availability, quality, and
practical utility of empirical data.
The second class of problems is less concerned with the efficacy of
particular social science methods, but more broadly questions whether
pragmatism can help resolve highly charged constitutional dilemmas.
This argument therefore is not an objection to the quality of the data or
the ability of judges to understand the data. Rather, it is a global
condemnation of the uselessness of "facts," however accurate, in
resolving fundamental disagreements over legal, moral, or political
issues.
81. See Meares & Harcourt, supra note 8, at 742-44 (noting different groups of commentators
from varying philosophical perspectives who have called for increased attention to social science
research in constitutional decisionmaking).
82. For the moment, this blurring of the distinctions between judges, legislators, and executive
branch officers by referring to them together as "decisionmakers" is intentional.
83. See Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the
Academy and Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 347, 349-50 (1995) ("Judges, legislators, and
practitioners want to know, and in fact, should know, the societal effects of their decisions and
actions.") (footnotes omitted).
84. A leading casebook on utilizing social science methodologies in the law is MONAHAN &
WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 73, which both explains and differentiates the
different contexts and purposes for using social science in law and serves as an excellent
introduction to the voluminous literature in the field. A representative collection of essays on social
science and the law can be found in SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE LAW, supra note 71.
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1. Data Failure: Whether Social Science Data Can Adequately
Capture the Legal and Social Phenomena To Be Studied
The first complaint about the use of empirical methods is that these
approaches may fail to adequately capture the complexity of the
phenomena being analyzed,85 either because the research on the
phenomena is nonexistent or immature,86 or because the legal or social
phenomena contain elements that elude quantification. There is
obviously some validity to the complaint that a decision, legal or
otherwise, based on poor data is intrinsically unreliable.88
85. To the extent that this complaint asserts that social science studies are insufficiently
descriptive, this objection is related to the natural limits of theory, a point that Posner has
persuasively refuted:
[A]n economic theory of law will not capture the full complexity, richness, and confusion of the
phenomena--criminal or judicial or marital or whatever-that it seeks to illuminate. But its
lack of realism in the sense of descriptive completeness, far from invalidating the theory, is a
precondition of theory. A theory that sought faithfully to reproduce the complexity of the
empirical world in its assumptions would not be a theory-an explanation-but a description.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.3, at 18 (5th ed. 1998).
86. See POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2, at 256 (observing that because judges often must
make decisions prior to the creation of "any body of organized knowledge to turn to for help" they
must rely on their intuitions); id. at 255 ("Cases do not wait upon the accumulation of a critical
mass of social scientific knowledge that will enable the properly advised judge to arrive at the
decision that will have the best results.").
87. Faigman states:
Many legal scholars will respond by insisting that human behavior in areas such as domestic
violence, rape, and child sexual abuse is 'impossible' to study given the contexts involved.
After all, in contrast to DNA, we obviously cannot carry out controlled experiments on such
phenomena. This reaction, however, not only shows the lack of scientific imagination of the
speakers but also is a testament to the lack of scientific training of most legal scholars. A
science is not defined as such by virtue of its ability to be studied in controlled experiments. If
that were the case, most areas of biology, chemistry, and physics would not qualify. Part of a
sophisticated understanding of science includes a complex appreciation of the difficulties of the
subject.
David L Faigman, The Syndromic Lawyer Syndrome: A Psychological Theory of Evidentiary
Munificence, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 817, 820 (1996) [hereinafter Faigman, Syndrome] (footnote
omitted); see also David L. Faigman, The Evidentiary Status of Social Science Under Daubert: Is It
"Scientific, " "Technical, " or "Other" Knowledge?, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 960, 963 (1995)
[hereinafter Faigman, Evidentiary Status] (noting that "many of the factual questions the law raises
about human behavior are examples of complex phenomena not easily studied") (restating point
first made in David L. Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
555,561 (1995) [hereinafter Faigman, Mapping]).
88. See also Faigman, Evidentiary Status, supra note 87, at 962-63 ("[S]cience is slow, even
plodding, and it often requires ideal conditions that rarely exist or studies only small numbers of
variables that limit the ability to generalize any findings.") (restating point first made in Faigman,
Mapping, supra note 87, at 560).
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Several other related complaints lurk under the surface of this charge.
First, there is the notion that certain concepts embodied in the law-
liberty, justice, equality, fairness, and due process-simply cannot be
measured89 or fruitfully compared.9" It is also possible that some who
would make this point are not really complaining that the comparisons
are invalid because they are empirically flawed-they are making a
broader normative point that the balancing should not take place in the
first instance.9' For example, someone who believes in an absolutist view
of the First Amendment probably would not be moved by arguments that
certain forms of speech might cause societal harm.92 The adoption of the
absolutist view on the issue basically precludes accepting a state ban on
speech no matter what the empirical proof demonstrates. Therefore, this
is not truly an argument about data failure-it is an argument that
judicial reliance on social science data is just the first step towards
89. As one commentator has observed:
It is one thing to stress the importance of attending to consequences, and it is quite another to
insist that the only meaningful consequences are those that are amenable to economic analysis,
or capable of mathematically precise measuring and weighing, or available for collection and
examination by the latest innovations in social scientific method.
Berkowitz, supra note 28, at 45.
In a recent essay, Ward Farnsworth argued that Posner's analysis of the 2000 presidential election
demonstrates the weakness of Posner's pragmatism. See Ward Farnsworth, "To Do a Great Right,
Do a Little Wrong": A User's Guide to Judicial Lawlessness, 86 MINN. L. REV. 227 (2001).
Although he attacks Posner's pragmatism on a variety of grounds, one of Farnsworth's primary
arguments is that reliance on a cost-benefit analysis based upon extralegal materials is especially
fraught with peril when the purported benefits are as dubious as the ones pressed by Posner and the
Court. Id. at 240-48; id. at 265 ("It was both empirically and conceptually difficult to determine
whether the benefits of the Court's remedial decision outweighed the costs."). Farnsworth's point is
well taken. As will be made clear below, however, the point of this Article is to demonstrate the
value of Posner's pragmatism, even if we accept the validity of the criticisms levied by
commentators such as Farnsworth. This Article does not purport to endorse cost-benefit analysis in
all cases.
90. See Meares & Harcourt, supra note 8, at 795 (noting that a "likely criticism is that most of
the values of interest-especially personal liberty and efficient law enforcement-are
incommensurable and therefore cannot properly be compared"); Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly
Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 157
(1984) ("The values of process are hardest to weigh in a calculus of costs and benefits.").
91. See generally Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41
VAND. L. REV. 111 (1988) (arguing that resistance to formalized methods for judicial reception of
legislative facts is due, in part, to the fact that pragmatic balancing has not supplanted other forms
of judicial decisionmaking).
92. There is a large literature on the concept of rights as "trumps," which will not be recounted
here. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 727-33 (1998) (describing view of
constitutional rights set forth in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-205 (1977)).
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violating rule of law principles because it leads to judges making policy
decisions outside of their proper role, in derogation of established legal
rights.93
More generally, one might argue that certain constitutional disputes
cannot be reduced to the types of questions that social science favors.94
As Deborah Merritt asks: "If we cannot count the number of people
inhabiting a state without controversy, how can we hope to generate
clear answers to the hundreds of social questions informing
constitutional law?" 95
Finally, others have noted the complaint that certain social scientists
or social science methodologies are biased, and thus that the promise of
objective scientific data to inform legal decisionmaking is elusive.96 If
taken to its logical conclusion, this argument can be rather radical-it
essentially means that we should never trust the "facts" that social
scientists proffer because the scientific method is too easily corrupted.97
Defenders of the scientific method, however, readily acknowledge its
imperfections-they just do not agree that such broad, anti-empirical
assertions are enough to doom the entire endeavor of informing legal
judgments with the most reliable, current scientific or sociological data
or theories available.9"
93. See Fallon, supra note 64, at 574 ("By inviting judges to act on their personal views of what
would make the future better, pragmatism would authorize judicial behavior that offends both rule-
of-law and democratic values; it would also devalue the notion of a constitutional 'right."').
94. See Merritt, supra note 51, at 1292-93 ("Human beings and the societies they form are too
complex and changeable to generate precise social science answers to constitutional
controversies.").
95. Id. at 1293 n.25 (citing Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316
(1999); Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1 (1996)).
96. See Fortson, supra note 32, at 2364-65 (arguing that social science is no more useful to
judges than moral argumentation because social science is based on non-objective presumptions);
Richard E. Redding, Reconstructing Science Through Law, 23 S. ILL. U. LJ. 585, 593-97 (1999)
(explaining how objectivity of social science can be threatened by researchers' values and biases);
Tamanaba, supra note 17, at 340-41 (explaining that social science has been criticized for being
inherently conservative, and thus favoring the status quo).
97. This argument clearly has more validity if the amicus briefs filed by the parties are the main
source of scientific data. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 78, at 100 (explaining that amicus curiae
briefs filled with social science data are "too often designed to persuade rather than to inform the
Court" and that "[m]ost authors ... are lobbyists whose primary goal is to advance the interests of
their clients... not guided by the scientific norms of neutrality and objectivity").
98. Faigman, Evidentiary Status, supra note 87, at 964 (arguing that "the proper response to
empirical complexity... [is] to demand the best science available and remain aware of its
limitations").
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2. The Dilettantism Dilemma: Whether Law Professors Can Generate
the Social Science Research Necessary To Support an Empirical-
Pragmatic Judicial Approach
Judge Posner believes that the legal academy should "redirect its
research and teaching efforts toward fuller participation in the enterprise
of social science (broadly conceived, and certainly not limited to
quantitative studies) and by doing so give judges help in understanding
the social problems that get thrust on the courts." 99 Given Posner's
explicit call for law professors to engage in more empirical research to
support the judiciary in its pursuit of pragmatism, it must be noted that
whether law professors should or can successfully produce
interdisciplinary and empirical scholarship' has been debated
extensively over the last ten years."'
If we assume that Posner is correct that increased empirical study in
legal academia is desirable, the question still remains whether law
professors are up to the task-whether they are capable10 2 and willing to
99. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2, at 164.
100. Interdisciplinary scholarship need not be empirical (indeed, it may be purely theoretical).
The two forms of scholarship are grouped together here because, as a practical matter, legal
scholarship that goes outside of traditional doctrinal boundaries is likely to have interdisciplinary
foundations.
101. The debate gathered steam and found its voice in 1992, when D.C. Circuit Judge Harry T.
Edwards commented in a famous law review article: "Our law reviews are now full of mediocre
interdisciplinary articles. Too many law professors are ivory tower dilettantes, pursuing whatever
subject piques their interest, whether or not the subject merits scholarship, and whether or not they
have the scholarly skills to master it." Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 36 (1992). Responses to Judge Edwards
may be found in Symposium, Legal Education, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 1921 (1993); see also J.M.
Balkin, Interdisciplinarity as Colonization, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 950 (1996) (noting two
trends: profound disagreement over the direction of legal scholarship and increase in
interdisciplinary scholarship, especially at "elite" institutions); Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism
in Legal Scholarship, 4 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 79, 79 (1991) ("Mhe dramatic rise in
interdisciplinary work has witnessed a considerable amount of sub-standard scholarship. This work
likely would not find a home in the professional journals of the associated disciplines, but appears
all too often in leading law journals."); Steven Lubet, Is Legal Theory Good for Anything?, 1997 U.
ILL. L. REV. 193, 193-95 (describing symposium responses to Edwards's article).
102. See, e.g., Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 817
(1999) ("[M]ost law professors do not possess the requisite training or background that most
sophisticated statistical work requires. Fewer still possess the inclination and energy to acquire,
update, or retool their research skills or analytical repertoire."); Nard, supra note 83, at 361-66
(outlining various explanations for the lack of empirical scholarship, based in part upon an informal
telephone survey with law professors); id. at 368 ("[Ihe legal profession is bereft of empirical
scholarship, and the primary reason for this is that law professors are not well trained in the
empirical method."); Rubin, supra note 70, at 1899 ("Pragmatically, legal scholars are not trained to
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produce high quality interdisciplinary empirical scholarship in support
of their theoretical claims.
10 3
be social scientists and do not have the necessary resources available to them in their institutional
setting."); Steven L. Schwarcz, Introduction: Is Law An Autonomous Discipline?, 21 HARV. J.L. &
PuB. POL'Y 83, 87 (1997) ("[L]aw professors often lack both training in empirical methods and the
funding necessary to perform empirical studies."). Dworkin explains:
Most legal scholars are poorly equipped, in training and time, to produce original research
about complex empirical issues-they must rely on reports of the research or arguments of
experts. But on many important issues experts disagree, and justifying reliance on one set of
experts rather than another is as demanding a task, as much beyond most lawyers' competence,
as original research would be. A scholar must often take refuge in obviously unsatisfactory
claims that his view is supported by "most!' experts, or by the "weight of expert opinion," or
something of the sort.
Ronald Dworkin, Reply, 29 AIz. ST. LJ. 431,443 (1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, Reply). Also, there
are many different forms of mastery, as J.M. Balkin astutely points out:
Lawyers are particularly good at applying principles worked out in one fact situation to
different fact situations, but not particularly good at statistical or empirical study. They are
good at simple mathematical reasoning, but not particularly good at more complex models.
They are good at reading books that have facts in them, but not particularly good at designing
and implementing studies or experiments that would discover new facts.
Balkin, supra note 101, at 968.
103. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 323 (1989) (explaining and criticizing lack of academic empirical research). J.M.
Balkin, in discussing the law and economic movement, observes:
The kind of economic analysis that spread most easily and effectively through the legal
academy reflected the comparative advantages of lawyers. It was a sort of rhetoricized, arm-
chair law and economics. It was an economics in which one made certain empirical
assumptions, and one's opponent countered by making different empirical assumptions, but
neither was actually going to go out and test the assumptions because neither was trained to do
any such thing.
Balkin, supra note 101, at 968. Dorf also contends:
Despite legal realism's successful critique of the conception of the legal enterprise as a search
for "the one true rule of law which, being discovered, will endure, without change, forever," to
a significant degree, American legal education and American legal reasoning continue to
proceed from Langdell's premise that the answers to difficult legal questions are to be found in
the reports of judicial decisions.
Dorf, supra note 51, at 38 (footnotes omitted) (quoting GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN
LAW 43 (1977)). But see Heise, supra note 102, at 812 ("Although empirical legal scholarship
remains the overwhelming exception to the general rule favoring non-empirical research, evidence
suggests that the production of empirical evidence is on the rise."); Nard, supra note 83, at 360
(making same point).
A prominent example of empirical scholarship in the area of criminal procedure involves the
intense scholarly debate over the effects of the Miranda decision. For a summary of the empirical
evidence, see Richard A. Leo, Miranda's Irrelevance: Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the
Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L REv. 1000, 1005-11 (2001); see also Paul G. Cassell, The Costs
of the Miranda Mandate: A Lesson in the Dangers of Inflexible, "Prophylactic" Supreme Court
Inventions, 28 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 299 (1996); Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical
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A scholar who recently surveyed the rich literature on the subject
pointed to six reasons for the dearth of empirical research by law
professors: (1) empirical work is hard; 10 4 (2) law professors are not well-
trained in empirical methods; 0 5 (3) empirical work is risky because,
unlike more conceptual work, it is falsifiable; 0 6 (4) empirical legal
scholarship is less prestigious than theoretical scholarship;0 7 (5) there is
a lack of internal institutional incentives for empirical research;0 8 and
(6) there is a lack of external institutional incentives, such as funding
support." 9 Whether these reasons are legitimate or not, any call for
empirical scholarship by law professors must be tempered by an
understanding of the professional and institutional limitations on such a
movement.110
3. The "Ignorance Hypothesis": Whether Courts Can Understand
and Apply Empirical Data or Scientific Research
Another problem with utilizing empirical methodology or social
science research to help analyze or resolve legal disputes is that judges
might be unable to interpret the relevant data. J. Alexander Tanford has
labeled the group of theories that posit judicial incompetence with
empirical social science as the "ignorance hypothesis."' As Monahan
and Walker explain:
Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387 (1996); John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police
Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1147 n.4 (1998) (citing Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No
Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1084 (1996); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 278 (1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L.
REV. 500 (1996)). A demonstration of "applied pragmatism" outside of the area of criminal
procedure can be found in Susan M. Wolf, Pragmatism in the Face of Death: The Role of Facts in
the Assisted Suicide Debate, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1063 (1998).
104. Heise, supra note 102, at 816.
105. Id. at 817-18.
106. Id. at 818-19.
107. Id. at 819-20.
108. Id. at 820-22.
109. Id. at 822-24.
110. Although Posner calls for law professors to generate this research, it should be noted that
there may be other institutions adept at handling this type of empirical research, either alone or in
concert with law professors. For example, this Article will suggest that the United States Marshals
Service, a federal law enforcement bureau, would be capable of undertaking research useful to the
resolution of certain criminal procedure cases. See infra Part IV.
111. J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and
Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 154-55 (1990) ("The ignorance hypothesis holds that judges, despite
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The fundamental objection that can be raised to any scheme that
requires courts to evaluate social science research is that serious
errors will be made in the evaluations. Armed with little
knowledge, either courts will rely on research containing
undetected flaws, or they will discount meritorious studies. In
either case, a rule of law may come to be premised on an erroneous
empirical foundation.
1 2
Concerns regarding judicial competence in this realm are not new-
when one surveys the long history of the courts and science' 3 two broad
themes emerge: first, the judiciary is often assailed for failing to turn to
science where it might be of use in resolving legal or factual issues,1
4
and second, courts are criticized for improperly using scientific
information when they avail themselves of that data." 5 The Supreme
Court has been a frequent target in this regard. Monahan and Walker
explain:
The Court has often relied upon the conclusions of scientific
research without any consideration of the validity of the methods
that produced those conclusions. And on those relatively rare
occasions when the Court did not offer conclusory scientific
judgments, but rather undertook its own examination of science,
the Court did so in an ad hoc and unsystematic manner.1
6
Numerous other scholars have lodged similar complaints regarding
the federal judiciary's many failed efforts at interpreting or applying
social science or scientific data." 7 David Faigman points to two of the
most well known Supreme Court efforts:
a generally high level of education and intelligence, are inexperienced with, and do not understand
empirical social science, especially its statistical language.").
112. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 509 (1986) [hereinafter Monahan &
Walker, Social Authority].
113. Science here includes all branches of the social sciences.
114. For a summary and critique of the various theories advanced for why the courts have been
inhospitable to social science, see Tanford, supra note 111, at 151-57.
115. These concerns are not new. See generally THE UsE/NoNUSE/MISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL
RESEARCH IN THE COURTS (Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron eds., 1980) (papers and dialogues
adapted from 1978 Conference sponsored by Council for Applied Research).
116. Walker & Monahan, Daubert, supra note 68, at 840-41.
117. See David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact Finding": Exploring the Empirical
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 549 (1991) [hereinafter
Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding] (noting persistent criticism of the Supreme
Court's misuse of empirical research); Merritt, supra note 51, at 1292 ("Any attempt to rely
Washington Law Review
Occasionally, the Court fashions its constitutional decisions in
accordance with the contemporary consensus of scientific opinion.
The two cases which best exemplify this practice are also the cases
which have led the Court to avoid it. By far the most notorious use
of social science in constitutional law is footnote 11 of Brown v.
Board of Education, and the most notorious use of biological
science in constitutional law is Roe v. Wade. In both cases, the
Court seemingly crafted its opinions in light of scientific
consensus, and in both instances the Court lost credibility in doing
SO.
118
Others question whether the institutional barriers for properly
incorporating social science into constitutional decisionmaking may be
too great. Deborah Merritt surmises:
It is tempting to solve this problem by simply imploring the Court
to work harder at getting social science right .... The courts,
however, face substantial barriers in attempting to answer
constitutional questions with social science: judges are not trained
in the scientific method, they depend upon equally untrained
parties to present empirical evidence, and the social science itself is
too often flawed and malleable.119
Even Monahan and Walker, two of the foremost proponents of the use
of social science materials in law, admit that their
confidence is not without limits. Whether a judge can adequately
evaluate social science research used as a social framework
depends upon both the particular judge doing the evaluation and
the particular piece of research being evaluated. Occasions may
exclusively, or even primarily, upon social science to answer constitutional questions is likely to
generate bad science and bad law. The Supreme Court has a rather poor record in this regard-even
in answering relatively concrete constitutional questions.");Wolf, Pragmatism in the Face of Death,
supra note 103, at 1066 n.7 (1998) ("A copious literature critiques the Court's approach to data,
especially social science data since that data's first use in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1907)")
(citing, as examples, Donald N. Bersoff & David J. Glass, The Not-So Weisman: The Supreme
Court's Continuing Misuse of Social Science Research, 2 U. Chi. [Roundtable] 278 (1995);
Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding, supra; Tanford, supra note 111).
118. Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding, supra note 117, at 565-66 (footnotes
omitted). David Faigman has been writing on the intersection of science and the law for over fifteen
years. He recently published a book on the topic, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF
SCIENCE IN THE LAW (1999).
119. Merritt, supra note 51, at 1292; see also Rubin, supra note 70, at 1882-83 (noting
conceptual and organizational limitations on judiciary's ability to explore empirical issues).
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arise when the complexity of the research exceeds the ability of the
judge to evaluate it intelligently. 2 '
Posner himself acknowledges that "[a] danger of inviting the judge to
step beyond the boundaries of the orthodox legal materials of decision is
that judges are not trained to analyze and absorb theories and data of
social science.' ' . Some might assert that this skepticism is well
founded. After all, even Posner has been charged with dilettantism, in
part based upon some alleged misstatements he made regarding
monkeys, chimpanzees, and bonobos. 22 Regardless of the importance of
Posner's error, it does highlight the perils associated with attorneys
attempting to master non-legal disciplines and methodologies. As
Michael Doff postulates: "If so extraordinary a judge as Posner cannot
avoid misapprehending important details of the specialized fields with
which he grapples, his claim that courts generally have great assimilative
powers must be an overstatement."' 3
At the same time, even scholars who have criticized the judiciary's
handling of social science in the past have confidence that, with proper
effort, lawyers can handle such materials." Monahan and Walker have
argued that
120. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in
Law, 73 VA. L REV. 559,591 n.113 (1987).
121. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2, at 255. Although he concedes that "[t]he courts'
capacity to conduct empirical research is extremely limited, perhaps nil," Posner believes that the
courts possess greater "assimilative powers." Id. at 164. One scholar, though, has aptly wondered if
this confidence in the judiciary is based "perhaps on Judge Posner's projection of his own eclectic
intellectual appetite onto his colleagues on the federal bench." Dorf, supra note 51, at 53; see also
id. at 54 n.278 (opining that "most judges and academics would fail" at trying to acquaint
themselves with "'a vast multidisciplinary literature on sex, a literature to which medicine, biology,
sociobiology, psychiatry, psychology, sociology, economics, jurisprudence, theology, philosophy,
history, classics, anthropology, demography-even geography and literary criticism"' as Judge
Posner claims to have done in writing about sex) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, SEx AND REASON 2
(1992)).
122. Michael Dorf cites two examples of Posner's purported dilettantism. See Doff, supra note
51, at 53 n.278. First he notes Martha C. Nussbaun's contentions that Posner inaccurately portrays
academic philosophy. See id. (citing Nussbaum, supra note 32, at 1782). Second, Doff asserts that
Judge Posner has erroneously referred to bonobos as "a species of monkey," and has incorrectly
grouped together "chimpanzees and other monkeys" even though chimpanzees and bonobos are
horninoid apes, not monkeys. See id. (citing Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory,
supra note 29, at 1661 and Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the
Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1565 (1998)). This Article expresses no opinion regarding the proper
classification of any primates.
123. See Dorf, supra note 51, at 53 n.278.
124. For example, Faigman states:
327
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[aicquiring the knowledge of social science necessary to evaluate
most research studies is no more difficult than acquiring the
knowledge of economics necessary to adjudicate many antitrust
cases or the knowledge of chemistry necessary to resolve much
environmental litigation. Anyone who can comprehend the Federal
Tort Claims Act can learn what standard deviation and statistical
significance mean." 5
If any conclusions can be drawn on this point, it is that the ability of
judges (and lawyers) to understand social science data cannot easily be
generalized-too much depends on the capability of the judges involved
and the complexity of the particular non-legal concepts before the court.
Just as it would probably be incorrect to assume that judges are wholly
incapable of mastering anything other than legal doctrine, it would be
naYve to assume that every judge and every lawyer has the potential to
master sophisticated non-legal concepts. Lawyers and judges have
struggled on more than one occasion with traditional doctrinal legal
concepts with which they are generally familiar, so it is logical that they
might have heightened (but not necessarily insurmountable) difficulty
dealing with non-legal concepts.
4. Banality: Empirical Study Fails To Provide Constitutional Policy
Preference
We now turn to the most potent and persistent criticism of
pragmatism-banality. 6 Pragmatism's detractors argue that pragmatism
is useless or banal because it endorses no substantive legal,
Presenting the problem as concern over the ability of lawyers to comprehend social science
minutiae misstates the issue. Even the most difficult concepts used by social scientists are no
more difficult than the more esoteric legal concepts lawyers employ regularly. The proper
question is whether lawmakers have the inclination or motivation to devote the time necessary
to learn the methods of social science.
David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as
Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1080 (1989).
125. Monahan & Walker, Social Authority, supra note 112, at 511 n. 119. Of course, one could
accept the basic truth of this observation, yet still believe that a substantial number of lawyers and
judges are unable to handle complex antitrust and environmental law matters.
126. See Farber, Reinventing Brandeis, supra note 15, at 164-65 (observing the existence of a
"view--common among both its critics and supporters-that legal pragmatism is essentially banal")
(citing Dworkin, supra note 70, at 359; Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 787, 814 (1989); Posner, What Has Pragmatism To Offer Law?, supra note 35, at 1653;
Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW &
SOcIETY supra note 16, at 89; Smith, supra note 3, at 410).
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constitutional, or philosophical positions.' 27 In sum, unlike "top-down"
constitutional theories,12 pragmatism does not compel legal conclusions
or outcomes in specific cases,129 and it may even possess a tendency
towards deferring important value judgments. 3 ' As one scholar puts it:
[P]ragmatism is empty of substance: a methodology of inquiry and
a theory of truth do not themselves present any truths about the
world (other than the theory of truth itself). Pragmatism does not
say what the good is, how to live, what economic or political
system to develop, or anything else of that nature. 3'
This agnosticism towards ends or results-an adamant refusal to
express a preference for desired goals or outcomes-either renders
pragmatism useless according to its critics, 32 or merely reinforces
127. See Fallon, supra note 64, at 562-64 (contrasting "substantive" constitutional theories that
"aim to promote transparent substantive goals" with formal theories such as "methodological
pragmatism" that attempt to prescribe a proper procedure for constitutional decisionmaking).
128. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLuM. L. REV.
857, 927 (1999) ("Judge Posner characterizes Dworkin's approach to constitutional law as 'top-
down' meaning it starts with a theoretical derivation of constitutional rights or principles and then
proceeds to apply these abstractions to decide actual cases.").
129. Louis Menand has argued that this is true for all theory:
It is sometimes complained that pragmatism is a bootstrap theory-that it cannot tell us where
we should want to go or how we can get there. The answer to this is that theory can never tell us
where to go; only we can tell us where to go. Theories are just one of the ways we make sense
of our choices. We wake up one morning and find ourselves in a new place, and then we build a
ladder to explain how we got there.
Louis Menand, Pragmatists and Poets: A Response to Richard Poirier, in THE REVIVAL OF
PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 369. Menand makes the same statement in Louis
Menand, An Introduction to Pragmatism, in PRAGMATISM: A READER xxxiv (Louis Menand ed.,
1997), with the added observation: "The pragmatist is the person who asks whether this is a good
place to be. The nonpragmatist is the person who admires the ladder."
130. Fallon, supra note 64, at 564-65:
Frst, anyone who adopts a constitutional theory embraces a set of commitments against which
she invites her own future arguments and actions to be tested for consistency and inconsistency,
and possibility for dishonesty, fecklessness, or breach of trust.... In this context, substantive
theories may call for a greater depth of precommitment than many participants in constitutional
debates are conscientiously prepared to make. It is often difficult to specify in advance how far
particular substantive ends should be pursued, and what attendant costs should be accepted, in
varied and frequently unknown factual contexts. By contrast, it may be easier to subscribe to a
decision procedure that reserves substantive judgment.
131. Tamanaha, supra note 17, at 328 (1996) (footnotes omitted); see also Arnold, supra note
17, at 904 ("[T]he modem pragmatist values rational thinking, empirical inquiry, and human
judgment about what is good and useful.").
132- Even strong proponents of scientific and empirical research note this potential weakness.
See Faigman, Mapping, supra note 87, at 560 ("[Slcience provides no assistance over broad and
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existing legal structures. 33 In fact, these critics would argue, pragmatism
collapses on its own weight because pragmatism calls for doing "what
works best," while pragmatists steadfastly refuse to take a position on
what is best.134 As Jeremy Waldron explains:
Anyone who says that the aim of law is to 'make things better'
must be able to offer us two things: a way of arguing about what
counts as an improvement (when there is a disagreement about
this-as there is in our society); and a way of arguing about
questions of distribution and fairness for cases (almost all the cases
that the law addresses) in which making things better for some
people means making them worse for others. Posner sometimes
gives the impression that he thinks anyone who addresses these
questions has crossed the line from the practical to the impractical,
from pragmatism to moralism. If he thinks this, he is wrong (and
wrong on perhaps the most important challenge that pragmatism
faces in a legal context). In the disputes that face courts and
legislatures, debates about what would count as making things
better and debates about the fair distribution of improvements are
profoundly important areas of human concern, particularly that of values."); Nard, supra note 83, at
360 ("[O]nce the results of an empirical survey have been obtained, the question remains: What are
we to do now? ... [A] guiding principle is needed to achieve or remedy what the empirical study
uncovers.").
133. See Farber, Reinventing Brandeis, supra note 15, at 170 ("In more simplistic terms, by
adopting as a standard 'whatever works,' pragmatism may seem to reinforce existing social values,
or perhaps to reduce law to a series of cost-benefit analyses (based, of course, on existing economic
values)."); see also Rosenfeld, supra note 17, at 151 ("[P]ragmatism's propensity to draw attention
to means is not only inadequate but can also be downright harmful. Submersion or concealment of
ends most often boosts the status quo, and thus exacerbates the obstacles encountered by those who
are disfavored by prevailing institutional arrangements.").
134. Posner himself indicates that he is "guided mainly by the kind of vague utilitarianism, or
'soft core' classical liberalism that one associates with John Stuart Mill, especially the Mill of ON
LIBERTY." POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2, at xii. Significantly, Posner has explained what
he does not mean by doing what is "best":
I leave open the criteria for the 'best results' for which the pragmatic judge is striving, except
that, pace Dworkin, they are not simply what is best for the particular case without regard for
the implications for other cases. Pragmatism will not tell us what is best; but provided there is a
fair degree of value consensus among the judges, as I think there is, it can help judges seek the
best results unhampered by philosophical doubts.
Id. at 262.
Dworkin, on the other hand, accuses Posner of being in the intuitive but hidden grips of
Darwinian pragmatist theory, that "presupposes that certain kinds of human lives and certain states
of human societies are intrinsically superior to others." Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, supra
note 30, at 1736.
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more or less unavoidable. It is simply question-begging to think
that such debates can be superseded by a good-natured
commitment to pragmatic amelioration."'
The essential question is put artfully by Michel Rosenfeld, who asks:
"In short, is pragmatism self-sufficient or is it merely parasitic on
certain contestable conceptions of the good?' 136 Ronald Dworkin, a
fierce critic of pragmatism, refers to this as "the standard pragmatist
dilemma."'137 Dworkin explains:
Pragmatists argue that any moral principle must be assessed only
against a practical standard: does adopting that principle help to
make things better? But if they stipulate any particular social
goal-any conception of when things are better-they undermine
their claim, because that social goal could not itself be justified
instrumentally without arguing in a circle. So, typically, they
decline to say what making things better means: Richard Rorty and
the other leaders of Posner's antitheory army seem to assume,
contrary to all political experience, that it is obvious to all when a
situation is improving or, in a word they believe useful, whether a
particular strategy "works." But moral disagreements necessarily
include disagreement about what counts as "working." "Pro-life"
and "pro-choice" activists would give a very different account of
what form of abortion regulation "works," for example. So moral
pragmatism has seemed to many critics an empty theory: it
encourages forward-looking efforts in search of a future it declines
to describe.
31
Dworkin has repeatedly and vigorously expressed similar sentiments
in a variety of writings,139 and in a book review of Problematics, he
135. Waldron, supra note 48, at 601; see also Shreve, supra note 39, at 65 (noting difficulty with
pragmatists calling something a problem, or identifying a solution to a problem, if pragmatism lacks
substantive reference points).
136. See Rosenfeld, supra note 17, at 100 (emphasis in original). He later concludes that
pragmatism is parasitic. Id. at 151.
137. Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, supra note 30, at 1735.
138. Id. (footnotes omitted).
139. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1265-66 (1997) [hereinafter, Dworkin, Arduous Virtue]; Ronald Dworkin,
In Praise of Theory, 29 ARmZ. ST. L. J. 353, 366-67 (1997) (explaining "emptiness" in advising
lawyers and judges to seek a decision that "works"); Dworkin, Reply, supra note 102, at 431;
Dworkin, Reply, supra note 102, at 433:
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argues that Posner has conceded the point. t4 However, more recently
Posner has attempted to answer this criticism by arguing that factual
inquiry may lead to common ground for those in the center of a highly
charged debate, even if those at either ideological extreme may remain
unconvinced.' 4 '
D. Pragmatism's Pitfalls in Sum
The foregoing discussion obviously does not resolve the many
complex questions surrounding Posnerian pragmatism's exhortation to
use social science materials in resolving legal issues. The intent is
simply to highlight the strongest and most persistent complaints on the
matter, which fall into two broad classes. First, we are faced with
[Posner's] brand of pragmatism is empty because it instructs lawyers to attend to facts and
consequences, which they already know they should, but does not tell them which facts are
important or which consequences matter, which is what they worry about. Of course, in some
circumstances, pointing out that a doctrine will have surprising consequences-that a welfare
program designed to help a particular group will actually harm that group, for example-is
obviously immensely helpful. But these circumstances are rare: most often the controversy is
not about what means will in fact achieve an agreed end, but about what end should be agreed
upon-about how high efficiency should rank, for example, against social or distributive goals
or the protection of rights or goals of integrity.
See also Dworkin, Philosophy and Monica Lewinsky, supra note 30. Other scholars have made
similar points. See, e.g., Doff, supra note 51, at 80 ("Figuring out what 'works' in practice only
makes sense if one has a normative framework for measuring success. Jim Crow worked reasonably
well as a system of social control, but disastrously as measured by a norm of human dignity.")
(footnotes omitted); Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 521,
546 ("There is no scientific fact about human gestation that is likely to resolve the abortion debate
one way or another, there is no analysis of human preferences and macroeconomic structure that is
likely to determine how redistributive our economic policies should be."); see also Butler, supra
note 31, at 342; Cloud, supra note 23, at 213-14 (arguing that pragmatism's exhortation to proceed
empirically and seek the "best" results provides little guidance to judges); Fortson, supra note 32, at
2348 ("Social science can offer guidance in achieving the goals that society sets, but it can offer no
guidance in setting those goals.").
140. See Dworkin, Philosophy and Monica Lewinsky, supra note 30, at 48.
141. See Posner, On the Alleged "Sophistication" of Academic Moralism, supra note 31, at
1020. Posner observes:
The pragmatists' hope is rather that by abstaining from moral disputation and focusing instead
on the facts-by being, in short, a pragmatist-the judge or legislator may find some common
ground after all. It is possible, for example, that if more people knew how partial-birth abortion
does-and does not-differ from other forms of late-term abortion, and knew too the
circumstances under which women decide to have such abortions, the people who are not at
either extreme of the abortion debate but rather are centrists (that is, the majority) would
discover once that they actually agreed about how it ought to be approached.
Id.
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questions regarding the empirical methods themselves. In this category,
we have addressed whether social science data can adequately reflect or
illuminate the social interactions or phenomena that law seeks to govern,
whether law professors can produce the social science research
necessary to support a pragmatic judicial approach and, if so, whether
judges are capable of understanding and utilizing social science
research.
A second category of philosophical complaints is more fundamental.
Here we see the assertion from prominent critics of pragmatism,
exemplified by Jeremy Waldron and Ronald Dworkin, that pragmatism
is useless because it expresses no preference for any political, moral, or
social goals. This criticism questions whether, in the final analysis, even
accurate social science research can help resolve fundamental
disagreements over highly disputed moral and legal questions. Both
categories of complaints are potent, but in the remainder of this Article,
we will investigate what empirical pragmatism has to offer us in the
context of home arrests under Payton, even if we assume the validity of
these complaints.
II. JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE AND APPLICATION OF PAYTON
A. Background: The Rules Governing Home Arrests
In successive terms, nearly twenty years ago, the Supreme Court
handed down two opinions establishing the basic constitutional rules for
when police may enter a residence to arrest a criminal suspect. In Payton
v. New York, 42 the Court held that, absent exigent circumstances, the
Fourth Amendment143 prohibits warrantless police entry into a suspect's
residence for the purpose of arresting the suspect.'" The Payton Court
142. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
143. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
144. Payton, 445 U.S. at 603.
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then went further, holding 45 that police in possession of an arrest
warrant may enter a suspect's dwelling to arrest the suspect if there is
reason to believe the suspect is within the residence.'46 One term later, in
Steagald v. United States,147 the Supreme Court built upon Payton's
limitation on police authority and held that a search warrant, issued by a
neutral and detached magistrate, is constitutionally required to permit
entry into a third-party's residence to arrest a non-resident suspect.1
48
Although Paytont49  and Steagald appear to set down fairly
straightforward rules governing police conduct, over the last two
decades the implementation of Payton and Steagald has raised several
difficult issues. Observers have questioned: (1) whether it is justified to
permit entry into a suspect's own residence based upon an arrest
warrant, as opposed to a search warrant;' (2) whether the privacy
145. See Part H.B, infra, for a discussion of whether the Court's statement regarding arrest
warrants constitutes a holding or dictum.
146. Payton, 445 U.S. at 603 ("(fIor Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on
probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the
suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.").
147. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
148. Id. at 205-06. As in Payton, neither consent nor exigent circumstances were at issue. Id. at
211.
149. The extent to which Payton created or merely clarified the law is open to debate. Compare
Note, Arrest Warrants Required for Arrests Within the Home-Payton v. New York, 30 DEPAuL L.
REV. 207, 208 (1980) ("The decision overturned statutes in twenty-three states and settled an issue
extensively debated in the federal courts of appeals. In addition, this holding reversed what many
commentators and courts considered 'text book law for centuries'-the right of law enforcement
officers to arrest without a warrant in the home.") (footnotes omitted), with United States v.
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 552-53 (1982) (holding that Payton should be applied retroactively because
"its ruling rested on both long-recognized principles of Fourth Amendment law" and "overturned no
long-standing practice approved by a near-unanimous body of lower court authority").
150. See Note, Warrantless Entry To Arrest in Suspect's Home, 94 HARV. L. REV. 178, 186
(1980) (arguing that an arrest warrant does not sufficiently protect a suspect's rights and that the
Court should require either "probable cause to believe the suspect is at home or uses his home
regularly" and "some valid reason to make a home arrest if a public arrest were feasible"); see also
Roger D. Groot, Arrests in Private Dwellings, 67 VA. L. REv. 275, 281 (1981) ("[IThe Payton
Court assumed that a prior independent finding of probable cause to arrest renders unnecessary a
prior independent finding of probable cause to enter. That assumption assigns an important factual
inquiry to the police and undermines traditional fourth amendment procedures.") (footnote omitted);
Edward G. Mascolo, Arrest Warrants and Search Warrants in the Home: Payton v. New York
Revisited and Modified Under State Constitutional Law, 66 CONN. B.J. 333, 341-42 (1992)
(arguing that allowing entry upon an arrest warrant, which reflects a determination of probable
cause to arrest, is illogical when the stated purpose of the warrant requirement is protecting the
home from unreasonable searches); George R. Nock, The Point of the Fourth Amendment and the
Myth of Magisterial Discretion, 23 CoNN. L. REv. 1, 25-26 (1990) (referring to the Supreme
Court's Payton explanation for why an arrest warrant suffices, as a "lame effort at reason"); Steven
W. Skinner, Note, Police Officers Acting Pursuant to an Arrest Warrant May Pursue a Fleeing
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interests of a suspect's cohabitants are sufficiently protected when police
seek entry into a suspect's residence pursuant to an arrest warrant;151 and
(3) how courts should determine resident status in this context, and thus
whether Payton (permitting entry with an arrest warrant) or Steagald
152
(requiring a search warrant) controls in a particular case.
1 3
This Article addresses a vexing, related question-how certain must
police be that a suspect is present prior to entering his residence to
effectuate arrest? As noted above, Payton permits police, armed with a
valid arrest warrant, to enter into a suspect's residence when they have
"reason to believe" that the suspect is present. Since 1980, numerous
state and federal courts have applied Payton's "reason to believe"
Suspect into a Private Residence and Forcibly Enter the Dwelling Without Knowing the
Underlying Offense of the Warrant and Without First Knocking and Announcing Their Presence-
State v. Jones, 143 N.J. 4, 667 A.2d 1043 (1995), 26 SETON HAL L. REV. 1736, 1760 n.98 (1996)
"IMhe Payton Court failed to explain why sufficient probable cause for an arrest warrant justifies
entry into the home. An arrest warrant bestows no authority for a search of a suspect, but rather, an
arrest warrant is more concerned with identity and guilt of the individual to be seized.") (citations
omitted); cf. Craig M. Bradley, The Court's "Two Model" Approach to the Fourth Amendment:
Carpe Diem!, 84 J. CRIM. L & CRMIINOLOGY 429, 453, 457-59 & n.156 (1993) (advocating a
search warrant requirement for entries to effectuate arrest, as part of a proposal geared towards the
clarification and simplification of Fourth Amendment law).
151. See Groot, supra note 150, at 285 (contending that Payton should be restricted "to situations
in which the suspect lives alone'); Mascolo, supra note 150, at 343, 350 (arguing that Payton does
not sufficiently protect the privacy rights of a suspect's co-residents); Michael Verde, Comment,
The Unwarranted Choice: Arrest Warrants and Problems Inherent in the Payton Doctrine, 32
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 169, 178 (1987) (suggesting that Payton may rely on faulty assumptions
regarding suspect behavior which fail to adequately protect "the fourth amendment rights of those
unfortunate enough to live with an individual wanted by the police"); see also Mary I. Coombs,
Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CAt. L. RFv. 1593,
1638 n.199 (1987) ("[E]very search of the home of a suspect who lives with nonsuspects involves
an incursion on the privacy interests of innocent persons that is justified solely by their relationship
with the suspect."). For a fascinating multi-resident case, see Community for Creative Non-Violence
v. Unknown Agents of the United States Marshals Service, 797 F. Supp. 7, 13 (D.D.C. 1992)
(stating that execution of arrest warrant at homeless shelter must not "unreasonably infringe on the
rights of innocent third parties who live in the shelter").
152. It has also been asked whether Steagald sufficiently ensures that the invasion of a third
party's privacy is justified, absent a requirement of showing that less intrusive alternatives, such as
public arrest or arrest at the suspect's residence, are not possible. See Sherry F. CoIb, The
Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness," 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1680-
81(1998).
153. See Mascolo, supra note 150, at 343-44 (contending that inconsistency between Payton and
Steagald "creates confusion in the lower courts, and breeds disrespect for Supreme Court edicts and
the privacy interests in the activities that take place in the home"); Sarah L. Klevit, Note, Entry To
Arrest a Suspect in a Third Party's Home: Ninth Circuit Opens the Door, 59 WASH. L REv. 965,
972-74 (1984) (arguing that Steagald and not Payton should be applied to suspects staying with a
third party homeowner).
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standard-usually with meager discussion or elaboration. Moreover, as
opposed to other questions of Fourth Amendment law,"5 4 judicial
application of Payton's "reason to believe" rule has received virtually no
academic consideration.
155
At the outset, it might be helpful to note a few points that will frame
the following discussion. First, three conditions must be met to satisfy
Payton literally: (1) the police must have a valid arrest warrant; (2) the
suspect must live at the dwelling to be entered; 56 and (3) the police must
154. There is a substantial body of literature intensely criticizing the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and
the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1149,
1149 (1998) ("The commentators are remarkably unanimous: The Supreme Court cases construing
the Fourth Amendment are a mess that lacks coherence and predictability, and fails to communicate
the contours of the field.") (citing Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107
HARV. L. REV. 757, 759-61 (1994); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 349-52 (1974); Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back
into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 399 (1994); Bruce G. Berner, The
Supreme Court and the Fall of the Fourth Amendment, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 383, 384 (1991); Phyllis
T. Bookspau, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44
VAND. L. REV. 473, 474-75 (1991); Bradley, supra note 150, at 1468-70; Daniel J. Capra,
Prisoners of Their Own Jurisprudence: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Cases in the Supreme Court,
36 VuLL. L. REv. 1267, 1268-69 (1991); Cloud, supra note 23, at 200-02; Donald Dripps, Akhil
Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: "Here I Go Down That Wrong Road
Again," 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1564 (1996); Tracey Macin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 201-02 (1993); Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of
Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 587 (1989);
Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1991);
Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the
Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (1988); Scott E. Sundby, A
Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV.
383, 383-86 (1988); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEo. L.J. 19, 19-20 (1988); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the
Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 49 (1974)).
Fourth Amendment scholarship has taken some hits as well. See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, Criminal
Law, Criminology, and the Small World of Legal Scholars, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 521, 532 (1992)
("Fourth Amendment law review scholarship is, on the whole, the worst example of analytic
jurisprudence--empty assertions of deontological rights theory versus empty utilitarianism.").
155. One exception is an article surveying Eleventh Circuit case law. See James P. Fleissner,
Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey January 1, 1995-December 31, 1995: Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 47 MERCER L. REV. 765, 778-80 (1996) (discussing interpretation and application of
Payton in United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530 (11th Cir. 1995)). In the interests of full
disclosure, it should be noted that the author clerked for the Honorable Phyllis A. Kravitch, United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, during the term in which Magluta, one of the cases
discussed herein, was decided. However, this Article neither reflects Judge Kravitch's beliefs about
the issues raised in Magluta, nor any part of the decisionmaking process in chambers or among the
other members of the panel.
156. Though Payton seems to apply an absolute standard of certitude as to the suspect's
residence, every court applying the Payton rule also has applied the "reason to believe" language of
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have reason to believe that the suspect is at home.157 For the purposes of
this Article, we will assume that the first two conditions have been
satisfied: police have obtained an arrest warrant and sufficiently linked
the premises to the suspect. The only remaining issue is thus proof of
presence. This Article will not focus upon cases where police do not
possess an arrest warrant; it will also not address the proof that goes into
establishing residence for the Payton rule.
Second, it might also be helpful to note that Payton issues arise in
both civil and criminal cases. The standard is implicated in civil rights
actions-most often brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 58 -alleging law
enforcement violations of a plaintiff s Fourth Amendment rights, and in
evidence suppression hearings (and appeals therefrom) in criminal
prosecutions.5 9 Both types of Payton cases are discussed together in this
Article, although it is recognized that differing procedural postures could
affect the precise issue being addressed by the courts. Where necessary,
it will be noted, for example, if a court is discussing the sufficiency of
the presence prong to the resident status requirement. See Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220,
1225 (10th Cir. 1999):
There is no substantial reason to believe that the standard of knowledge should be different or
greater when it comes to... whether the suspect resides at the house. It would be curious
indeed if the two prongs of the test were governed by two different standards of proof. More
importantly, requiring actual knowledge of the suspect's true residence would effectively make
Payton a dead letter.
State v. Miller, 777 A.2d 348, 359 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) ("As far as we are able to
determine, no court which has applied the Payton standard has regarded the first element to be as
absolute as its text suggests. Most courts have held it to be governed by the same reasonable belief
test as informs the second element.") (collecting federal and state cases); see also United States v.
Route, 104 F.3d 59, 62-63 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying reason to believe to residence prong); United
States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212,214 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1535 (same).
157. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980). For the purposes of this Article, this three-
prong rule will be referred to as either the "Payton rule" or the "Payton standard." In other contexts,
when courts and scholars speak of the rule established by Payton, they are often referring to
Payton's primary holding that the Fourth Amendment "prohibits the police from making a
warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest."
Id. at 576.
158. Payton cases can also be brought as Bivens actions. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (authorizing civil suits for damages
against federal law enforcement officers for violations of Fourth Amendment rights); see also
ERWIN CHEE RINsKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 9.1, at 573 (3d ed. 1999) (noting expansion of
Bivens damages actions to violations of other constitutional rights). But most Payton cases appear
to arise under § 1983.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1224-25 (10th Cir. 2001); Route, 104 F.3d
at 62-63; Lauter, 57 F.3d at 214; Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1995). It is worth noting
that the Supreme Court has made clear that a Payton violation will never lead to the invalidation of
the arrest itself. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 18 (1990).
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evidence to withstand a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment,
rather than making a final Payton determination on the merits. It is also
worth mentioning that the person arguing that Payton has been violated
may or may not be the suspect named in the arrest warrant. For example,
someone residing with the suspect may argue that police entered the
residence in violation of the Payton rule. Finally, it is typically
unimportant in the following discussion whether the suspect was indeed
found in the residence. The crucial question usually revolves around
what police believed prior to the entry-not whether those beliefs were
confirmed later.
B. Judicial Acceptance of the Payton Standard
Because the police in Payton and its companion case New York v.
Riddickt61 concededly acted without warrants of any kind,' 6' and in both
cases it was undisputed that the police had probable cause to believe that
the suspects were present at the time of entry,'62 courts initially had to
determine whether the Payton rule, which sets a standard for police
entries with a warrant, was binding precedent or dicta. 163 On this score,
160. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
161. Id. at576, 578.
162. Id. at 583 ("We also note that in neither case is it argued that the police lacked probable
cause to believe that the suspect was at home when they entered.").
163. See Klevit, supra note 153, at 967 n.14 ("Arguably, this language from Payton is dicta
because in the case itself the police acted without any warrant at all. Payton could be narrowly
construed to hold only that statutes authorizing police entry without any warrant are
unconstitutional. This argument was considered but rejected by the Ninth Circuit .... ). As the
Ninth Circuit reasoned:
The second possible ground for avoiding the application to this case of the Supreme Court's
positive statement in Payton that an arrest warrant plus reason to believe the suspect is present
are sufficient to permit entry without a search warrant is that the statement was merely dictum
that need not be followed by this court because the officers in Payton had neither a search
warrant nor an arrest warrant. This restrictive interpretation of Payton has been rejected by
every court of appeals and every state court that has considered the issue. We reject it as well.
United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir. 1983) (en bane); see also Lyles v. City of
Barling, 181 F.3d 914, 917 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that the Payton standard is "clearly established
Fourth Amendment law"). But see O'Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465, 1468 n.7 (10th Cir.
1989) (dictum in footnote referring to Payton language as dictum); People v. Jacobs, 729 P.2d 757,
761 n.4 (Cal. 1987) (referring to Payton's reason to believe standard as dictum); State v. Jones, 995
P.2d 571, 573 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (before deciding the matter on state constitutional grounds,
observing that the Supreme Court's "statement in Payton is technically dictum, because the police
in Payton did not have an arrest warrant," but acknowledging that "the Court later cited Payton as
controlling authority in a case in which the police did have an arrest warrant') (citing Steagald v.
United States, 451 U.S. 204, 214 n.7 (1981)).
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the courts have been nearly unanimous: Payton's reason to believe
formulation has prevailed in virtually every federal and state court to
consider the matter."M Moreover, recent Supreme Court case law
demonstrates unequivocal support for Payton,165 although unfortunately
An inscrutable description of Payton was provided by way of an oddly accurate oxymoron in
Nash v. Douglas County, 733 F. Supp. 100, 105 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (describing Payton as "holding in
dictum that for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant carries with it the limited authority to
enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within")
(emphasis added). Of course, a court could conceivably determine that the Payton rule is dicta, but
still follow it on the theory that it elaborates the correct standard.
164. The rule in the Ninth Circuit can be questioned due to an errant case that referred to the
standard as "probable cause." See United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing
Perez v. Simmons, 900 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1990), amending 884 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1989)). As the
Tenth Circuit has pointed out, though, Perez-which was amended to state a "reasonable grounds
for believing" standard-does not stand for the proposition for which it is cited by Harper, and
more recent Ninth Circuit authority embraces the reason to believe language. See Valdez v.
McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1224-25 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Perez and United States v.
Albrektsen, 151 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 1998)). Several other Ninth Circuit cases have also referred to
the standard as "reason to believe" or cited Payton for that proposition. See Watts v. Sacramento,
256 F.3d 886, 889-90 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Cunningham, No. 91-50044, 1993 WL
27016, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 1993) (quoting Payton); United States v. Litteral, 910 F.2d 547, 553-
54 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Ramirez, 770 F.2d 1458, 1460 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc). Moreover, although Harper purports to
apply a "probable cause" standard, it is a remarkably lenient version of probable cause. See infra
footnotes 318-322 and accompanying text.
In addition, a recent Oregon Supreme Court opinion decided not to follow Payton on state
constitutional grounds. See State v. Jones, 27 P.3d 119, 123 (Or. 2001) (holding that probable cause
was required under Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution, which is analogous to U.S.
Coast. amend. IV), affig State v. Jones, 995 P.2d 571, 574 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (2-1 decision)
("Jones r"). Because the state conceded the absence of probable cause, Jones, 27 P.3d at 121, 123,
the court held that the police had violated section 9 of the Oregon Constitution. See id. at 123. The
Oregon Supreme Court conceded that its holding was inconsistent with federal case law applying
Payton. See id Moreover, the Jones court's assertion that Oregon precedent had adopted a clear
probable cause test is itself open to dispute. See Jones I, 995 P.2d at 575-76 (Linder, J., dissenting);
see also infra Part lIM.C.1 (discussing State v. Jordan, 605 P.2d 646 (Or. 1980)). Finally, it should be
noted that, on occasion, courts have referred to the standard as probable cause, but without citation
to, or discussion of, Payton. See, e.g., Doby v. Decrescenzo, No. Civ. A. 94-3991, 1996 WL 510095
at *33 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1996) ("Police officers acting under a valid arrest warrant are permitted to
enter that person's residence if they have probable cause to believe that the person is there.") (civil
action brought under Pennsylvania state law), afrd, 171 F.3d 858 (3d Cir. 1999).
165. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610-11 (1999) (citing Payton rule and noting that
police "were undoubtedly entitled to enter the Wilson home in order to execute the arrest warrant for
Dominic Wilson" because Supreme Court "decisions have applied ... basic principles of the Fourth
Amendment to situations, like the one in this case, in which police enter a home under the authority
of an arrest warrant in order to take into custody the suspect named in the warrant'); Steagald, 451
U.S. at 221 ("As noted in Payton v. New York... an arrest warrant alone will suffice to enter a
suspect's ov residence to effect his arrest."); see also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 704
(1981):
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without providing much guidance as to the content of the Payton
standard.
Accepting the Payton standard raises the question of what facts or
evidence will satisfy the standard. Payton, courts have noted, provides
little guidance as to the meaning of "reason to believe,"'66 as Justice
Stevens included this term without reference to Supreme Court
precedent or other authority.t 67 Therefore, it has been up to courts
applying Payton to divine its meaning and place it within the context of
other Fourth Amendment standards.
16 8
In Payton v. New York... we held that police officers may not enter a private residence to
make a routine felony arrest without first obtaining a warrant. In that case we rejected the
suggestion that only a search warrant could adequately protect the privacy interests at stake,
noting that the distinction between a search warrant and an arrest warrant was far less
significant than the interposition of the magistrate's determination of probable cause between
the zealous officer and the citizen.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's support of Payton has not required further elaboration on the
content of the standard. In United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1534 (11th Cir. 1995), one of
the parties cited Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), in support of a probable cause standard,
because of the Buie Court's observation that police in possession of "an arrest warrant and probable
cause to believe Buie was in his home, the officers were entitled to enter and to search anywhere in
the house in which Buie might be found." Buie, 494 U.S. at 332-33 (emphasis added). The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed with this reading of Buie, noting that the Supreme Court's conclusion
that probable cause was sufficient did not lead to the conclusion that probable cause was required.
See Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1534:
[Tihe Court's language in Buie is not dispositive, because the Court there merely reasoned that
based on the facts of Buie the police officers' possession of probable cause entitled them to
enter and sweep the residence-the Court did not and has not, ever held that probable cause is
required to enter a residence to execute an arrest warrant for the resident.
166. See Smith v. Tolley, 960 F. Supp. 977, 985 (E.D. Va. 1997) ("The Supreme Court did not
define the 'reason to believe' standard which it articulated in Payton, and the circuits have not
provided much guidance.") (citing Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1534 (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 603));
Skinner, supra note 150, at 1760 n.98 ("In declining to require a search warrant to enter the
dwelling of a subject of an arrest warrant, the Court referred to no authority for the ruling, but
simply asserted that entry with merely an arrest warrant is 'constitutionally reasonable."'); see also
Mascolo, supra note 150, at 335-36:
In rejecting the requirement of a search warrant to enter the residence of a suspect for purposes
of arrest, the Payton Court cited no authority for this dismissal, but simply concluded that entry
with an arrest warrant is 'constitutionally reasonable.' This summary dismissal of the search
warrant requirement, and incomplete treatment of this issue, laid the groundwork for much of
the confusion among lower courts subsequently applying the Payton Rule.
(footnotes omitted).
167. Payton, 445 U.S. at 603.
168. Judicial acceptance of Payton's "reason to believe" language is accompanied with the
explicit or implicit rejection of a higher, more onerous burden of proof-typically "probable cause."
The relationship between Payton's "reason to believe" language and "probable cause" is discussed
extensively, infra Part III.
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Admittedly, the question of whether someone is at home (or more
properly stated, whether there is reason to believe that fact) appears to be
a common-sense inquiry rather than the type of substantial philosophical
or interpretative question that puzzles courts and leads to intense
academic debate. Still, because the Payton standard governs whether
police can intrude into the home, and the Supreme Court has observed
that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed, ' 169 it is important to
determine what Payton embodies. 70
C. Factors Commonly Considered by the Courts in Payton Cases
Most courts resolve Payton cases without the pretense of analysis.
Instead, one approach typically dominates--courts state the Payton
standard, list the factors that supported the belief that the suspect was
home"' (perhaps adding a statement cautioning courts to be "sensitive to
common sense factors indicating a resident's presence"'), and then they
conclude that the standard has been met." The most commonly noted
factors, which are discussed below, include: (1) suspect contact or
169. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
170. William Stuntz, who properly questions the fairness of current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence due to its emphasis on the home, states that: "Fourth Amendment law regulates house
searches more than anything else. Not only is probable cause required, but so is a warrant; indeed
homes are almost the only place where the warrant requirement remains meaningful." William J.
Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1265, 1269
(1999). Thus, one might wonder what remains of the Fourth Amendment's protections if even the
sanctity of the home is not free from concern.
171. My decision to organize this discussion by the factors the courts have considered creates a
slight problem: it may not be clear how much weight a particular factor carried when considered in
tandem with other factors. See Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir. 1999) ("No
single factor is, of course, dispositive. Rather, the court must look at all of the circumstances present
in the case to determine whether the officers entering the residence had a reasonable belief that the
suspect resided there and would be found within."); cf. id at 1229-30 (Ebel, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting "myriad ways to infer presence" but observing that time of day cases
all "had other indicia of presence besides the time of day at which they conducted their search").
Therefore, as factors supporting a reasonable belief of presence are discussed in the following
subsections, readers are strongly cautioned that in many cases multiple factors are present and the
weight of a single factor may be minimal.
172. ld at 1226 (quoting United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1538 (11 th Cir. 1995)).
173. On occasion, courts conclude that Payton's presence prong has been satisfied without
detailing the evidence in support of that conclusion. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 419 S.E.2d 334, 337
(Ga. Ct. App. 1992) ("There is no contention that the federal arrest warrant was not valid and the
undisputed evidence of record shows that the F.B.L agents had reason to believe that Wright was in
his apartment when they entered.").
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observation; (2) the presence of noise, lights and cars; and (3) the time
of day the police seek entry, especially in light of any information
regarding the suspect's schedule.
1. Suspect Contact or Observation
A relaxed approach to applying Payton is least likely to cause concern
in cases where the defendant is actually seen by police, or a third party,
in or at the residence immediately prior to entry. In the most convincing
Payton cases, either the suspect answers the door when police knock, t74
or a cohabitant answers the door and indicates that the suspect is present,
either verbally 175 or with a non-verbal cue. 17 6 In such cases, the accepted
174. See United States v. Cunningham, No. 91-50044, 1993 WL 27016, at *1, *3 (9th Cir. Feb.
4, 1993) (suspect opened and attempted to shut door); State v. Coma, 981 P.2d 754, 755 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1999) (defendant answered door when police knocked); Commonwealth v. Rivera, 710 N.E.2d
950, 953 (Mass. 1999) (after noting that the issue was waived on appeal, the court held that police
had "more than a reasonable belief; they had probable cause," that defendant was present where he
answered door in response to vigorous knocking and kicking by officers, who possessed photograph
of suspect and had just captured, as of yet unidentified, fleeing co-resident suspect outside of
apartment building); Commonwealth v. Acosta, 627 N.E.2d 466, 467-68 (Mass. 1993) (defendant
answered door when police knocked); State v. Cota, 675 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (en
banc) (same); State v. Watson, No. 17606-1-HII, 2000 WL 300814, (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2000)
(suspect answered door and as police entered to arrest subject, they pursued a woman who moved
suspiciously through the residence); see also Archer v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 826, 830-31
(Va. Ct. App. 1997) (police saw white male who "perfectly" matched suspect's description in motel
room, and after vigorous knocking, opened an apparently unsecured door).
175. See United States v. Clayton, 210 F.3d 841, 842, 844 (8th Cir. 2000) (man who answered
door indicated that suspect was present, opened door revealing suspect asleep on the couch); Parra
v. Chino, Nos. 96-55218, 96-55271, 1998 WL 88256 (9th Cir. Mar. 2, 1998) (Parra's wife
answered door, told police her husband would come to the door in a moment and then closed and
apparently locked the screen door; fearing an escape attempt, officers forcibly entered and searched
the residence for Parra); United States v. Miles, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1204-09 (D. Kan. 1999) (after
initial denials, girlfriend eventually told police that the suspect was in the apartment; entry upheld
under three different alternative theories: (1) a valid Payton entry; (2) exigent circumstances; and
(3) consent), affid, No. 00-3230, 2001 WL 815379 (10th Cir. Jul. 19, 2001) (based on consent
only); State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320, 329-30 (Mo. 1993) (mother indicated defendant was
home and then opened door further so defendant could be seen); Noel v. Commonwealth, No. 1730-
99-2, 2000 WL 781322, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. June 20, 2000) (unpublished disposition) (after man
who answered the door indicated that he would get the suspect, police officer entered residence).
In United States v. Boyd, 180 F. 3d 967 (8th Cir. 1999), the defendant argued that the trial court
erred by concluding that police had reason to believe he was a resident at the home where he was
arrested. In Boyd, officers knocked on the door, identified themselves to the suspect's girlfriend,
Troupe, told her that they possessed an arrest warrant for her boyfriend, Boyd, and asked where he
was. Id. at 973. Troupe responded that Boyd was up in his room and police went upstairs to arrest
the suspect. Id. at 973, 978. The court contended that Troupe's response to the officers ("He's up in
his room") made it "reasonable for the marshals to believe they had Troupe's consent to enter the
home." Id. at 978. Even if Troupe's comment did not amount to consent to enter, it certainly seems
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laws of time and space lead to a near-certain belief that the suspect is
present.
177
Less compelling, yet still persuasive, are cases where police or a third
party see the suspect at or near17 1 the residence some time prior to the
entry, 79 even if the identification is less than certain.180 In fact, courts
to be a strong piece of evidence that he was present. Yet, oddly, the court does not cite the comment
as support for the Payton rule, although the court details other proof of presence in the opinion. Id.
176. United States v. Stinson, 857 F. Supp. 1026, 1027 (D. Conn. 1994) (woman who answered
door "looked over her shoulder, turned toward the back of the apartment, and then turned back to
face" police, when asked for suspect's location).
177. At the other end of the spectrum would be cases where the police enter immediately after
seeing the defendant leave his home, thus eradicating any belief that the suspect is still present. As
of yet, there have been no reported cases upholding an entry on those facts. Cf. People v. White, 183
Cal. App. 3d 1199, 1209 (1986) (stating that where rape victim told police that her assailant, White,
departed from scene of crime by car a short time earlier, and no car fitting description was in
vicinity of residence, "any belief White could be found in his house was more in the nature of wild
speculation.... far below the standard of a 'reasonable belief."'). But see United States v.
Edmonds, 52 F.3d 1236, 1248 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that fact that suspect had last been seen
departing his residence did not exclude possibility that he was present, when police returned the
next morning, because "normally, a person who is currently living at an apartment returns there at
some point to spend the night").
178. U.S. v. Morgan, No. 92-5068, 1992 WL 203950 (4th Cir. Aug. 24, 1992) (per curiam)
(officer saw suspect running towards his home; interior lights were on and then off; suspect's car
was parked in the rear of the house).
179. See Boyd, 180 F.3d at 978 (confidential informant told police that suspect was at girlfriend's
residence); United States v. Smith, 131 F.3d 1392, 1396 (10th Cir. 1997) (police entered house 15
minutes after spotting suspect at the door of the garage); United States v. Spencer, 684 F.2d 220,
221-23 (2d Cir. 1982) (police arrived at defendant's home thirty-five minutes after being told by
defendant's girlfriend that he was home); People v. Wader, 854 P.2d 80, 90-91 (Cal. 1993)
(substantial evidence supported trial court's determination that officer had reasonable cause to
believe defendant was inside because "the arresting officer personally observed defendant at the
residence in the early morning hours before the arrest at davn"); People v. Dyke, 224 Cal. App. 3d
648, 659 (1990) (motel manager with picture of suspect phoned police to say she spotted the
suspect); see also Bratton v. Toboz, 764 F. Supp. 965, 968-72 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (confidential
informant informed police that the someone resembling the suspect-he was 99% sure-was at the
residence approximately two-and-a-half hours prior to police entry); Wisconsin v. Blanco, No. 98-
3153-CR, 98-3535-CR, 2000 WL 623024 (Vis. Ct. App. May 16, 2000) (one occupant saw suspect
outside of building smoking cigarette; another resident saw suspect near the apartment just before
police arrived, and police saw suspect's aborted attempt to climb out of bathroom window).
In United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1225, 1227 (10th Cir. 2001), the court held that Payton
was satisfied where a confidential informant told police that the suspect was home, after which the
police heard a "loud thud" in the residence. However, the basis for the Cl's knowledge is not clear
from the opinion. ld. at 1225, 1227-28.
180. See Anderson v. Campbell, No. 95-6459, 1996 WL 731244, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 1996)
(suspect's father, who possessed the same basic features as his son, was seen through window);
Bailey v. Kenney, 791 F. Supp. 1511, 1519-20 (D. Kan. 1992) (officers entitled to qualified
immunity in § 1983 action where police incorrectly entered residence of man with the same name as
a fugitive, because bondsman saw someone enter residence, even though a neighbor did not
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have specifically held that a later determination that the identification
was erroneous does not weaken its contribution to the reasonable belief
that the suspect was present. 8 ' Finally, contact with a suspect at a
location by phone has also been held to support the belief that the
suspect would be present at the time of entry.
182
2. Noise, Light, and Cars
Absent an indicator as clear as contact (visual or otherwise) with the
suspect, courts look to other indicia of a suspect's presence. The two
most commonly utilized factors are noise or light emanating from the
suspect's residence, 83 especially if the presence of the noise or light
represents a change from earlier circumstances.
84
positively identify a photo of the fugitive as his neighbor); see also Smith v. Tolley, 960 F. Supp.
977, 988-89 (E.D. Va. 1997) (three individuals, though not the suspect, observed in suspect's
residence, and suspect's husband emerged from the residence to confront the police); Wilson v.
Northcutt, No. l:90-CV-928JTC, 1991 WL 495710, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 25, 1991) (entry valid
where officers saw person in house, who would not come to the door, who resembled description of
suspect in warrant, but for hair color, and neighbors verified description of person present in home
prior to officer's entry). But see Watts v. Sacramento, 256 F.3d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Payton claims because it could not be said
"as a matter of law that it was reasonable" for police to believe that the man who answered the door
was the suspect), reversing Watts v. Sacramento, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1116 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
181. See State v. Green, 723 A.2d 1012 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (no constitutional
violation where police spotted someone matching the suspect's description on the street in front of
the suspect's residence and pursued him into the residence by kicking down doors, even though the
belief of the suspect's identity turned out to be incorrect).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 217 (8th Cir. 1996) (police phoned prior to
entry); Russell v. Kitsap County Sheriff's Dep't, No. 2413151-5-11, 2000 WL 380543, at *2 (Wash.
Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2000) (suspect called the police department minutes before the police arrived and
a neighbor had advised police that no one had left the house all day).
183. See United States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 63 (5th Cir. 1997) (television heard on premises);
Tolley, 960 F. Supp. at 988 (interior lights "illuminated the house"); United States v. Morehead, 959
F.2d 1489, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (lights observed illuminating both a building and a camper on the
premises); Anderson, 1996 WL 731244, at *3 (lights on at home); Hardaway v. Georgia, 372 S.E.2d
845, 846 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (moving light and noises); State v. Northover, 991 P.2d 380, 381, 384
(Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (basement light on); State v. Workman, 476 S.E.2d 301, 311 (N.C. 1996)
(lights were on inside trailer and noises were heard inside); State v. Asbury, 493 S.E.2d 349, 351-
52 (S.C. 1997) (light on in residence and kitchen window open); Russell, 2000 WL 380543, at *5 (a
light was on in the residence). But see Lyles v. City of Barling, 181 F.3d 914, 917-18 (8th Cir.
1999) (dispute in facts regarding whether light or sound emanated from the residence sufficient to
withstand summary judgment on qualified immunity defense in § 1983 action); Asbury, 493 S.E.2d
at 354-55 & 354 n.2 (Toal, J., dissenting) (noting that police sighting of light on in residence was
called into question on cross-examination).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Meindl, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1210, 1213 (D. Kan. 1999) (in
contrast to previous day, outdoor security lights activated, television operating in living room, and
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Second, courts often cite the presence of a vehicle at the residence to
support the belief that the suspect is present. There are three types of
vehicle cases. First, there are cases where a car is specifically linked to
the suspect or the police have been informed that the presence of the
vehicle means that the suspect will be present.'85 Second, there are cases
where the vehicle is not linked to the suspect, but the court still finds the
presence of a vehicle to carry some weight in terms of indicating
presence.8 6 Third, there are cases where the vehicles present have been
linked to known friends or associates of the suspect. In this third group
of cases, the presence of the vehicle supports the conclusion that a friend
is visiting the resident, which in turn supports the theory that the suspect
is present. 87
electric meter on house moving at accelerated pace); U.S. v. Morgan, No. 92-5068, 1992 WL
203950 (4th Cir. Aug. 24, 1992) (interior lights were on and then off).
185. See United States v. Boyd, 180 F. 3d 967, 978 (8th Cir. 1999) (hood of girlfriend's car still
warm, and car matching description of car driven by suspect parked outside of the girlfriend's
residence); United States v. Edmonds, 52 F.3d 1236, 1248 (3d Cir. 1995) (black Ford Mustang
connected to suspect seen parked outside of residence); United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530,
1537-38 (1lth Cir. 1995) (despite dispute in evidence, presence of vehicle allegedly connected to
fugitive contributed to reasonableness of conclusion that he was at home); Morgan, 1992 WL
203950, at *1 (suspect's car was parked in the rear of the house); United States v. Litteral, 910 F.2d
547, 553-54 (9th Cir. 1990) (informant told agents that if suspect's car was there, he would be
present); United States v. De Parias, 805 F.2d 1447, 1457 (1lth Cir. 1986) (apartment manager told
agents that suspects were at home if a certain car was parked outside of the premises); United States
v. Beck, 729 F.2d 1329, 1331 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (suspect's car parked nearby his apartment); United
States v. Hagman, Nos. 00-40050-01/02-DES, 2000 WL 1476578, at *1-3 (D. Kan. Sept. 19, 2000)
(a bail bondsman that staked out the motel room for three days and was told by a motel employee
that the suspect drove a gold Pontiac and that if the car was there, then the suspect was there);
United States v. Segarra, No. 5:91-CR-53 (WWE), 1991 WL 434803, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 27,
1991) (defendant's vehicle parked in the vicinity of the apartment complex); Archer v.
Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 826, 829-31 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (police received anonymous tip
stating that a wanted man who drove a light green Geo Storm was at a named hotel; when police
located the car in front of a motel room, they knocked on the door vigorously, opening the
unsecured door, revealing presence of suspect). But see Lyles, 181 F.3d at 917-18 (presence of
vehicle, which was warm to the touch indicating it had recently been driven, not dispositive where
neighbor told police that another vehicle had recently departed the residence); Harasim v. Kuchar,
702 F. Supp. 178, 182 (N.D. 111. 1988) (summary judgment in favor of police officer denied where
police did not verify the presence of either of two vehicles connected to the defendant).
186. See Bervaldi, 226 F.3d at 1258, 1267 (two trucks and boat trailer parked at residence);
Route, 104 F.3d at 63 (unidentified vehicle remained in driveway as co-resident suspect
apprehended as he attempted to depart by car); Tolley, 960 F. Supp. at 988 (two cars parked near the
suspect's home, "one in the driveway and one in the street"); United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d
1489, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (multiple vehicles present); Russell, 2000 WL 380543, at *2, *5 (four
vehicles were parked outside of the residence; and a neighbor had advised the police that no one had
left the house all day).
187. See Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1538 ("The presence of a visitor at a residence supports the
reasonable conclusion that the resident is at home.").
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3. Time of Day and the Suspect's Schedule
Courts also have given great weight to the time of day the police seek
entry. Early morning t88 or late evening"' police entry weighs in favor of
finding that it was reasonable to believe the suspect was at home,
although it is arguable whether the time of day, without more, should
suffice to permit entry."g The time of day factor is often viewed in
conjunction with information about the suspect's schedule."' 1 Therefore,
the fact that the suspect is not known to be working could affect how
police act at a particular time of day. Thus, in one case, the Tenth Circuit
188. See Edmonds, 52 F.3d at 1248 (police arrived at 6:45 a.m. and monitored apartment until
9:40); Beck, 729 F.2d at 1331-32 (7:30 a.m.); United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 319 (2d Cir.
1983) (8:45 a.m. on a Sunday morning); United States v. Lovelock, No. 96 CR. 440 (HB), 1997 WL
4574, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (7:00 to 8:00 a.m. and door was found open), aFtd 170 F.3d 339 (2d
Cir. 1999) (not addressing presence prong of Payton); United States v. Stinson, 857 F. Supp. 1026,
1031-32 (D. Conn. 1994) (approximately 7:00 a.m.); Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 693 N.E.2d
1007, 1010 (Mass. 1998) (5:00 to 6:00 a.m.); People v. Ocasio, 430 N.Y.S.2d 971, 975 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct., 1980) (noting that "the police entered at 6:30 a.m., a time when it would be expected the
suspect was sleeping"); Asbury, 493 S.E.2d at 350 (just after daybreak). But see Blake v. Peterson,
No. 94 C 6561, 1995 WL 360702, at *10 (N.D. I11. 1995) (concluding, where court had already held
that the police did not have reason to believe that the suspect resided at the residence to be entered,
entry at 6:15 a.m. not justified under Payton, where vehicle associated with suspect not present and
surveillance not performed at residence); Harasim, 702 F. Supp. at 182 (denying summary
judgment in favor of police officer in civil rights action where only fact adduced in support of
reason to believe that suspect was present was officer's testimony of "belief that persons are always
home at 7:00 a.m."); State v. Miller, 777 A.2d 348, 364 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (after
holding that police did not have reasonable belief as to residence, also holding that police entry to
serve parole arrest warrant at 7:10 a.m. was impermissible because the officers did not "offer any
basis for a reasonable belief, beyond the early hour, that defendant was present within").
In United States v. Miles, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Kan. 1999), the court noted the time of entry in
its findings of facts, id. at 1204, and cited case law referring to the time of day factor in its legal
discussion, id. at 1207, but did not explicitly rely on the time of entry, 9 a.m., in its legal analysis.
See id. at 1208.
189. Tolley, 960 F. Supp. at 988 (Monday at 10:30 p.m.); Anderson v. Campbell, No. 95-6459,
1996 WL 731244, at *3 (10th Cir. 1996) (8:45 p.m. on a cold, snowy evening); State v. Northover,
991 P.2d 380, 384 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (8 p.m.); State v. Workman, 476 S.E. 2d 301, 311 (N.C.
1996) (11:30 p.m. on a Sunday night).
190. Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1230 (10th Cir. 1999) (Ebel, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that the "time of day" circuit court cases cited by the majority all "had
other indicia of presence besides the time of day at which they conducted their search").
191. See Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1535 ("[O]fficers may presume that a person is at home at certain
times of the day-a presumption which can be rebutted by contrary evidence regarding the suspect's
known schedule.").
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(over a vigorous dissent 92) upheld a midday entry where the suspect
purportedly was unemployed and liked to stay out late drinking.193
4. The Phantom Suspect
Courts have been willing to overlook the absence of a direct sighting
of a suspect by police or neighbors under the theory that a fugitive would
likely be laying low to avoid detection and apprehension. 94 At first
192. See Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1230 n.2 (Ebel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(expressing disagreement with majority's portrayal of the level of certainty in the officer's
declaration regarding the suspect's lifestyle). Judge Ebel's dissent in Valdez remains one of the most
thoughtful judicial considerations of Payton, in large part because of Ebel's willingness to question
the factual conclusions asserted by the prosecution and the majority.
193. See id at 1226-27 (holding that midday entry was valid where officer asserted knowledge
that suspect was unemployed and liked to stay out late drinking).
Although there is no indication in the record that the officers had reason to know whether
appellant would be at his home when they went there to execute the arrest warrant, we find it a
reasonable anticipation on the officers' part to believe that a person would be at his place of
abode, especially at 8:30 in the morning for a man not known to be working.
United States v. Woods, 560 F.2d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 1977) (pre-Payton case). But see People v.
Jacobs, 729 P.2d 757, 759-62 (Cal. 1987) (in case decided under state law, although police knew
that the defendant did not have a day job, without more evidence of presence, it was not reasonable
to enter his residence at 3:20 p.m.).
194. See United States v. Edmonds, 52 F.3d 1236, 1248 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that belief
that suspect was present "not dispelled by the fact that someone probably involved in a drug
operation did not appear when the agents announced themselves at his door"); Magluta, 44 F.3d at
1535 ("[O]fficers may take into consideration the possibility that the resident may be aware that
police are attempting to ascertain whether or not the resident is at home .... ); United States v.
Beck, 729 F.2d 1329, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 1984) (determining that lack of response to knock and
announcement did not prove that no one was at home "since it was reasonable to expect a fugitive to
hide or flee if possible"); United States v. Meindl, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1213 (D. Kan. 1999)
(stating that police could reasonably believe defendant was concealing himself when he did not
respond to the knock on the door, especially in light of their experience serving a different arrest
warrant on the suspect two weeks earlier); Bailey v. Kenney, 791 F. Supp. 1511, 1520 (D. Kan.
1992) ("[lMhe failure of the person within the house to respond to the knocks at the door,
accompanied by the announcement that they were police officers, could reasonably be interpreted as
an attempt to evade apprehension."); United States v. Segarra, No. 5:91-CR-53 (WWE), 1991 WL
434803, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 27, 1991) ("It was reasonable for the officers to conclude that the
Defendant failed to respond to their knocks because he was hiding or fleeing."); State v. Beal, 994
P.2d 669, 673 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that suspect was a fugitive with a "history of eluding
officers"); see also 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.1(a), at 230 (3d ed. 1996) ("[I]f
the defendant's quarters are dark and no sounds or movements can be detected within and no one
answers the door, the other facts and circumstances (e.g. nature of the crime, crime recently
committed, defendant's car parked nearby) may nonetheless support the inference that the defendant
is concealing himself therein.").
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blush this seems to create a Catch-22195 for those seeking to avoid
detection by the police-if they are seen by police, then Payton is
automatically satisfied and police may enter the residence, yet if they
evade detection, police may presume that they are in hiding and
exhibiting behavior consistent with a criminal suspect. To be fair,
though, courts do not typically treat the absence of the suspect as an
indicator of presence 19 6-- they simply refuse to treat a lack of sighting as
a powerful Payton defense. 97
More to the point, deference to the police on direct suspect
observation probably arises from the refusal of the courts to impose any
affirmative investigative duty on police in the otherwise lawful
execution of arrest warrants. 198 This deference seems to be a reflection of
195. The use of this phrase should not be taken to suggest that it is necessarily improper to force
a criminal fugitive suspect into a "Catch-22."
196. But see United States v. Hagman, Nos. 00-40050-01/02-DES, 2000 WL 1476578, at *3 (D.
Kan. Sept. 19, 2000) ("[Ihe defendant did not respond to the officers knocking and announcing
their presence. A suspect who does not answer the door when officers knock or announce their
presence may also support a reasonable belief the suspect is present.") (citing Valdez, 172 F.3d at
1226). Of course, there is an enormous difference between holding that a reasonable belief that the
suspect is present may still be warranted even if the suspect does not answer the door, and
concluding that the fact that the suspect did not answer the door supports the reasonable belief as to
presence. The Hagman court blurs this distinction.
197. See Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1538:
[Tihe officers were entitled to consider that Magluta was a fugitive from justice, wanted on a 24
count drug trafficking indictment, who might have been concealing his presence. This could
explain why the marshals never saw Magluta during their observation, and why he might not
have been spotted previously. Hence, the lack of direct evidence that Magluta had been seen
that day does not eviscerate the marshals' reasonable conclusion that he was home.
There are rare situations where an absence of evidence has probative value. A leading Second
Circuit Payton case, United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1983), provides an interesting
related example. In Terry, police sought to enter a suspect's residence at 8:45 a.m. on a Sunday
morning. Id. at 319. Outside of the residence, a 12-year old boy wearing a shirt with the name
"Terry" on it told police that his parents lived in the apartment and "did not indicate that his father
was not at home." Id. (emphasis added). The court accepted the boy's silence as support for the
proposition that the father was home. Id.; see also United States v. Miles, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1201,
1207 (D. Kan. 1999) (citing Terry, 702 F.2d at 319, for the proposition that "officers may consider
an absence of evidence the suspect is elsewhere").
198. See Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1226 ("Direct surveillance or the actual viewing of the suspect on
the premises is not required."); id. at 1226 n.2 ("While surveillance certainly may bolster a Payton
entry, the cases fail to reveal any requirement of substantial prior surveillance of a residence prior to
entry."); see also Terry, 702 F.2d at 319 ("We have rejected the contention that the police must first
conduct a thorough investigation to obtain evidence of an arrestee's actual presence before entering
his residence." (citing United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 984 (2d Cir.1980)).
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the judiciary's long-standing institutional concerns regarding second-
guessing police work.199
D. Dubious Payton Cases
In cases where multiple factors indicate the suspect's presence, the
theoretical weakness of the typical Payton approach is not evident. The
fallibility of this method manifests itself when police possess scant
evidence of a suspect's presence, or even information suggesting that the
suspect is not at home.200 For example, in United States v. May,"0' police
investigating a murder that took place on a Saturday afternoon learned
that the suspect spent Saturday night at his residence.2'2 An arrest
warrant was issued on the following Monday and, without any other
information, police entered the suspect's residence on Tuesday
morning." In holding the entry valid under the Fourth Amendment, the
court stated:
Thomas slept somewhere on Sunday and Monday. The police
reasonably could suppose that the somewhere was the address on
the affidavit and that Thomas would still be inside at 11:20 a.m.
199. For example, in the context of investigatory stops, the Supreme Court has warned:
A court... should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing
situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing.... A
creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine
some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished.
But "[t]he fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished
by 'less intrusive' means does not, by itself, render the search unreasonable."
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985) (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433, 447 (1973)). Anthony Amsterdam captured the essence of judicial deference to police action
over twenty-five years ago, when he explained:
What [a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard] means in practice is that appellate courts
defer to trial courts and trial courts defer to the police. What other results should we expect? If
there are no fairly clear rules telling the policeman what he may and may not do, courts are
seldom going to say that what he did was unreasonable.
Amsterdam, supra note 154, at 394.
200. It could be argued, however, that the foliowing cases do not reflect an intrinsic weakness in
the Payton methodology, but rather that the courts simply failed to properly weigh the indicia of
presence. Another possibility is that these cases were decided correctly and that the Payton standard
is simply extremely lenient towards police behavior and is satisfied with little evidence of presence.
Neither perspective weakens this Article's critique that these opinions lack sufficient factual bases.




when they arrived. The police could not be certain of this but
certainty is not required.... Thomas must have felt safe at his
dwelling, having returned there after committing a murder in broad
daylight.... and the logical place one would expect to find
Thomas on that Tuesday morning was at his home.2°4
The D.C. Circuit's application of Payton to May's facts eviscerates
the Payton rule. First, the fact that Thomas slept at his home on the night
of the murder-prior to the issuance of a warrant for his arrest-does
not lead to the conclusion that he slept there on subsequent nights.
Second, even if such an assumption is warranted, it is questionable
whether 11:20 a.m. is early enough to support the presumption that May
would still be on the premises." 5 Perhaps the May court's true reasoning
can be found in its statement: "Given the gravity of his crime, the police
would have been remiss if they had not attempted to apprehend him as
quickly as possible. And the logical place one would expect to find
Thomas on that Tuesday morning was at his home., 20 6 This is akin to a
rebuttable presumption that dangerous felons can be found at home.20 7
The question remains, however, of whether this presumption is
warranted, and if so, whether courts should be forced to explicitly state
this as the governing rule, as opposed to shrouding their actions in
Payton's "reason to believe" balancing test.
An approach similar to May was utilized by the Massachusetts
Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto,208 where an informant
notified the police that he had seen DiBenedetto in his residence four
days earlier. The DiBenedetto court reasoned that "[tihere was no reason
to believe that DiBenedetto had left,"20 9 and held that the early morning
204. Id. (citations omitted).
205. See supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the presumptions
regarding the time of day a person might logically be found at home.
206. May, 68 F.3d at 516.
207. LAFAVE, supra note 194, § 6.1(a), at 225-26:
Sometimes when the objection is raised that the police entered the defendant's premises without
probable cause to believe he was then there, the court will respond in a way which makes it less
than clear whether the probable cause requirement is being accepted or rejected, as by saying
that "rudimentary police procedure dictates that a suspect's residence be eliminated as a
possible hiding place before a search is conducted elsewhere."
(quoting People v. Sprovieri, 95 Ill.App.2d 10, 238 N.E.2d 115 (1968)).
208. 693 N.E.2d 1007 (Mass. 1998).
209. Id. at 1010.
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timing of the police entry210 and the fact that the door was ajar not only
easily satisfied the reason to believe test, but probable cause as well.
21'
Note that the court did not state that police investigation had failed to
turn up information suggesting that the suspect had departed, just that no
information rebutted this belief. In a sense, the DiBenedetto court
implicitly put the burden on the suspect to produce evidence that it was
unreasonable for the police to believe he was present.
Even evidence rebutting the belief that the suspect is present has
failed to persuade courts that the police did not possess reason to believe
the suspect was present. In Minnesota v. Williams,21 2 the hotel desk clerk
informed police that the suspect had not stayed in his room the night
before the search," 3 and that he had been locked out of his room for
failure to pay his bill.2"4 Despite this powerful evidence that the suspect
would not be in the room, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that
police entry into the hotel room was proper under Payton.215 The
Williams court provided no reasoning for its conclusion, simply stating:
The arrest warrant justified the limited entry into room 226 to
determine possible locations where the arrestee could conceal
himself. The police officers were not required to rely on the hotel
manager who told them that Hayes/Lebeau was not in his room. A
valid arrest warrant implicitly grants police the limited authority to
enter a suspect's residence 'when there is reason to believe the
suspect is within.' The officers acted reasonably in seeking
210. Although the opinion states that warrant execution occurred "between 5 A.M. and 6 P.M,"
id., the description of the entry as "early morning' strongly suggests that the "P.M." is a
typographical error.
211. I- at 1010; see also United States v. Junkman, 160 F.3d 1191, 1192-93 (8th Cir. 1998)
(police entered male suspect's purported hotel room, allegedly rented by someone else on his behalf,
when in response to their knock and announce a female occupant yelled "cops" and officers heard a
commotion within the room).
212. 409 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
213. Id. at 554-55.
214. Id.
215. The fruits of the search, however, were suppressed on the grounds that police exceeded the
bounds of a reasonable search for the suspect. See icL at 556 ("The trial court did not clearly err in
ruling that police officers lacked justification for conducting an exploratory search of the hotel room
when armed with a valid arrest warrant.... [They had no authority to search the room, even
ostensibly to verify identification of the fugitive or to determine if the fugitive had an airline ticket
and was preparing to flee the state.").
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admission into Hayes/Lebeau's room to determine if he was
present.
2 6
Unpublished opinions have applied Payton in a similarly lax
manner.21 7 A series of federal district court cases in New York is
instructive. In United States v. Hughes,1 8 the court concluded that
because the suspect was originally arrested in the apartment-nearly six
months earlier-there was "sound reason to believe she could be found
there again."2'19 Likewise, the court in Magedson v. Fina? held that
there was "uncontroverted evidence" that the suspect "was on the
premises at the time of the search, ' 21 because the suspect provided the
address to police at an earlier time. 222 Finally, in United States v.
Pichardo,2 the court elevated Payton deference to its highest level by
simply skipping the presence prong of the Payton rule altogether 2 4
Although the opinion describes in detail how police formed probable
cause (the court's term) to believe that the suspect named in the warrant,
Carmen Rosario, resided at the residence to be entered,as there is no
216. Id. at 555 (citations omitted). The use of the dual name "Hayes/Lebeau" arises out of the
fact that police possessed an arrest warrant for Richard Charles Hayes, but "[t]he deputies were
informed that Hayes was staying at the hotel under the name of John Lebeau." Id. at 554.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the police were in the wrong room and that they sought to
use the contraband discovered against Williams, not Hayes/Lebeau.
217. See, e.g., United States v. Grubb, No. 95-5103, 1996 WL 200326, at *1, *4 (10th Cir. 1996)
(entry into living quarters located on the second floor of a business held proper under Payton where
the business owner stated: "Well, I think he is at work. He drives our truck and it's not there, but I
am not sure. He may be asleep.").
218. No. 88 CR. 257 (CSH), 1989 WL 1308 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1989).
219. Id. at *3.
220. No. 91-CV-213, 1993 WL 113489 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1993) (granting summary judgment
on § 1983 claim).
221. Id. at*ll.
222. Id. at *10.
223. No. 92 CR. 354 (RPP), 1992 WL 249964 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1992).
224. Id. at *3; see also Anderson v. United States, 107 F.Supp.2d 191, 196-97 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(holding that Payton was satisfied without analyzing the presence prong); Sharp v. McWilliams,
No. Civ. A.3:98-CV-1454L, 1999 WL 814546, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 1999) (discussing and
applying Payton standard without reference to facts satisfying the presence prong); State v.
Pederson, No. 19450-7-r, 2001 WL 1187159, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2001) (holding that
the fact that the residence belonged to the suspect, "supported a reasonable inference that they
would find her there," even though a roommate stated that he did not see the suspect on the
premises).
225. Pichardo, 1992 WL 249964, at *1.
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mention of a police determination that Rosario was present at the time of
attempted entry. 6
It is hard to imagine Payton embodying less than in the previous three
opinions,' but two other notably lenient opinions bear mentioning.
United States v. Wickizern represented the Sixth Circuit's first attempt
at applying Payton. In Wickizer, the court upheld police entry into a
cabin without any discussion of Payton's presence prong.229 The only
evidence adduced prior to police entry was a tip that the suspect "was
staying at a cabin with another man and woman. ' Perhaps the
background facts of Wickizer motivated the court's decision-
particularly that the suspect had recently escaped from jail and police
had been told that he was armed and that he had said that he would not
be taken alive. 3 Still, those facts, compelling as they might have been,
do not explain why the court neglected to discuss Payton's presence
requirement.
More recently, a Kansas Court of Appeals opinion tried valiantly to
lower the Payton bar. In State v. Beal,"3 the court held that police
properly entered a detached garage on Beal's property when executing a
warrant for his arrest.3 The garage, a heavy metal structure with no
windows and only a small "swivel-type" peephole, was locked. 3 Police
had been told while searching the main residence alternatively that Beal
was "out of town" and "over at Jimmy' s."235
The Beal court concluded that Payton was satisfied and that police
were justified in opening the garage door with a battering ram and
utilizing a police dog to sniff out the suspect because "some of the
226. The Pichardo court mentioned the time of entry-approximately 8:00 a.m.-but only as
background. Id.
227. At least one district judge in New York has applied Payton with more bite. See United
States v. Martinez, No. S2 92 Cr. 839 (SWK), 1993 WL 322768, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1993)
(case discussed, infra, note 261).
228. 633 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1980).
229. Id at 901-02.
230. Id at 901.
231. Id
232. 994 P.2d 669 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000).
233. Id at 673. After a police dog indicated the presence of drugs in a cabinet, police withdrew
and obtained a search warrant. Id. at 671.
234. Id. at 671, 673.
235. Id. at 671.
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officers knew Beal had used the detached garage as an office""2 s and he
"was a fugitive [with] a history of eluding officers. ' 2 7 The court also
observed that the police had previously searched the office pursuant to a
search warrant. 3 No evidence supported the belief that Beal was on the
premises at the time the police arrived 39
There are several ways of analyzing the cases above. First, one might
argue that the courts that dropped Payton's presence prong simply erred
as a matter of law. Those opinions should have been reversed and the
courts should have been required to re-apply the Payton test with both
the residence and presence prongs intact. Or, in the alternative, it is
possible that the above cases adopted, sub silentio, a presumption that
proof of residence supports proof of current presence-to such an extent
that analysis of presence is unnecessary. The question then would be
whether this assumption is empirically sound. Does residence prove
presence? And if so, why did Payton separate the two elements? More
likely, the courts that dropped the Payton presence prong simply did in
the open what most courts have routinely done behind the guise of
balancing factors: failed to determine whether police had an empirically
sound basis for believing that the suspect would be at home.
236. Id. at 673.
237. Id.
238. Id. The court neither fully elaborates on the circumstances of the prior search, nor explains
how the information from that search supported the Payton entry at issue. See id.
239. Another case where the court declined to mention Payton's presence prong was Clayton v.
City of Kingston, 44 F. Supp. 2d 177 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). In this case, Taisha Clayton brought a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action against police, the department and the city, based upon events surrounding the
execution of an arrest warrant at Clayton's residence for Yves Francois, whom the police believed
was staying with another man, Omar Finch, at Clayton's apartment. ld at 177-78. Clayton argued
that a search warrant was required, pursuant to Steagald, because she was not named in the arrest
warrant. Id. at 180. The court granted the officers' motion for summary judgment based upon
qualified immunity. Id. at 182. In response to Clayton's argument, the court naturally focused on the
residence issue to determine whether Payton or Steagald governed. However, once Judge McAvoy
determined that there was sufficient proof that Francois was residing or "staying" at the apartment
to invoke Payton, id. at 182, there is no discussion of the proof adduced of Francois's presence at
the time of entry. (Though in the "background" section of the opinion, there is an indication that
Francois had been seen outside of the residence at an earlier point in the day-but the time between
sighting and entry is not specified.) It is quite possible that the court did not address this issue
because Clayton did not raise it or the facts suggesting Francois's presence at the time of entry were
indisputable. Nevertheless, as the Clayton court itself observed, Payton is explicitly a two-prong
test. See id. at 181 (quoting United States v. Lovelock, 170 F.3d 339, 343 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting
United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1995))). So, while one cannot say that the court
erred by failing to consider the second prong (because it might not have been at issue), mention of
the presence issue would have been prudent.
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E. Payton Comes Alive!
As the foregoing suggests, it is extremely rare for courts to hold that
the Payton standard has not been met." ° With a few notable exceptions,
courts usually hold that the police have reason to believe that a suspect
was present if the police possessed no information in their favor or if the
state waived its right to argue this point.241 For example, in State v.
Loftin,24 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that police violated
Payton by entering a residence to execute an arrest warrant because,
during the course of a one and a half-hour stakeout, there was no sign of
the suspect or his previously identified blue van and no answer at the
residence. 3 In fact, one officer even testified that "no one appeared to
240. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 194, at 226 ("The actual exclusion of evidence on the ground that
the police lacked probable cause to believe that the defendant was present in his own home at the
time of entry has occurred but rarely."). Due to the court's cursory discussion, it is not clear whether
United States v. Diaz-Garcia, 808 F. Supp. 784, 787 (S.D. Fla. 1992), should be included in this
Part as a lax Payton case. In Diaz-Garcia, the court specifically discredited the wife's testimony that
she told the police at the door that the her husband, the subject of a warrant, was present and that he
was on his way out to surrender. Id. Instead, the court explicitly adopted the government's version
of the facts, namely that when police knocked on the door and asked if the woman's husband was
present, she said no and refused police entry to search. Id.
Yet, the facts set forth in the Diaz-Garcia opinion contain an interesting inconsistency--one
officer testified that the defendant "could be seen from outside the door," id., while the opinion also
states that "officers proceeded one or two steps into the doorway, and observed the defendant .... "
Id. at 786. The court should have reconciled the two versions of the facts, lest it be suggested that a
Payton police residential entry can be validated by information gained after police enter the
residence.
241. See, e.g., Hoppe v. O'Rourke, No. 98-CV-3548, 2000 WL 748106, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 8,
2000) (denying defense motion for summary judgment in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action where defendant
police officer testified in deposition that he did not believe that the suspect was present when he and
his partner entered the plaintiff's home to execute an arrest warrant); State v. Lofton, No. C8-01-
195, 2001 WL 1035033, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2001) (state neither filed brief on appeal
nor argued before the district court that suspect resided at location entered); cf United States v.
Curzi, 867 F.2d 36, 39 n.3 (1st Cir. 1989) (district court found and government conceded that police
did not have "probable cause" to believe that resident for whom outstanding arrest warrant existed
was present at the time of entry).
242. 275 S.E.2d 575 (S.C. 1981).
243. Id. at 576. In State v. Peacher, 280 S.E. 2d 559, 579 (W. Va. 1981), the court engaged in
Payton-type analysis (Peacher is not a Payton case, since the police did not possess an arrest
warrant when they first entered the residence, see id. at 579) and held that police did not have
reason to believe the suspect was present when they first entered his residence. The court noted that
the police returned to the suspect's trailer precisely because the trail had gone cold, id. at 579, and
concluded that the police officer's decision to allow himself to be pushed, unarmed, through a small
window in search of a suspect in a recent brutal murder, belied the police's assertion that they
thought the suspect was present. Id. at 579-80. The police in Peacher attempted to justify their
entry based on exigent circumstances. Id. at 579. Though the court held that the police improperly
entered the residence, the court upheld the admission of the evidence under the "independent source
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be home."2" In Loftin, police seem to have primarily sought to justify
their entry based upon the property manager's consent 45-there is no
mention that the state put forward facts regarding the suspect's presence
to justify police entry.246
In People v. Jacobs,247 police sought to arrest John Albert Jacobs at
his residence at approximately 3:20 p.m. and were greeted by his eleven-
year old daughter at the door.248 There was conflicting testimony
regarding whether the daughter consented to the subsequent police entry
that led to the discovery of stolen merchandise.249 It was undisputed,
however, that the defendant's vehicles were nowhere in sight,2o there
was no suggestion that the defendant had seen the police approaching
and was attempting to hide,"' and the defendant's daughter told police
that he would be back in an hour. 2 At the heart of the police argument
was the asserted belief that Jacobs would be present because they knew
that Jacobs did not have a day job. 3 However, the court concluded that
although the police officer's "testimony supports an inference that
defendant could be home at 3:20 p.m., when the officers attempted to
serve the warrant, it does not, without more, support a finding that the
rule." See id. at 580.C"In this case all of the independent evidence upon which a finding of probable
cause could have been based was discovered prior to the illegal entry and none of it was discovered
as a result of police illegality.").
244. Loftin, 275 S.E.2d at 576.
245. This is all mere conjecture as the opinion's discussion on this point is rather cursory. Id. at
576-77.
246. Id. at 576.
247. 729 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1987). Jacobs is technically not a Payton case, since it was decided
under § 844 of the California Penal Code, which provides:
To make an arrest.. . a peace officer may break open the door or window of the house in which
the person to be arrested is, or in which they have reasonable grounds for believing him to be,
after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which admittance is desired.
Id. at 760 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 844). Nevertheless, Jacobs is included here because it applies
a similar standard to the Payton rule, and represents one of the few cases in which police entering a
residence in reliance upon an arrest warrant were deemed to have acted improperly. The decision to
include Jacobs here is quite debatable, especially because the Jacobs court seems to equate the
statutory standards found in § 844 with probable cause. Id. at 761.
248. Id at 759.




253. Id. at 760-61. In fact, Jacobs was suspected of stealing from his night job. Id. at 759.
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Even less evidence was proffered in State v. Roepka,25 where the
state conceded (and the court agreed) that police had no reason to
believe that the suspect, Ruzicka, was within the trailer house occupied
by Roepka.s 6 If the state's concession were not enough, the opinion is
devoid of any indication that the suspect was present; to the contrary, the
suspect was not spotted during surveillance and Roepka denied
Ruzicka's presence 5 7 As in Loftin, the more forceful argument made on
appeal centered on the issue of Roepka's consent to the police entry, 8
so the case was remanded to the lower court to make findings on that
score5 9 One gets the sense reading Roepka that the lower court simply
misapplied the Payton rule, and on appeal, the state, exhibiting excellent
judgment, decided to let the matter go.
In Loftin, Jacobs, and Roepka, police armed with arrest warrants but
lacking any evidence of the suspects' presence26° could not enter the
suspects' residence. If these cases suggest that Payton has limits, they
only establish that Payton does not create a per se rule allowing entry
under all circumstances. 26' None of these three published opinions
254. Id. at 761. A recent New Jersey case is also on point. In State v. Miller, 777 A.2d 348, 364
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), the court first held that police did not have reasonable belief as to
Payton's residence prong and then also held that the police entry to serve parole arrest warrant at
7:10 a.m. was impermissible because the officers did not "offer any basis for a reasonable belief,
beyond the early hour, that defendant was present within."
255. 347 N.W.2d 857 (Neb. 1984).
256. It at 858-59 (remanding for determination of whether resident consented to police entry).
257. ld. at 858; see also United States v. Aldred, No. 00-200-KI, 2000 WL 1310655, at *3 (D.
Or. Sept. 14, 2000) (granting suppression of evidence where suspect had been ordered to vacate the
shed in which he was residing approximately three weeks before police entry, and nothing in the
record indicated the suspect's presence), rev'd on other grounds, No. 00-30311, 2001 WL 1108919
(9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2001).
258. Roepka, 347 N.W.2d at 858.
259. See id.
260. Although People v. Cabral, 560 N.Y.S.2d 71 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1990), is a "residence," not a
"presence," case, it bears mentioning. In Cabral, the court held that officers improperly entered a
residence where their sole basis for entry was the subject's address on court papers from six months
earlier, especially since the current resident, who was present at 8:30 a.m., had a telephone bill from,
and key for, the apartment. Id. at 74.
261. A few unpublished opinions have applied Payton with more bite. See United States v.
Kratzer, No. 00-10020-01-JTM, 2000 WL 882434, at *3 (D. Kan. June 5, 2000) (no reasonable
basis for police entry where no one answered the door, all of the doors but the one inside the garage
that lead to the house were unlocked, no lights were on in the home, no sounds came from within
the house and the only vehicle on the premises was an old Chevy truck located in the detached shed,
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provide a strong demonstration of judicial vigilance in the exercise of
the Payton standard.262
F. A Less Critical Note on the Limits Imposed by Payton
The foregoing discussion amply illustrates the deference courts
extend to police in the interpretation and application of Payton's
presence prong. This should not be taken to suggest that judicial
deference on the right to enter a residence under Payton insulates the
police from all potential Fourth Amendment liability regarding their
activities at the residence. 63 The Supreme Court has observed that "the
Fourth Amendment does require that police actions in execution of a
warrant be related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion."'  This
and one detective testified that suspect would probably be driving a small Ford sedan), afTd, No.
00-3203, 2001 WL 589883 (10th Cir. June 1, 2001); Speaks v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 96-
3428, 1996 WL 741996, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 1996) (finding genuine issue of material fact
existed as to police officers' reasonable belief that suspect was present in home on date of entry,
where only information proffered by defendants was that police possessed information that the
suspect hung out or stayed in the residence at issue); State v. Lantzer, No. 62616, 1992 WL 74234,
at *1 (Ohio Ct. App Apr. 9, 1992) (per curiam) (upholding trial court's suppression of evidence,
where officers entered residence at night to execute an arrest warrant for a misdemeanor offense,
after officers, with a 15-man SWAT team, had performed surveillance on house for one and one-half
hours, and had observed no activity which could make them reasonably believe the suspect was in
the house).
In United States v. Martinez, Nos. S2 92 Cr. 839 (SWK), 1993 WL 322768, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 19, 1993), the court held that Marshals did not have reason to believe that the suspect was
present even though: (1) they arrived at 5:30 a.m. and sought entry at 7:30 a.m. (monitoring the
apartment in the interim); (2) noise from a radio or television emanated from the apartment; and (3)
the superintendent identified the suspect's photograph and stated that he usually left later in the day.
Id. at *4. The court was unconvinced, noting that over the two-hour period of direct surveillance, the
Marshals heard no footsteps, nothing being moved, no talking, and no doors opening or closing. Id.
at *6. Most important, the Marshals had previously been informed that the suspect was splitting
between the apartment and his wife's residence, a fact that the court believed raised the burden of
proof for entry. Id. at *5.
262. It appears that judicial vigilance is more likely at the summary judgment stage of a Payton
civil action. See, e.g., Lyles v. City of Barling, 181 F.3d 914, 917-18 (8th Cir. 1999) (dispute in
facts regarding whether light or sound emanated from the residence sufficient to withstand summary
judgment on qualified immunity defense in § 1983 action).
263. See Carl Horn, For the Criminal Practitioner: Review of Fourth Circuit Opinions in
Criminal Cases Decided in Calendar Year 1992, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 119, 177 (1993):
A valid arrest warrant carries with it the authority to enter the home of the person to be arrested,
assuming there is reason to believe the person may be inside. Once validly inside the house,
other principles relative to search and seizure may apply, including particularly searches
incident to arrest and the plain view doctrine.
(citation omitted).
264. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611 (1999).
Posner, Pragmatism, and Payton
clearly means that police may still violate the Fourth Amendment if their
actions go beyond what is necessary to locate and arrest a suspect,
especially if the suspect surrenders at the door.265 Depending on the
facts, though, police overreaching may be most accurately characterized
as a violation of Maryland v. Buie,266 which authorizes limited protective
sweeps incident to arrest, rather than as a Payton violation. Although the
outcome may be the same under Buie or Payton, there is a danger that
imprecise reasoning may make it difficult for subsequent courts to
understand the applicability and boundaries of each doctrine.
Consider, for example, State v. Risinger,267 in which three police
officers sought to arrest a suspect at home. The full facts from the
opinion are provided here, because the timing of events is important:
Two officers, Hutson and Siegler, appeared at the front door, and
Officer King went to the rear of the apartment to secure its back
door. The two officers knocked at the front door, and appellee
opened it. After the officers identified themselves and told appellee
that he was wanted by the El Dorado Police Department, appellee
invited the officers into the foyer of the apartment and explained to
them that police departments sometimes get him and his cousin
mixed up. Because the foyer area was small, the two officers and
the appellee stepped into the living room area to further discuss
and effect the appellee's arrest. In addition, the appellee had
265. See, e.g., United States v. Albrektsen, 151 F.3d 951, 954-55 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
police violated arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights where they entered hotel room after suspect
volunteered at the threshold of the room); State v. Kubit, 627 N.W. 2d 914, 919-24 (Iowa 2001)
(same); see also e.g., People v. LeBlanc, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 195, 200-01 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(determining that police executing arrest warrant at hotel room violated the Fourth Amendment
where, after spotting contraband in plain view, they searched the rest of the hotel room without a
search warrant); State v. Estep, 753 N.E.2d 22, 26-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that, although
police properly entered residence under Payton, they did not have justification to sweep the entire
residence). But see State v. Coma, 981 P.2d 754, 759 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that
detective did not unlawfully enter residence when suspect who answered door twice refused to
comply with requests to turn around and place his hands behind his back and Detective entered
residence one and a half feet past the door-just far enough to handcuff suspect); Archer v.
Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (Va. CL App. 1997) (holding that police properly searched
motel room for weapons even though suspect was already in custody); Albrektsen, 151 F.3d at 954
n.5 (suggesting that police would have been warranted in entering hotel room if suspect had
retreated from the threshold).
266. 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990) (holding that "[tihe Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited
protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer possesses a
reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an
individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene").
267. 762 S.W.2d 787 (Ark. 1989).
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apparently asked to put on his shoes, which were located in the
living room. Officer King was on the patio immediately outside the
sliding door of the living room, so when the officers entered the
room, they were able to allow King to enter. Apparently from his
position outside the patio door, Officer King observed an ash tray
containing a hemostat holding a cigarette. After entering the living
room, King went over to the hemostat and cigarette on top of a
coffee table, and at that time, he saw a glass tray with a straw and
razorblade protruding from under a couch. When he pulled the tray
all the way out, King saw that it had white powder residue, which
was confirmed to be cocaine. On the same tray, King also found a
"bunch of marijuana" and cigarette papers that were used to roll
marijuana. One of the other officers subsequently discovered a
curio box, which, when opened, was found to contain three valium
pills.
268
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that King was properly on the
premises under Payton and that the objects in plain view, including the
drug tray that had been pulled out from under the couch, were
admissible.269 The court held, however, that the plain view doctrine did
not apply to the matter inside the pillbox, and that opening the box
exceeded the proper bounds of a search incident to arrest.
27
Risinger's argument that he did not invite King into his home was
ultimately unavailing, yet in refuting the argument, the Arkansas
Supreme Court displayed some interesting reasoning. The court stated
that "King was only at the back door to ensure the appellee could not
escape. King's role in securing and entering the back door was a
reasonable one, which was designed to ensure appellee's arrest." 271
Obviously, securing the rear entrance was reasonable. The proper legal
basis for sustaining Officer King's entry, though, is less clear, especially
because when King entered the residence the suspect seemed to be fully
cooperating.272 Though an argument could have been made that safe
arrest procedure required that all of the officers be permitted to enter
even if the suspect was cooperating, the court did not explicitly endorse
this view. Perhaps the fact that Officer King saw suspicious non-
268. Id. at 788.
269. Id. at 789.
270. Id.
271. Id. (emphasis added).
272. Id.
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contraband from outside motivated the court's stance. Yet the court did
not endorse the position that a sighting of non-contraband authorized
entry.
If the suspect had surrendered at the front door and Hutson and
Siegler called out to King that the suspect was in custody, it is doubtful
whether there would have been a legal basis for Officer King to then
enter the house (absent a viable fear of violent confederates lurking
about). The Risinger court's decision does not answer exactly why the
actual facts compelled a different outcome, though certainly it intuitively
makes sense that once the other officers entered the residence to
complete the arrest process, King could also enter. Perhaps there is a
waiver or consent concept at work here-that a suspect must elect to be
arrested at the threshold-once he retreats into the residence (even if he
is not attempting to evade arrest) a blanket waiver of privacy interests is
triggered, at least for the rooms in which the suspect is standing.'
G. Payton in Sum
Examining Payton's progeny leads to two conclusions. First, the
Payton "reason to believe" rule is a remarkably relaxed standard that is
almost always satisfied. With rare exceptions, courts hold that police
possessed reason to believe that a suspect was present at the time of
entry. Second, police entering residences pursuant to Payton, and courts
reviewing law enforcement action, employ a wide range of untested
assumptions about suspect and citizen behavior. The speculative nature
of these assumptions decreases the level of Fourth Amendment
protection afforded to an individual in his or her home.
273. It is also worth mentioning the recent Supreme Court opinion in Illinois v. McArthur, 531
U.S. 326 (2001). There the Court held that a police officer who had probable cause to believe that
illegal drugs were in McArthur's residence did not violate the Fourth Amendment by refusing to
allow McArthur to reenter his residence without a police escort while the police waited for a search
warrant. Id. at 331-37. The Court reasoned, in part, that where the suspect re-entered for his own
convenience, the reasonableness of the greater restriction-to bar McArthur from reentering at all,
implied the reasonableness of the lesser restriction-to permit "reentry conditioned on observation."
Id. at 335. McArthur is not completely analogous to Risinger because the greater power to arrest
does not necessarily encompass the lesser power to enter the residence if the suspect is found at the
door and can be arrested immediately. Still, McArthur suggests that where it is the suspect's choice
to reenter his residence, it is not unreasonable for police to accompany him. Id. But this does not
resolve the question of whether all of the police present may do so.
Washington Law Review Vol. 77:299, 2002
IlI. THE PROBABLE CAUSE COMPARISON: FUTILE EFFORTS
AT TRADITIONAL LEGAL REASONING
A. Why Discuss Probable Cause?
Although courts typically apply Payton in a mechanical fashion, rare
attempts have been made to place Payton within a broader Fourth
Amendment context by comparing "reason to believe" to a better known
criminal procedure standard-"probable cause.' '2 74 However, efforts to
illuminate the Payton standard by comparing it to probable cause are
fruitless and highlight the weakness of traditional legal reasoning in this
context.
B. Reason To Believe and Probable Cause: Two Possibilities
Two possibilities exist when comparing reason to believe with
probable cause. First, the two terms may be synonymous." This would
explain Justice Stevens's decision not to elaborate upon reason to
believe in Payton276 and why numerous commentators' 7 have used
274. The Supreme Court has stated that probable cause to search exists "where the known facts
and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found." Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696
(1996). At times, the parties attempt to make the perceived distinction between probable cause and
reason to believe the center of the debate. See United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1534 (11th
Cir. 1995).
275. The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure provides support for this view, although it
employs the terms "reasonable cause" and "reasonable cause to believe." See MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDLIRE § 120.1 note (American Law Institute 1975) ("The term reasonable
cause is the usual statutory equivalent of the Fourth Amendment's 'probable cause' standard."); id.
§ 120.6 ("If a law enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe that a person whom he is
authorized to arrest is present on any private premises, he may, upon identifying himself as such an
officer, demand that he be admitted to such premises for the purpose of making an arrest."); id.
§ 120.6 cmt. n.5 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 206 (1965)).
276. A perceptive California appellate court opinion also noted that the Payton dissent used
"reasonable grounds to believe" interchangeably with probable cause. See White v. California, 228
Cal. Rptr. 672, 677 n.2 (Cal. App. 1986); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 616 n.13
(1980) (White, J., dissenting).
277. See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment
"Reasonableness," 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1679 (1998); Mascolo, supra note 150, at 346-47;
James B. Haddad, Pretextual Fourth Amendment Activity: Another Viewpoint, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 639, 673 (1985); Thomas D. Colbridge, Search Incident to Arrest: Another Look, 68 FBI
L. ENFORCEMENT BuLL. 27, available at 1999 WL 14948080 (May 1, 1999); Edward M. Hendrie,
Warrantless Entries to Arrest: Constitutional Considerations, 67 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 25,
available at 1998 WL 15028962 (Sept. 1, 1998); Verde, supra note 151, at 193.
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reason to believe and probable cause interchangeably. 27 Second-and
the most common post-Payton judicial interpretation-is that reason to
believe requires less proof than probable cause. 79 This view respects the
Payton court's choice of a unique formulation, "reason to believe," in an
opinion replete with references to probable cause.20 As one federal
district court succinctly put it, "when the Court wishes to use the term
'probable cause,' it knows how to do so." 28'
C. The Terry v. Ohio Analogy
Most courts have held that Payton reason to believe requires less
proof than probable cause. Thus, an analogy can be drawn between a
Payton entry and a Terry'2 stop based upon reasonable suspicion that
278. This might also account for why cases decided under the Payton standard seem so similar to
probable cause cases. See infra Part I.C.
279. United States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 62 (N.D. Tex. 1997) ("All but one of the other circuits
that have considered the question are in accord, relying upon the 'reasonable belief' standard as
opposed to a 'probable cause' standard.") (footnote omitted); see also Valdez v. McPheters, 172
F.3d 1220, 1224-25 (10th Cir. 1999) (adopting reason to believe test and collecting cases); United
States v. Miles, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1204 (D. Kan. 1999) (collecting cases); United States v.
Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that district court erred by applying a probable
cause standard to Payton's residence prong because "the proper inquiry is whether there is a
reasonable belief that the suspect resides at the place to be entered.., and whether the officers have
reason to believe that the suspect is present."). Finally, in Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1227 n.5, the court
stated that "although not articulated as such, the dissent seemingly applies a standard much closer to
'probable cause' than 'reasonable belief.' While probable cause itself is a relatively low threshold of
proof, it is a higher standard than 'reasonable belief,' which is, as everyone agrees, the appropriate
standard."
280. See United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1534 (1lth Cir. 1995) ("The strongest support
for a lesser burden than probable cause remains the text of Payton, and what we must assume was a
conscious effort on the part of the Supreme Court in choosing the verbal formulation of 'reason to
believe' over that of 'probable cause."').
281. Smith v. Tolley, 960 F. Supp. 977, 986 (E.D. Va. 1997); see also LAFAVE, supra note 194,
§ 6.1(a), at 227-28 (suggesting that the Supreme Court may have intended to send a message of
flexibility to lower courts, so they would not "adopt a hard-nosed 'probable cause to believe the
suspect is at home' test," though opining that "on balance it seems preferable to insist upon
probable cause").
Nevertheless, it would seem odd for the Supreme Court to create a new, less stringent standard
without a more fully developed discussion than is present in Payton. Cf White, 228 Cal. Rptr. at
678 (noting that the California Supreme Court "has been very careful to announce when it was
deviating from the traditional 'probable cause' standard" such as in the case of investigatory stops).
282. The Supreme Court has held that an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment,
conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). For comments on the debate over whether Terry and its progeny reflect a
proper interpretation of Fourth Amendment law, see Terry v. Ohio 30 Years Later: A Symposium on
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criminal activity is afoot,2"3 as opposed to probable cause to believe that
a crime has been committed.284 A comparison between Terry v. Ohio2s5
and Payton, however, requires overlooking several objections. First, the
Supreme Court has strongly contended that probable cause and
reasonable suspicion cannot easily be defined.286 Second, scholars have
the Fourth Amendment, Law Enforcement and Police-Citizen Encounters, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
721 (1998).
283. But see Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 911, 926 (1998) ("Notwithstanding the fact that Terry is widely known today
as ... establishing a reasonable suspicion standard, one can find nothing in Chief Warren's opinion
to support the claim that he thought that was the standard the Court was adopting."); id. at 951-52
(explaining that the "reasonable suspicion" standard emerged in Supreme Court cases decided
between 1968 and 1979).
284. At least one court has stated that the Terry standard is distinguishable from the Payton
standard, with the simple assertion that, "[tihese are two different legal standards." United States v.
Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Clayton, 210 F.3d 841, 844 n.3
(8th Cir. 2000)); see also Fleissner, supra note 155, at 779 (characterizing the Payton standard, as
applied in discussing Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, as "akin to the 'reasonable suspicion' standard in
investigatory stops"). Additionally, commentators have noted that the Supreme Court explicitly
relied upon comparisons between a protective sweep of a residence pursuant to Maryland v. Buie,
494 U.S. 325 (1990) (which usually follows a Payton entry), and the limited searches of people that
flow from Terry and its progeny. See Mark A. Cuthbertson, Comment, Maryland v. Buie: The
Supreme Court's Protective Sweep Doctrine Runs Rings Around the Arrestee, 56 ALB. L. REV. 159,
163-65 (1992); Adam F. Trupp, Note, Maryland v. Buie: Extending the Protective Search Warrant
Exception into the Home, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 193, 197-98 (1991).
285. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
286. Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96 (1996):
Articulating precisely what "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause" mean is not possible.
They are commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with "the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act." As such, the standards are "not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal
rules." We have described reasonable suspicion simply as "a particularized and objective basis"
for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity and probable cause to search as existing
where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable
prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found. We have cautioned
that these two legal principles are not "finely-tuned standards," comparable to the standards of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt or of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. They are
instead fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts in which
the standards are being assessed.
(internal citations and some quotation marks omitted); see also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE, § 3.2 (1996) ("Notwithstanding the frequency with which police, lawyers and judges must
decide whether a given set of facts amounts to probable cause, it remains 'an exceedingly difficult
concept to objectify."') (quoting Joseph G. Cook, Probable Cause to Arrest, 24 VAND. L. REv. 317
(1971)); Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of
the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 102 (1999) (noting
that "the courts have affirmatively resisted clearly defining the contours" of reasonable suspicion);
Slobogin, supra note 154, at 1082 ("[Probable cause] is the standard with which we are most
familiar--except we don't really know what it means."); Stuntz, supra note 170, at 1215
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argued that measures such as probable cause cannot be fixed.287 Third,
different types of facts contribute to the likelihood that criminal behavior
has occurred, than the likelihood that someone is present at a
residence.2
("[R]easonable suspicion has never received a solid definition. (Perhaps it can't.)"); see also Meares
& Harcourt, supra note 8, at 781:
Despite the Court's reluctance to discuss the level of certainty probabilistically, there is
evidence that decisionmakers assess the level of evidence that justifies different police actions
in implicit probabilistic terms. For example, in one study, 96 out of 166 federal judges surveyed
indicated a belief that the reasonable suspicion standard requires 40% certainty or less that
evidence of crime would be found by an officer after a stop. In the same study, 25% of the
judges indicated that 50% certainty was necessary for reasonable suspicion, while another 19%
indicated that 60% certainty or more was necessary. This empirical evidence makes it quite
clear that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence leaves open just how much liberty should be
circumscribed.
(citing C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof. Degrees of Belief Quanta of Evidence, or
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1293, 1327 tbl. 3 (1982)) (footnotes omitted).
We must take the Court's vociferous disclaimers about the quantifiability of reasonable suspicion
and probable cause with a grain of salt because, in the Terry context, both the Supreme Court and
the lower courts have built an entire area of Fourth Amendment law upon the idea that courts and
police can adequately distinguish probable cause and reasonable suspicion. See Saltzburg, supra
note 283, at 954:
Probable cause is a judgment call based upon the totality of the circumstances, and even though
there is most always some probability of criminal activity, however small, associated with
events, courts have been able to make probable cause a meaningful term. This does not mean
that all judges agree in all cases. But there is a substantial body of agreement on when probable
cause does or does not exist in many familiar circumstances. This is also true of reasonable
suspicion.
(footnote omitted).
287. See "AKHL REED AMAR, TE CONSTITUTION AND CRImINAL PROCEDURE, FIRST PRINCIPLES
19 (1997) ("[P]robable cause cannot be afixed standard. It would make little sense to insist on the
same amount of probability regardless of the imminence of the harm, the intrusiveness of the
search... !'); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 85, § 28.1, at 748 (suggesting that
gravity of the crime being investigated, or the social loss involved, justifies a lesser showing of
probable cause). Posner's view has been adopted by the Seventh Circuit in the context of exigent
circumstances. See Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1564-67 (7th Cir. 1985) (plurality opinion)
(en banc); see also Mason v Godinez, 47 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[Tjhe amount of
information the police are required to gather before establishing probable cause for arrest is in
inverse proportion to the gravity of the crime and the threat of its imminent repetition.").
288. See LAFAVE, supra note 286, § 3.1(b), at 7:
The fact that there are grounds amounting to probable cause to make an arrest does not mean
that a search warrant could lawfully issue upon that same information. Nor can it be said that
probable cause for a search warrant would necessarily justify an arrest. Each requires a showing
of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances-a point which is seldom
made explicit in the appellate cases.
Allen & Rosenberg, supra, note 154 at 1160:
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court and the commentators have not
wavered on one basic proposition: reasonable suspicion requires less
proof than probable cause.289 So, if we assume that the Terry and Payton
standards are equivalent in some sense, one conclusion must follow:
Payton cases should have less proof of presence than cases where
probable cause was applied to the presence of a suspect.290 But the
probable cause comparison quickly falls apart, because cases from the
"Probable cause" is not a thing; it is a probability measure, a burden of persuasion in other
words. The relevant "things" in the picture are what must be established to the level of probable
cause, such as that there is a murderer in the house and who is dangerous in some fashion.
See also LAFAVE, supra note 286, § 3.1(b), at 6:
It is generally assumed by the Supreme Court and the lower courts that the same quantum of
evidence is required whether one is concerned with probable cause to arrest or probable cause
to search. For this reason, discussions by courts of the probable cause requirement often refer to
and rely upon prior decisions without regard to whether these earlier cases were concerned with
the grounds to arrest or the grounds to search.
(footnotes omitted).
289. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990):
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense
that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or
content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable
suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable
cause.
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (noting that "the level of suspicion required for a
Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause"); Raymond, supra note 286, at
102 ("Reasonable suspicion has not been quantified, but it can be approximated. It is less than
probable cause, which has been described as a 'fair probability."') (footnotes omitted); see also
William J. Stuntz, Terry and Substantive Law, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1362, 1362 (1998) (opining
that a "good approximation" of reasonable suspicion "might be something like a one-in-five or one-
in-four chance"). See generally LAFAVE, supra note 194, § 9.4 (exploring the permissible grounds
for a Terry stop, which is "not the probable cause needed for arrest but rather some lesser
standard").
The Court has also emphasized that reasonable suspicion "requires a showing considerably less
than preponderance of the evidence." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); Sokolow, 490
U.S. at 7 (same).
290. Even here we have to ignore the Supreme Court's admonition "that because the mosaic
which is analyzed for a reasonable-suspicion or probable-cause inquiry is multi-faceted, one
determination will seldom be useful precedent for another." Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 698 (quoting
Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 212, 238 n. 11 (1983)) (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at 703
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (noting "futility of attempting to craft useful precedent from the fact-intensive
review demanded by determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion"). But see id. at
698 (observing that there are exceptions where factual situations are close enough to warrant the use
of analogy in Fourth Amendment decisionmaking). It is not clear how courts are supposed to resolve
these issues, when the Court explains on the one hand that "the legal rules for probable cause and
reasonable suspicion acquire content only through application," id. at 697, while simultaneously
warning courts against trying to use one case as precedent for another.
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last thirty years29-both before292 and after Payton was decided 293-
reveal that, in this context, it is difficult to discern the meaning of
probable cause.
1. Pre-Payton Cases
Courts in the pre-Payton era alternated between the terms "probable
cause" and "reason to believe," often within the same opinion, without
adequate discussion or distinction.294 An example can be found in State
v. Jordan,295 in which the court relied on eighteen state and federal court
decisions that purportedly "held that a police officer may enter a private
premises to execute a valid arrest warrant as long as the officer
reasonably believes that the subject of the arrest warrant is on the
291. The treatment of police entries as a matter of constitutional concern is of relatively recent
vintage. See John C. Siegesmund II, Note, The Neglected Fourth Amendment Problem in Arrest
Entries, 23 STAN. L. REV. 995, 995 n.7 (1971) ("Only two federal cases have dealt with such entries
in terms of fourth amendment doctrine. Other courts ... approved arrest entries on the basis of
either statutory or common law.").
292. Prior to Payton and Steagald, courts split on the proper standards for residential arrest
entries. As one district judge explained:
Prior to April, 1980, the Circuits agreed that an arrest warrant alone was not constitutionally
sufficient to justify the entry into a third party's dwelling in search of the subject of that
warrant. Something more was needed; the most lenient of Circuit courts required only that the
government officials holding the arrest warrant also have a reasonable belief that the person
named in the warrant is located on the premises. One Circuit required exigent circumstances in
addition to the arrest warrant. Another Circuit required both that the entering officers have
probable cause to believe that the subject of the warrant is present, and exigent circumstances.
Adelona v. Webster, 654 F. Supp. 968, 973-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (footnotes and citations omitted);
see also Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333, 340 (3d Cir. 1974) ("Whose circuits which have considered
the question have uniformly held that such entry is constitutional only when the police have
probable cause to believe that the suspect is within.").
293. One source of probable cause cases could be police entries to locate a suspect in a third-
party's residence pursuant to a search warrant. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 205-06
(1981) (holding that Fourth Amendment required police to obtain a search warrant to enter a third
party's residence to arrest a non-resident suspect); Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(4) ("A warrant may be
issued under this rule to search for and seize any.., person for whose arrest there is probable cause,
or who is unlawfully restrained."). However, for several reasons beyond the scope of this Article,
there is a dearth of search warrant case law applying probable cause to the presence of a suspect
named in an arrest warrant.
294. See United States v. Arboleda, 633 F.2d 985, 994-95 (1980) (Oakes, J., dissenting)
(observing that many of the home arrest cases "seem to equate 'reasonable belief' with 'probable
cause,' while allowing the officers to make the judgment without consulting a magistrate").
295. 605 P.2d 646 (Or. 1980).
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premises." 96 Yet a review of the opinions cited in Jordan indicates that
six of the cases failed to state any clear standard on this precise issue,
297
one case primarily used probable cause, 298 two cases seem to have used
both a probable cause and reason to believe standard in some
combination,2 99 and one opinion is too perplexing to pin down. 00 Finally,
Jordan itself adopted a probable cause standard while citing three
"reason to believe" opinions.9
296. Id. at 649 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Woods, 560 F.2d 660, 665-66 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978); United States v. Harper, 550 F.2d 610, 613-14 (10th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977); United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1976),
on pet. for rehearing, 545 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977); United
States v. James, 528 F.2d 999, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959 (1976); Rice v.
Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280, 1291-92 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723, 729 (5th Cir. 1973); Rodriguez v. Jones,
473 F.2d 599, 605-06 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); United States v. Brown,
467 F.2d 419, 423-24 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 262-63 (6th Cir.
1967); United States v. Alexander, 346 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 993 (1966);
People v. Stibal, 372 N.E.2d 931 (I1. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Platten, 594 P.2d 201 (Kan. 1979);
Nestor v. State, 221 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1966); Cook v. State, 371 A.2d 433 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1977); State v. Jemison, 236 N.E.2d 538 (Ohio 1968); State v. Clark, 319 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1974); Commonwealth v. Terebieniec, 408 A.2d 1120 (Pa. Super Ct. 1979); State v. McNeal,
251 S.E.2d 484 (W.Va. App.1978)).
297. See Jones, 475 F.2d at 729; Platten, 594 P.2d at 205; Nestor, 221 A.2d at 368; Jemison,
236 N.E.2d at 541-42; Clark, 319 N.E.2d at 609-10; McNeal, 251 S.E.2d at 488-89 (discussing
presence in context of exigent circumstances without stating specific standard).
298. See Terebieniec, 408 A.2d at 1125-27 (clearly framing test in temas of probable cause, yet
explaining that the evidence "would reasonably support a belief that" the suspect was at home at the
time of entry).
299. See Wolff, 513 F.2d at 1292 (holding that Fourth Amendment requires "reasonable or
probable cause to believe that the suspect is within") (emphasis added); Brown, 467 F.2d at 423-25
(stating test in terms of reasonable belief, then concluding that there was probable cause to believe
the suspect was on the premises).
300- See Stibal, 372 N.E.2d at 933-34. The Stibal court first states the rule in terms of reasonable
belief, notes that some jurisdictions require probable cause, then concludes enigmatically that there
was compliance with "this latter standard" because the police could reasonably believe that the
defendant was present. Id.
301. State v. Jordan, 605 P.2d 646, 651 (Or. 1980) (citing United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d
406, on pet. for rehearing, 545 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Brown, 467 F.2d 419,
423-24 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 262-63 (6th Cir. 1967)). A
dissenting judge in a recent Oregon Court of Appeals opinion made the same observation. See State
v. Jones, 995 P.2d 571, 575-76 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (Linder, J., dissenting). Some opinions on this
topic are simply mystifying when closely scrutinized. For example, in State v. Harris, 272 S.E.2d
719, 720 (Ga. 1980), vacated sub nom. Harris v. Georgia, 452 U.S. 901 (1981), the Georgia
Supreme Court chastises the Court of Appeals for using a probable cause test rather than a
"reasonable belief" standard. Then the court indicates that reasonable belief encompasses the same
standard of reasonableness as probable cause. Id. One might wonder how a court could err by
invoking the wrong standard, if it is equivalent to the proper standard.
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Second, little proof was required to satisfy even those courts that
applied a probable cause test as to the suspect's presence in the pre-
Payton era,30 2 with rare exceptions. 3 For example, in Fisher v. Volz,
3 4
the Third Circuit declined to hold that police lacked probable cause as a
matter of law to enter a third-party's residence,0 5 even though the only
evidence linking the residence to the suspect was the fact that police had
traced a phone number possibly connected to a bank robber to her
building.3 6 The Volz court contended that the evidence was as least as
strong as in two circuit court opinions where probable cause existed.0 7
Yet the form of probable cause applied in those two cases, Brown and
302. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 385 F. Supp. 1400 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (holding that
probable cause existed to believe that suspects in Seattle, Washington bank robbery would be found
at residence in Detroit, because the suspects had bought plane tickets to Detroit, and a call from the
suspects' hotel room in Oregon was traced to the Detroit residence). This state of affairs led to the
claim that under the pre-PaytonlSteagald regime the cases "allow[ed] the intrusion when the police
officers do not have probable cause to believe the suspect is at home at the time, and ... even when
the police have reason to think that the suspect is not at home." Daniel A. Rotenberg & Lois B.
Tanzer, Searching for the Person To Be Seized, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 56, 67 (1974) (emphasis added).
But see LAFAVE, supra note 194, § 6.1(a), at 225 (stating that "vhile it may be fairly said that the
cases cited in support of this statement do not justify such a conclusion, it must be conceded that it
is not possible to produce any substantial body of authority to the contrary") (footnote omitted).
303. See Vasquez v. Snow, 616 F.2d 217, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that police did not
have probable cause to believe that suspect would be at residence where he had been seen earlier
because the evidence showed that the "peripatetic" suspect was constantly changing his hideout,
and police searched four residences in one day searching for the suspect). Note that Vasquez, a May
1980 decision, technically was decided after Payton, which was decided in April 1980. It has been
placed here as a pre-Payton decision, because it makes no reference to Payton, and was likely
vitten and submitted for publication before Payton was handed down by the Supreme Court.
304. 496 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974).
305. Id. at 343. The court did not express its own opinion on this matter. It only said that the
proof was not insufficient as a matter of law. See id
306. Id. at 343. In perhaps the most astonishing fact presented in the opinion, one detective
testified a trial that in twenty-four years on the police force he had entered thousands of apartments
without ever obtaining a search warrant. Id. at 337.
307. Id. at 343 (citing United States v. Brown, 467 F.2d 419, 420-24 (D.C. Cir. 1972) and
United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 260-61, 263-64 (6th Cir. 1967)). It is not even clear
whether McKinney is a "probable cause" case, since it applied a reasonable belief test. See
McKinney, 379 F.2d at 263:
An arrest warrant is validly issued only when a magistrate is convinced that there is probable
cause to believe that the named party has committed an offense. This determination, together
with the inherent mobility of the suspect, would justify a search for the suspect provided the
authorities reasonably believe he could be found on the premises searched.
However, Fisher suggested that the McKinney court "apparently considered 'reasonable belief' to be
synonymous with 'probable cause,"' see Fisher, 496 F.2d at 340, and it relied upon a "probable
cause" Supreme Court case. Id. (citing McKinney, 379 F.2d 259 (citing McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S.
300 (1967))) (pinpoint cites not provided in original).
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McKinney, seems indistinct from the Payton standard. In McKinney,"8
the court upheld the search on two pieces of proof: a month old
statement by witnesses that the suspect had spent some time in the
apartment to be entered; 309 and an anonymous, undisclosed tip that the
fugitive was there. 310 The reasoning in Brown further illustrates the lack
of bite in this version of probable cause. In Brown, the D.C. Circuit
reversed the district court's grant of a motion to suppress, 31' holding that
the police had probable cause to enter the apartment of a suspect's
girlfriend. 31" The court relied on the following facts: (1) the 5:30 a.m.
entry time;313 (2) that two unidentified men311 seemingly315 entered her
apartment the night before; 316 and (3) that a resident clearly stalled police
when they arrived, while failing to dispute the suspect's presence.37
2. Post-Payton Cases
It appears that only one published federal appellate court opinion has
explicitly applied a probable cause standard to a Payton case. In United
States v. Harper,1 8 the Ninth Circuit carefully reviewed the facts that
supported the finding that "probable cause" existed for police to believe
that the suspect resided at his family's residence.31 9 Yet even as Judge
308. Under current Supreme Court doctrine, McKinney's Fourth Amendment claim would be
doomed, as there was no indication that he had an expectation of privacy in the residence that was
searched. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1998). McKinney merely paid the
homeowner to harbor the fugitive. See McKinney, 379 F.2d at 260-61.
309. McKinney, 379 F.2d at 260.
310. Id. at 260-61. The information was not disclosed either a pretrial hearing on the motion to
suppress or the trial, but the appeals court held that it could consider the evidence. See McKinney,
379 F.2d at 264.
311. Brown, 467 F.2d at 420.
312. See id. at 423-24.
313. See id. at 422. A simultaneous raid was executed at another address. Id.
314. Id. at 421 (described by police as "one a tall Negro and the other a very short Negro").
315. "Seemingly" because all police saw on that rainy, misty evening was two men enter building
with their own key and a light in "in the vicinity" of the girlfriend's apartment then come on. In fact,
"both Officers concluded that they 'had no reason to believe that that was the particular subject
[Brown] we were interested in' at the time the tall and short men entered the apartment building,"
until the light came on near the girlfriend's apartment. Id.
316. Id. (between 11:00 and 11:30 p.m.).
317. Id. at 422. The court also noted that the suspect was involved in a narcotics operation and
was wanted for murder. Id. at 424.
318. 928 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1990).
319. Id. at 896-97.
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Kozinsld chided the police for not obtaining a search warrant,3 20 he
ignored Payton's presence prong.3 21 Harper contains no discussion
regarding whether the police had reason to believe that the suspect was
present at the time of entry.3" Similarly, in Fontenot v. Cormier,3' 3 the
Fifth Circuit stated, arguably in dicta,324 that the police had probable
cause to believe that a suspect would be at a certain person's residence
"since that was where he resided."3' Thus, in one leap, the Fifth Circuit
equated probable cause as to residence with probable cause as to
presence.326
320. ld. at 895.
There's a simple way for the police to avoid many complex search and seizure problems: Get a
search vrarrant. Had they obtained a search warrant in this case--as they could well have-
there would have been no motion to suppress, no hearing, no objection at trial and no thorny
issues for us to resolve on appeal. But they didn't. So once again we consume a few pages of
the Federal Reporter analyzing the circumstances under which the police may enter a home
without a search warrant.
Id.
321. Even as the issue was being framed, the presence prong had disappeared. See id. at 896
("[Defendants] concede that the warrant was issued on probable cause and that, under Payton v.
New York... an arrest warrant normally carries with it the limited authority to enter the home of the
person named in the warrant."). Later in the opinion, as the court addressed the scope of the search,
it is implied that probable cause existed that the suspect vas present. See id. at 897 ("Defendants'
challenge to the scope of the search also fails. Once the police 'possess[ed] an arrest warrant and
probable cause to believe [David] -was in his home, the officers were entitled to search anywhere in
the house in which [he] might be found."') (quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990)).
Nevertheless, the Harper court does not address the suspect's presence as a requirement of Payton,
nor does it discuss what evidence supported this implied conclusion.
322. Id. at 896-97. To be fair, it was noted that "the police saw cars belonging to known
associates of David's parked at the Harper family home." Id. at 896. But it is not clear from the
opinion when these cars were parked at the residence, nor is there any indication that the cars
indicated presence at the time of entry.
323. 56 F.3d 669 (5th Cir. 1995).
324. The court held that the homeowner's Fourth Amendment rights were violated because police
did not possess a warrant and did not contend that exigent circumstances were present. See id. at
675.
325. Id.
326. Several cases from the Seventh Circuit have been omitted from this discussion, although
they do address probable cause in the context of home entries and would likely support the
arguments advanced herein. See, e.g., Mason v Godinez, 47 F.3d 852, 855-56 (7th Cir. 1995);
Reardon v. Wroan, 811 F.2d 1025, 1028-29 (7th Cir. 1987); Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560,
1564-67 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Nevertheless, in these cases, the Seventh Circuit has explicitly
endorsed the view that, in the context of exigent circumstances, increased exigency warrants less
probable cause in home entries. See Anne Bowen Poulin, The Fourth Amendment: Elusive
Standards; Elusive Review, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 127, 131 (1991) ("[Ihe plurality [in Llaguno]
employed a flexible definition of probable cause, requiring a greater quantity of information to
search when the crime is less serious and a lesser quantity when the crime is more serious."). The
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State courts have fared no better. When the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court was faced with the question of whether the Massachusetts
Constitution requires a greater level of protection than Payton, the court
avoided resolving the question by holding that the evidence satisfied
probable cause as well as Payton. In Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto,
327
the court held that the early morning timing of the police entry and the
fact that the door was ajar satisfied probable cause, even though the most
recent sighting of the suspect at his residence was four days prior to the
police entry.328
In fact, it appears that only one post-Payton circuit court has held that
the police did not establish probable cause to believe that a suspect was
present.329 In United States v. Jones,331 the court applied a "reasonable or
probable cause" test when police sought to arrest Earl Jones in his
brother's girlfriend's house.331 A confidential informant notified police
that the suspect might be present there,332 but indicated neither why he
possessed this belief, nor the length of time Jones had been at the
residence.3 33 The government argued that the two brothers had associated
with each other two years earlier; a male voice responded to the initial
knock on the door by the police; the police saw a male look outside of
the residence while the police knocked; and the occupants delayed in
opening the door after being told the police had a "warrant. '3 4 Although
the Sixth Circuit believed that, under the facts on which the government
relied, Jones's presence "was not impossible, 335 the court held that the
explicit adoption of a "sliding scale," id. at 128, version of probable cause inversely tied to exigency
makes these cases less helpful for analogizing to Payton cases.
327. 693 N.E.2d 1007 (Mass. 1998).
328. Id. at 1010; see also Doby v. Decrescenzo, No. CIV. A. 94-3991, 1996 WL 510095, at *5,
*34 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1996) (holding that, though suspect answered door, police had probable cause
to believe she "was there because the apartment was hers"); Commonwealth v. Rivera, 710 N.E.2d
950, 950-53 (Mass. 1999) (finding that probable cause existed where the suspect eventually opened
the door in response to the police).
329. See supra note 303 for a discussion of Vasquez v. Snow, 616 F.2d 217, 219-20 (5th Cir.
1980), which was decided just after Payton, but has been grouped with the pre-Payton cases for
special reasons.
330. 641 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1981) (third-party residence case decided after Payton but before
Steagald imposed a search warrant requirement for such entries).
331. See id. at 428 & n.3.
332. Id. at 427.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 428.
335. Id. at 429.
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facts failed to "suggest that it was probable or likely." '336 Most
significantly, the court was willing to probe into the value of each piece
of evidence to test it against the conclusion that the suspect and not his
brother could be found at the residence. 37
D. The Futility of the Probable Cause Comparison
In the last thirty years-both before and after Payton was decided in
1980-courts have occasionally dispensed with the "reason to believe"
standard and elected to apply a probable cause test to the presence of a
criminal suspect at a particular residence. Yet, a close review of these
decisions reveals that the term "probable cause" in this context has little
discemable meaning. Courts routinely have been satisfied with meager
evidence of a suspect's presence and some courts seem to use the terms
"probable cause" and "reasonable belief' interchangeably. This
approach is in stark contrast to the Terry-stop realm, where, despite
Supreme Court disclaimers on the quantifiability of reasonable suspicion
and probable cause, courts and commentators seem to make an effort to
distinguish the meanings of these terms.
In sum, in the home-arrest arena, it is futile to compare probable cause
of a suspect's presence with reason to believe a suspect is present to
derive the meaning of the Payton standard. Conventional legal reasoning
fails us in this situation. Although Payton's "reason to believe" seems
like it should require less proof than probable cause, the cases relying on
probable cause are at least as lenient as the Payton cases.338 The dilemma
calls for a non-formalistic response that eschews crude analogies to
superficially similar case law. The next Part discusses one possible
solution.
IV. EMPIRICAL PRAGMATISM AND PAYTON
Part I of this Article demonstrated that Payton case law is rather
stable and consistent. Reason to believe a suspect is home has been
interpreted to be a low threshold, nearly always satisfied by evidence
proffered by the state. Part III examined how efforts at traditional
336. ld
337. Id. at 428-29.
338. Of course, the answer could be that the Payton/probable cause comparison fails because the
two standards are equivalent and extraordinarily low.
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judicial reasoning involving comparisons of "reason to believe" and
"probable cause" fail to illuminate disputes over the application of
Payton, because "probable cause" in this context is also a low standard
that is nearly always satisfied. In the absence of any legislative or
constitutional action-an unlikely prospect-some rationale must be
advanced for looking outside of Payton's progeny to decide Payton
cases. Part IV will argue that pragmatism provides this philosophical
rationale, by encouraging or empowering judges to look beyond cases to
the realities of home arrests. 339 The outcome may be the same-a
holding that police entry was justified-but the process would be
decidedly different. Using this approach, decisions would be based on
facts regarding home entries rather than rote application of Payton case
law and unquestioned assumptions about suspect conduct.
This Part begins with a simple proposal for a study of home arrests
executed by the United States Marshals Service. This study would
generate the empirical knowledge necessary as a foundation for applying
pragmatism to resolve Payton cases. This Article will then argue that,
even accepting the validity of the critiques of pragmatism described in
Part I, empirical pragmatism can be of great use in the Payton context.
339. One scholar has argued that the Supreme Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence (though
not Payton specifically) is already pragmatic.
The Supreme Court's contemporary fourth amendment decisions reveal legal pragmatism at
work .... Recognizing the pragmatist pedigree for these opinions offers fresh explanations for
the Justices' interpretive behavior. From the perspective of traditional doctrinal analysis, these
opinions can appear to be nothing more than examples of the exercise of raw judicial power.
They now can be understood as the application of instrumental and contextual ideas about law
and its uses that are the product of one of the most influential legal theories operating in this
country in this century.
Cloud, supra note 23, at 301. Cloud's observations do not conflict with this Article's thesis for
several reasons. First, this Article solely focuses on application of Payton at the sub-Supreme Court
level. Whether or not Payton itself was pragmatic does not affect analysis regarding Payton's
subsequent lower court implementation. An opinion setting forth a legal rule could conceivably be
pragmatic, without its progeny deserving the same moniker. Second, Cloud implies that he does not
consider Payton to be pragmatic, as he uses the term, since he cites Payton as an example of a
decision that expresses a preference for a rule over ad hoc balancing. See id. at 275 & n.334. Third,
even if Payton and its progeny could be termed pragmatic, it does not reflect the type of pragmatism
advocated herein, in that Payton's progeny is thoroughly non-empirical.
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A. A Preliminary Proposal: A Study of Home Arrests by the United
States Marshals Service
1. What the United States Marshals Service Should Study
An empirical study of home arrests could form the foundation for
rejuvenated application of Payton. The United States Marshals Service
(The Marshals Service or USMS) is the ideal law enforcement partner
for a study of home arrests. The Marshals Service, a bureau within the
Department of Justice,34° accounts for a majority of all federal fugitive
arrests,34 and arrests more fugitives and executes more arrest warrants
than all of the other federal law enforcement agencies combined.342
According to the Marshals Service, in the last four years, the USMS has
arrested over 120,000 federal, state, and local fugitives.343 During the
first seven months of the year 2000, the Marshals Service arrested over
15,000 federal fugitives.3" Moreover, the Marshals Service often teams
up with agents from other federal,345 state, and local law enforcement
departments as part of permanent and short-term fugitive apprehension
340. See 28 U.S.C. § 561(a) (1999). For general background information on the United States
Marshals Service, the Department of Justice Website, at http://www.usdoj.gov/marshals/reading-
room/files.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2002), has links to several USMS public affairs documents that
can be downloaded, including: United States Marshals Service Past and Present, USMS Pub. 3
(Rev. Apr. 1997); United States Marshals Service Investigative Services Fact Sheet, USMS Pub.
No. 24 (Feb. 3, 1997); United States Marshals Service Fact Sheet, USMS Pub. No. 21 (Feb. 3,
1997); and United States Marshals Service Facts and Figures at a Glance (Fiscal Year 1996).
341. There is some conflict on the exact percentage. Compare United States Marshals Service
Investigative Services Fact Sheet, USMS Pub. No. 21 (Feb. 3, 1997) (stating number at 75%), with
U.S. Marshals Service website <http:llww.usdoj.gov/marshalslfactsheetslgeneral.html> (last
visited Apr. 30, 2002) (55% last year).
342. See United States Marshals Service Investigative Services Fact Sheet, USMS Pub. No. 21
(Feb. 3, 1997); House Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 106th Congress, Serial
No. 105, at 10 (July 13, 2000) (prepared statement of John W. Marshall, Director, United States
Marshals Service) [hereinafter Marshall Statement], available at 2000 WL 23831434.
343. Marshall Statement, supra note 342, at 10.
344. Id.
345. See House Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 106th Congress, Serial No.
105, at 27 (prepared statement of Robert J. Finan II, Assistant Director, United States Marshals
Service) [hereinafter Finan Statement] ("Since 1989, the Marshals Service has entered into
Memoranda of Understanding... with 10 federal law enforcement agencies giving [the USMS]
administrative and/or apprehension responsibilities for those agencies' fugitives."), available at
2000 WL 23831435.
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task forces.346 These task forces utilize synergy between the Marshals
Service and local law enforcement agents-with the Marshals offering
resources, personnel, and fugitive apprehension expertise and local law
enforcement contributing special knowledge of local conditions and law
enforcement issues. 347 Hence, the Marshals Service's unique fugitive-
apprehension role gives it a vested interest in determining the safest
3 48
and most reliable methods for apprehending fugitives while preserving
evidence for trial and avoiding the suppression of improperly obtained
evidence.
Finally, on the administrative side, the Marshals Service's preexisting
use of database technology would make it easy to maintain and analyze
arrest information. The Marshals Service has an in-house division, the
Analytical Support Unit, which is dedicated to data analysis.349 In fact,
the Analytic Support Unit has already done two substantial research
projects-a study geared towards identifying the common characteristics
of fugitives, 350 and a study of the threats made upon federal judges since
1980.31' Accordingly, it would not be difficult for the USMS to track and
analyze arrest data.
The preliminary proposal for study is rather simple.352 In Section II,
we learned that courts typically look to several recurring factors when
determining whether there is reason to believe that a suspect is present.
These factors primarily include: (1) police or third-party sighting of, or
contact with, the suspect at the residence some time prior to the
attempted entry; (2) light or noise emanating from the residence; (3) the
presence of vehicles, connected or unconnected to the suspect, at the
346. Currently, the USMS participates in approximately 130 task forces nationwide, of which it
leads sixty. See Marshall Statement, supra note 342, at 10; Finan Statement, supra note 345, at 29.
347. See generally DOJ Office of Legal Counsel, Authority of FBI Agents, Serving as Special
Deputy United States Marshals, To Pursue Non-Federal Fugitives (Feb. 21, 1995), available at
1995 WL 944018 (describing history of state and federal intergovernmental fugitive task forces).
348. The Marshals Service has emphasized the dangers presented by fugitives, who are "[b]y
definition.., mobile and opportunistic, preying on innocent citizens." Finan Statement, supra note
345, at 26.
349. Id. at 7-8.
350. Id. at 26-27.
351. Judging Threats: How Analysis Helps U.S. Marshals Service Gauge Harm to Judicial
Officials, in THE THtRD BRANCH, Vol. 30, No.7 (July 1998), available at http:/lwww.uscourts.govl
ttblaug98ttb/judging.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2002).
352. This Part is intended to simply sketch out what empirical study might uncover-not to
provide the formal parameters of the study.
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residence; and (4) the time of day the police seek entry in combination
with any known information regarding the suspect's schedule.
3 53
Obviously, this list is not exhaustive, and these factors could be
further refined. For example the exact amount of time between initial
police or informant contact with the suspect and the Payton entry might
be important. It would not be surprising to learn that the nature of the
offense for which the fugitive is wanted may also play a role in
determining whether she is present at the time entry is sought. But in one
form or another, the list above contains most of the commonly used
indicators of suspect presence. The study would analyze how reliable
each factor is as an indicator of presence, with the goal of creating a
comprehensive account of the weight of each presence factor,
individually and in concert. 4 James R. Acker explained the validity of
this form of data analysis in the area of Terry stops:
When common factors recur across cases, the possibility arises that
policy decisions can be made about their place in a probable cause
or reasonable suspicion equation. Variables that are not case-
specific, idiosyncratic, or otherwise resistant to classification do
not have to be left for processing by individual officers as if they
were.
355
Acker thus suggests an alternative to the Supreme Court's "preference
for case-by-case rather than doctrinal development of factors affecting
probable cause and reasonable suspicion." 356 In Acker's view "it is quite
likely that some aspects of a probable cause or reasonable suspicion
decision will be sufficiently predictable, and generalizable across cases,
that they need not be left to the quick judgment of the officer at the
353. See supra Part ILC.
354. Accordingly, this Article's thesis runs contrary to the assertion that "[w]hat specific
evidence equates to any burden of persuasion cannot be said in advance of any aspect of the human
condition." Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 154, at 1160. If one generates enough "local
knowledge," id. at 1160-61, about suspect presence, it can be determined in advance whether
certain facts meet the burden of establishing "reason to believe," if we assume that reason to believe
is a measure of probabilities. This may not be true in all cases involving probable cause and its
relatives-but it is possible in the Payton realm.
355. James R. Acker, Social Sciences and the Criminal Law: The Fourth Amendment, Probable
Cause, and Reasonable Suspicion, 23 CPIM. L. BULL. 49, 52-53 (1987); see also Meares &
Harcourt, supra note 8, at 793 (calling for the Supreme Court to engage in a "very public and
forthright discussion of the requisite probability of certainty required to justify a police stop or an
arrest based on empirical data").
356. Acker, supra note 355, at 78.
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scene."35 Acker's observation can easily be extended to the Payton
realm, where the courts so often rely on the same set of recurring factors
to establish suspect presence, and rarely are idiosyncratic facts at the
heart of the decision making process.
Categorizing home arrests based upon a small list of recurring factors
might seem rather tame as social science-but in the Payton context it
would be revolutionary. It would mean that prior to every police entry,
the police would have a statistically sound basis for determining whether
there is reason to believe that the resident is home. Courts could thus
honestly evaluate police action instead of engaging in formalist
reasoning that nearly always ends up with Payton satisfied.
In addition, such a study might begin to gather information on Payton
arrests, with an eye towards evaluating more broadly the efficacy of the
rule. For example, one might track how often a suspect's cohabitant's
privacy is also intruded upon or whether certain types of residences are
entered more frequently than others (e.g., motels versus single-family
homes). Thus, we would start to get a sense of how the burdens
associated with Payton entries are shouldered in practice.
2. How Would Courts Treat the USMS Study or Other Research
Regarding Home Arrests?
If the USMS study of home arrests is successful, trial courts will have
to decide the procedures for considering this research. 8 John Monahan
and Laurens Walker developed the leading framework for how courts
should address social science information in a trilogy of law review
articles published in the 1980s. 359 These articles built upon and refined
357. Id. at 59.
358. Appellate courts will, in turn, have to determine the level of deference to be accorded to the
study and whether it should be treated as precedent in subsequent cases. See David L Faigman,
Appellate Review of Scientific Evidence Under Daubert and Joiner, 48 HASTINGS L. J. 969, 976-79
(1997) (arguing in favor of de novo appellate review of scientific evidence that transcends a
particular dispute).
359. See generally Monahan & Walker, Social Authority, supra note 112; Walker & Monahan,
Social Frameworks, supra note 120; Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific
Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV. 877 (1988) [hereinafter Walker & Monahan,
Social Facts]; see also John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science Research,
15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 571 (1991) (summarizing authors' arguments on how courts should handle
social science research); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 331 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 5th ed.
1999) (noting that "the Federal Rules of Evidence make no effort to regulate" judicial notice of
legislative facts, but citing Monahan & Walker's Social Authority as an effort to rationalize this
endeavor).
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the traditional categories of facts first elaborated by the legendary
professor and administrative law treatise author Kenneth Culp Davis.
Davis divided facts into two categories in the context of administrative
law: (1) "adjudicative facts," which pertain to the case at bar;360 and (2)
"legislative facts," which are facts involved in deciding questions of law
or policy." As Monahan and Walker reconceptualized Davis's
distinction between different classes of facts, they applied distinctive
terminology, by referring to adjudicative facts as social facts,362 and
legislative facts as social authority.363 By using the concept of "social
authority," as opposed to the term "legislative facts," Monahan and
Walker focus our attention on the similarities between legal authority
and the uses of social science research that transcend particular cases.
This has implications that will be discussed below.
Monahan and Walker build upon this heuristic concept by making the
vital observation that certain social science research used by courts does
not easily fall into the legislative (social authority) or adjudicative fact
(social fact) categories.3 65 They point to an emerging use for empirical
data, which they term social frameworks, 66 and define as "the use of
general conclusions from social science research in determining factual
issues in a specific case. ''367 As examples of social frameworks,
Monahan and Walker use social research regarding eyewitness
identification, predictions of future dangerousness of convicted felons,
360. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 HARV. L. REV. 364,402 (1942).
361. Id. at 424; see also Monahan & Walker, Social Authority, supra note 112, at 482-83 (citing
Davis, supra note 360, at 402.
362. See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Empirical Questions Without Empirical Answers,
1991 WIS. L. REV. 569, 570 [hereinafter Monahan & Walker, Empirical Questions); Walker &
Monahan, Social Facts, supra note 359, at 11 & n.26.
363. See Monahan & Walker, Empirical Questions, supra note 362, at 571; Monahan & Walker,
Social Authority, supra note 112, at 488-95 (proposing that social science research used to create
legal rules should be deemed "social authority" and treated akin to legal precedent); Michael J.
Saks, Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works, 75 IOWA L. REv. 1011, 1023 tbl. 2 (1990)
(charting Monahan and Walker approach); Walker & Monahan, Social Facts, supra note 359, at
881.
364. Saks, supra note 363, at 1018-19; see also Monahan & Walker, Social Frameworks, supra
note 120, at 585 (explaining that under heuristic concept of social authority, "courts would treat
social science research, when used to create a rule of law, as a source of authority rather than as a
type of fact").
365. Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks, supra note 120, at 563-67.
366. Id. at 559, 563-70.
367. Id. at 570.
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battered woman syndrome, and behavioral traits of abused children.36
What makes all of these uses of social science similar is that in all four
situations general conclusions from social science are used to make case-
specific findings. In their casebook, the authors use suspect profiles,
including drug courier profiles, as further examples of the use of general
social science to determine facts regarding the likelihood of criminal
behavior.369
Monahan and Walker's social framework concept captures what a
study of home arrests might enable courts to do in the Payton context.
General information regarding suspect conduct and home arrests could
be used to determine whether the police had reason to believe a suspect
was present in a particular case. It should be noted, however, that the
Payton situation is somewhat different from a typical social framework
usage, because the determination of whether police have reason to
believe a suspect was present (like a determination of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion under Terry37 ) is arguably a mixed question of law
and fact reviewed de novo, not a finding of fact reviewed for clear
error.371 Still, because it is a legal conclusion that rests so heavily on its
subsidiary factual underpinnings, 372 it is sensible to use the social
framework approach.373
Once we agree that Payton home arrest information, whether from the
proposed USMS study or other sources, should be treated as a social
framework, several conclusions follow according to Monahan and
Walker. First, judges ruling on Payton cases should feel empowered to
368. Id. at 563-67; see also Monahan & Walker, Empirical Questions, supra note 362, at 589-
91 (using empirical data regarding eyewitness identification and behavioral traits of sexually abused
children as two examples of social frameworks).
369. MONAHAN & WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 73, at 395-422.
370. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-97 (1996).
371. Compare United States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 62-63 (5th Cir. 1997) (reviewing district
court's Payton reason to believe finding for clear error) with United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d
1530, 1536-37 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that Payton reason to believe determinations, like
determinations of probable cause, should be reviewed de novo).
372. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695-96.
373. In their casebook, Monahan and Walker examine various criminal profiles routinely used by
police, such as drug courier profiles to establish reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory
search or probable cause to search, under the rubric of "Contexts for Determining Present Facts."
See MONAHAN & WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 73, at 395-412. Although their
conclusions and reasoning seem correct, it might be prudent to note that the final determination on
probable cause or reasonable suspicion is a legal conclusion (or a mixed question of law and fact),
not a pure finding of fact. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695-96.
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use every tool at their disposal to gain information about home arrests,374
within the boundaries of ethical judicial conduct.375 Although Brandeis
briefs from the parties would undoubtedly be useful-judges should not
be limited to the parties' submissions.376 Second, it is arguably
reasonable to treat any study of home arrests as legal precedent, subject
to modification if new data emerges."
B. Data Failure, the Ignorance Hypothesis, and Dilettantism Are Not
Risks in the Payton Context
As discussed above, whenever one seeks to utilize scientific
information in adjudication, three formidable barriers arise: the limits of
the data, the limits of the judges interpreting the data, and the limits of
the professors providing the data.37' Although these serious concerns
arise when complex social science or scientific data is involved, they
would not be problems in the Payton context. The event being studied-
the presence of a suspect-is rather uncomplicated. No one could argue
that once the USMS data is collected and studied that there would be an
intrinsic problem with understanding the object of study, home arrests.
374. Saks, supra note 363, at 1028 (noting numerous tools at courts' disposal to find and
evaluate social science "in a manner analogous to finding and evaluating law"); see also Monahan
& Walker, Social Authority, supra note 112, at 495-98 (proposing that courts receive social
authority by way of Brandeis briefs and through independent judicial investigation, just as courts
can do independent legal research); Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks, supra note 120, at
588-89 (arguing that social frameworks should be obtained and evaluated as a court would locate
legal authority).
375. See generally George D. Marlow, From Black Robes to White Lab Coats: The Ethical
Implications of a Judge's Sua Sponte, Ex Parte Acquisition of Social and Other Scientific Evidence
During the Decision-Making Process, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 291 (1998).
376. See Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks, supra note 120, at 588-89.
377. See Meares & Harcourt, supra note 8, at 748 (explaining and approving of Monahan and
Walker's theory, under which social science is treated as law when it is used to address more general
issues) (citing Monahan & Walker, Social Authority, supra note 112, at 491); Monahan & Walker,
Social Authority, supra note 112, at 514-15 (arguing that lower courts' conclusions regarding
empirical research should be reviewed de novo and that lower courts should defer to appellate court
judgments regarding scientific authority unless the lower court is presented with new research not
available to the higher court); Saks, supra note 363, at 1029 & n.60 (explaining that general theory
behind social frameworks would be reviewed de novo, as would legal doctrine). See also Laurens
Walker & John Monahan, Scientific Authority: The Breast Implant Litigation and Beyond, 86 VA.
L. REV. 801, 822-23 (2000) (noting that the Fifth Circuit had, in effect, granted precedential effect
to a scientific conclusion that existing studies failed to prove a causal link between the drug
Benedictin and birth defects) (discussing Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307
(5th Cir. 1989), modified 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989)).
378. See supra Part I.C.
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Moreover, the study of home arrests does not require the mastery of
arcane scientific data or an entire scientific or academic discipline.
Judges should have no difficulty interpreting indicators of when a person
is at home.3 79 In fact, they have already been doing so, though without a
factual basis, and judges seem rather comfortable with the concepts that
arise in Payton cases. Finally, the use of the proposed USMS study
would render law professors' involvement at the data collection stage
unnecessary. This somewhat circumvents the institutional barriers
against empirical legal research,3 80 although academic oversight of the
study might be well advised. For the same reasons that judges will be
able to understand how these factors play out, professors should be able
to understand the data. Hence, judicial incompetence and professorial
dilettantism are not at issue.
Fortunately, the proposed study of home arrests does not raise
questions regarding causation, which often trouble courts that address
scientific matters. 381 This is because in the Payton context, we are not
attempting to prove causation. The presence of a vehicle, light, or noise
at a residence may indicate or correlate to presence, but it does not cause
the suspect to be present. This distinction between correlation and
causation is immensely important.382 One can readily contrast this with
complex legal, social, or scientific questions where judges and
legislators must determine, to the best of their ability, whether the
proposed action will result in desirable or undesirable outcomes. In such
situations, causation is immensely important, because if one does not
379. To the extent that judges still might struggle with concepts of probability, there are many
valuable resources for federal judges who endeavor to understand scientific and statistical
methodology. See David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Statistical Proof, in 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN
ET AL., MODERN SCIENTFC EVIDENCE 155 (2002) (revised version of David H. Kaye & David A.
Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 83
(Federal Judicial Center ed., 2d ed. 2000)); Scientific Method: The Logic of Drawing Inferences
from Empirical Evidence, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 119, supra; Erica Beecher-Monas, The
Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A Primer for Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1563,
1580-84, 1599-1604 (2000) (discussing probabilistic reasoning and statistical analysis).
380. See supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text.
381. Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray of Light for Judges Blinded by Science: Triers of Science and
Intellectual Due Process, 33 GA. L. REV. 1047, 1093-1109 (1999) (discussing difficulties courts
face with reconciling scientific understandings of causation, especially in the context of
epidemiological or toxicological studies, with legal standards of proof).
382. See M. Elizabeth Kams, Statistical Misperceptions, 47 FED. LAW. 19 (June 2000)
(emphatically explaining that correlation does not prove causation); see also MODERN SCIENTIFC
EVIDENCE, supra note 379, §§ 4.4.2-4.3.1 (discussing distinction between establishing correlation
and establishing causation).
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believe that the challenged action causes a result, then one may dispense
with normative question of whether the result is desirable.
Of course there are several practical problems with the proposed
USMS study that would have to be addressed. First, one might argue that
the Marshals Service would be biased, because it has a greater interest in
law enforcement objectives than in ensuring the privacy interests of
criminal suspects. Second, the Marshals Service may be unmotivated to
conduct the proposed study. After all, as this Article demonstrates, law
enforcement agencies fare very well in Payton cases. So one might ask
why the USMS or the Department of Justice would be interested in a
study that might lead to the more frequent suppression of evidence or an
increase in the payment of damages in civil suits. Third, even those in
favor of empirical studies might question whether studying when
suspects are at home is an inquiry of great import. One might argue that
the more pressing inquiry would be the effect on law enforcement that
would be wrought by stringent Payton application. To such critics, more
would be gained by measuring the probable effect of adjusting the
Payton rule on evidence suppression and conviction rates.
These are valid concerns, but they do not counsel in favor of
abandoning a study of Payton home entries. The last point can be
dispensed with first. The existence of other substantial subjects for study
does not obviate the need to study home arrests. First, home privacy is a
substantial interest. It makes sense to determine what type of information
police typically possess before they invade the home. Additionally, this
Article's suggestion that police action in this realm is worth studying
does not imply in any way that it would not be valuable to study the
potential effects that setting the Payton standard at various levels would
have on suppression and conviction rates. These issues may also be
worth studying. It seems to make more sense, however, first to get a lay
of the land and to obtain a solid sense of existing police practices, before
we move on to more complex causal questions regarding the potential
future effects of changing the Payton rule or applying it with more vigor.
Second, as with any empirical work, the potential for bias exists. This
suggests only that decisionmakers should not rely uncritically on social
science research, not that such research is of no use whatsoever."3
Finally, the question of USMS motivation to engage in the proposed
study is more difficult, but there are potential responses. First, putting
383. See supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
383
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the Payton issue to the side, the Marshals Service might gain valuable
insights regarding suspect conduct from the proposed study. This
information could make fugitive apprehension a less dangerous endeavor
if police are able to identify the types of locations and scenarios where
fugitives are least likely to offer violent resistance to arrest.384 Moreover,
one would assume that the Marshals Service wants to do all that it can to
avoid unwarranted entries into private residences. Although fugitive
apprehension is its top priority, there is something to be gained by the
USMS here. Even if law enforcement officers eventually prevail in
Payton cases, there are costs and burdens associated with litigating these
issues. A decrease in home entries also means a decrease in thorny
suppression issues and civil claims by innocent residents and
homeowners. In addition, it must be noted that the envisioned study is
exceedingly modest in scope. The study's cost in resources likely would
be negligible. One last, more idealistic point is worth mentioning. At its
core, Posner's pragmatism calls for reconceptualizing the roles played
by various players in the legal system. As judges and professors are
asked to transcend their current functions, law enforcement agencies
may also be asked to take on more innovative and less reactive roles.
Participating in the proposed study is one way that the USMS can be
infused with this pragmatic spirit.
C. Can Banality Be Overcome in the Payton Context?
If we accept that data failure, the ignorance hypothesis, and
professorial dilettantism are not problems in the Payton context, the
remaining hurdle is the dreaded charge of banality. We begin with
Posner's own concession (or explanation) that pragmatism, as a method
of inquiry, and not a substantive theory, cannot "resolve any moral or
legal disagreement., 385 We add this to the powerful critics of
pragmatism, led by Dworkin, who persuasively argue that empirical
study cannot assist judges in determining how to balance competing
visions of public good.386 Thus, one might ask, what can pragmatism
offer in the Payton context-or indeed in any context?
384. Such a study might also uncover interesting information regarding race, class, and policing.
385. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2, at xii; see also Tamanaha, supra note 13 1.
386. See supra notes 126-141 and accompanying text.
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1. The Value of Empirical Inquiry in Light of the Dworkinian Critique
Even if pragmatic empirical inquiry cannot resolve debates over
fundamental values, it can help legal decisionmakers in a variety of
ways. First, as pragmatism's detractors concede, empirical inquiry and
experimentation can be helpful when the political community agrees
upon the ends or normative goals that it wishes to pursue, but it is
undecided as to the optimal method to achieve those ends. 87 This can be
contrasted with a scenario where the ends themselves are the subject of
intense debate.388 As Dworkin explains:
Of course, in some circumstances, pointing out that a doctrine will
have surprising consequences-that a welfare program designed to
help a particular group will actually harm that group, for
example-is obviously immensely helpful. But these circumstances
are rare: most often the controversy is not about what means will in
387. Dworkin, Arduous Virtue, supra note 139, at 1265-66.
388. Dworkin explains:
We must distinguish two situations in which a political community might find itself. In the
first, it has a pretty good idea of what goals it wants to pursue through its constitutional and
other laws-a good sense, we might say, of where it wants to end up. It wants to keep inflation
down and nevertheless have sustained growth, for example. It wants a lively political discourse,
a lower crime rate, and less racial tension. It would know when it has achieved these goals, but
it is now uncertain how to pursue them. It might indeed be helpful, in some such cases, to tell
such a community not to try to solve its problems by first constructing grand economic or moral
principles and then proceeding in their light, but, instead, to be experimental-to try one thing
after another, just to see what works.
In the second situation, however, the community's problem is not that it doesn't know which
means are best calculated to reach identified ends. Rather, it doesn't know what goals it should
pursue, what principles it should respect. It wants to be a fair society, a just society, but it
doesn't know whether that means increased liberty for people to make intimate sexual decisions
for themselves, for example, or whether it means giving preferences in hiring and education to
minorities. Its difficulty is not that it doesn't have the factual basis to be able to predict the
consequences of granting increased sexual liberty or of adopting affirmative action programs.
Or, at least, that is not its only problem. Its deeper problem lies in not knowing whether these
consequences would be, overall, improvements or further defects in the justice and fairness of
its structures. In these circumstances it's evident, isn't it, that the pragmatist's earnest advice-
his practical, empirical, counsel of caution and theoretical abstinence-is worthless.
When we are in the second situation, we can't avoid general principles by asking ourselves
whether any particular step "works." We can't do that because no one can have any opinion
about what working is until he has endorsed, however tentatively, a general principle that
identifies a step as a step forward rather than a step backward. Whether increased sexual liberty
or affirmative action makes a society more just cannot be decided without deciding what




fact achieve an agreed end, but about what end should be agreed
upon-about how high efficiency should rank, for example, against
social or distributive goals or the protection of rights or goals of
integrity.
389
So, in a sense, at the heart of the conflict between pragmatists and
their critics is an empirical disagreement regarding the types of disputes
most often faced by society. 390 Dworkin and his allies think that it is rare
that the ends or goals are agreed upon.39t Instead, they think that legal
disputes usually involve some claim about which ends should prevail. In
contrast, pragmatists are more likely to believe that enough consensus
exists on ends to justify experimentation on means.392 So even if we
accept Dworkin's criticism, room remains for situations where empirical
study may be of use, such as when the goals are uncontroversial, but
there is a dispute over which method for achieving the ends will be most
effective.393
Second, empirical inquiry may be useful for revealing situations
where doctrine or legal categories obscure a complete understanding of
the underlying legal problem. As Steven Smith (a critic of pragmatism)
observes, a pragmatist might argue that excessive abstraction and
overuse of conceptual categories comes with the "costs of overlooking
potentially significant features of experience., 394 Therefore, the process
of compartmentalizing legal controversies into existing categories of
legal doctrine carries with it some risk of losing touch with important
features of the underlying issue.
389. Dworkin, Reply, supra note 102, at 433.
390. See Warner, supra note 17, at 552 n.81 (noting that the "extent of unresolvable
disagreement is, of course an empirical issue" but arguing that our daily lives demonstrate that
consensus is often lacking on "virtually every substantive aspect of public policy" and that "[tihe
intellectual history of the last three centuries is in part the history of the breakdown of any
consensus about what justifies a moral or political judgment!').
391. See A Case Too Far, supra note 30, at 8 ("There is no general consensus about society's
economic and social goals, as [Posner] seems to assume, but frequent and bitter disagreement about
them. What is a matter of simple pragmatism to Judge Posner, or any judge may well seem
outrageous to others.").
392. See POsNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 2, at 262 ("Pragmatism will not tell us what is best;
but, provided there is a fair degree of value consensus among the judges, as I think there is, it can
help judges seek the best results unhampered by philosophical doubts.").
393. Cf Shreve, supra note 39, at 66 (explaining that pragmatism can help to clarify and mediate
the debate among other substantive theories "without becoming one more competing theory").
394. See Smith, supra note 3, at 432-33. According to Smith, "[sluch a view seems to inform the
pragmatists' frequent condemnation of "abstraction" or "abstract theory." Id. at 433.
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However, the use of pragmatism as an antidote for excessive
abstraction has its own difficulties. As Smith explains, while excessive
abstraction can be a problem, it is hard to see how pragmatism can help
us figure out exactly when theory becomes too abstract. 395 The only
honest answer to Smith's observation is that one who asserts that theory
has gone awry must be willing to invoke some other normative basis for
asserting that theory has failed. If pragmatism cannot provide a
normative goal for lawmakers, then it is equally incapable of
determining when we are in a crisis. As Gene Shreve explains:
Pragmatism. . . is designed around the process of finding and
solving problems. But what are the problems? How, when and why
do we define them? Pragmatism is often thought to eschew moral
(substantive) values, but it must have a moral base somewhere to
escape relativism. That is, pragmatism can neither call something a
problem nor value one solution to it over another without
substantive reference points. Hence the dilemma. If pragmatism is
substantive, does it contradict itself? If pragmatism lacks
substantive reference, is it not hopelessly relativistic?
39 6
Third, and most important for the Payton context, pragmatic empirical
study can force courts to explicitly identify the normative bases of their
decisions, thus helping to create what Tracey Meares and Bernard
Harcourt aptly call "transparent adjudication. 397 As Deborah Jones
Merritt explains "[f]acts cannot replace constitutional theories, nor...
395. See id. at 433-34; TMANARA, supra note 53, at 37 (explaining that "there is no standard
for determining when a given level of abstraction is excessive").
396. Shreve, supra note 39, at 65-66 (quoting Gene R. Shreve, Symmetries of Access in Civil
Rights Litigation: Politics, Pragmatism and Will, 66 IND. L.J. 1, 34-35 (1990)); see also Warner,
supra note 17, at 551-54 (discussing pragmatism's inevitable relativism). Shreve's description is
similar to the concept of "institutional bad coherence," elucidated by Margaret Jane Radin, under
which an ideologically unacceptable legal conclusion is consistent with prior legal practices. See
Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL L. REV. 1699, 1721 (1990); see
also Margaret Jane Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal
Practice, 139 U. PA. L REV. 1019, 1047-48 (1991) (explaining how pragmatists may neglect
injustices deeply imbedded into the legal landscape).
397. As Meares and Harcourt observe:
By more transparent, we mean to describe adjudication that expressly and openly discusses the
normative judgments at the core of constitutional criminal procedure. Judicial decisions that
address the relevant social science and empirical data are more transparent in that they
expressly articulate the grounds for factual assertions and, as a result, more clearly reflect the
interpretive choices involved in criminal procedure decisionmaking.
Meares & Harcourt, supra note 8, at 735.
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mechanically resolve questions posed by theory," '398 but empirical
inquiry "can illuminate half-hidden theories that guide decision
makers." '399 Empirical pragmatism, while not a normative theory itself,
can force decisionmakers to reveal the motivations for their decisions, by
stripping away the guise of ill-supported factual assumptions."
2. The Value and Limits of Empirical Inquiry in the Payton Context
a. Transparent Adjudication and Payton
To make this discussion more concrete, let us see how this effort at
transparent adjudication might work in the context of home arrests under
Payton."' For the moment, we will assume that the rule set forth in
Payton is itself not open to reconsideration and that the "reason to
believe" standard adequately balances the interests of residential privacy
and police investigatory needs. 2 This Article has argued that Payton's
progeny has failed to properly capture the realities of suspect behavior.
Thus, what started out as a seemingly reasonable rule governing home
398. See Merritt, supra note 51, at 1287.
399. See id. at 1291. Faigman opines: "[w]hen the Court's factual observations depart from
reality, the rules attached to those facts become suspect." Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-
finding, supra note 117, at 612.
400. See Heise, supra note 102, at 808-09 (explaining the regrettable power of "[a]ssertions
unconnected to an empirical basis"); Meares & Harcourt, supra note 8, at 750-51 (criticizing the
Supreme Court for treating contested empirical claims as "self-evident, common sense, or simple
'facts of life') (discussing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000)). Meares and
Harcourt further state:
In a world in which there really is no research available to inform the Court's commonsense
judgments about human behavior, perhaps this conclusion would not be troubling. If relevant
research is indeed lacking, then personal experience (to which much reference was made in oral
arguments), and citations to Proverbs may be better than guessing. At least we could be
confident that the Court was doing the best it could to make a difficult decision without social
authority to help guide it. But what if there is social science research available to inform the
Court's commonsense judgments? Does it still make sense to be confident about the Court's
ability to make difficult decisions concerning the requisite balance between liberty and order
without consulting it? Do we really believe that the unadorned commonsense judgments of the
justices of the Supreme Court are adequate to determine the scope of individual rights?
Id. at 784 (footnotes omitted).
401. Meares and Harcourt demonstrate the value of transparent adjudication and empirical
inquiry in the context of ongoing debates over Miranda warnings and Terry stops. See Meares &
Harcourt, supra note 8, at 752-93.
402. Obviously one might argue that the Payton rule itself is deeply flawed.
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arrests somehow failed to develop content or incorporate the realities of
suspect or citizen conduct. Subsequent rote application of the rule then
reinforced what was becoming a meaningless standard. The question is
whether empirical study can point a way out of this dilemma. Several
hypothetical home-arrest scenarios may be enlightening.
Let us assume, arguendo, that a reliable and scientifically valid study
of home arrests indicates that the presence of a vehicle connected to the
suspect and light emanating from a residence indicates a 95% chance
that a suspect will be at home before 8 a.m. on a weekday. Police
approach a suspect's residence at 6:30 a.m. on a Wednesday and see the
suspect's car parked outside of his home and lights on in the residence.
Most observers would intuitively respond that Payton's reason to believe
standard has been satisfied. To say otherwise would mean that reason to
believe requires greater than 95% certainty-an implausible outcome. If
we put to the side momentarily exactly why we feel that "reason to
believe" cannot require greater than 95% certainty, then empiricism
seems to provide a solid basis for the police action.
Now let us change the hypothetical, and assume that police attempt to
arrest the suspect in the middle of the day. There is no light or noise
emanating from the residence, nor any cars parked in front of the
suspect's home. The home-arrest study reveals that these factors indicate
less than a 2% chance that the suspect will be found inside. Once again,
our intuitions line up with the study. It seems implausible to argue that
the formulation "reason to believe" should be satisfied when a study
shows less than a 2% chance that the suspect would be present.
Now let us take the inevitable case where intuition and the study of
home arrests fail to point together towards one conclusion. Assume a
case where a confidential informant reports seeing the suspect at his
residence at 3 p.m. on a Saturday. The police approach the residence at
7:30 p.m. that same day. The suspect's car is not present, but several
cars connected to the suspect's friends are parked in the driveway. No
lights are on in the residence, but the noise of a television or stereo can
be heard. The study shows that these factors taken together lead to an
18% chance that the suspect will be present. Then the question of
whether Payton is satisfied cannot be resolved intuitively. A court must
ask the next question: Does an 18% possibility that a suspect will be
present satisfy Payton? Is 18% high enough for "reason to believe?"
This is where a form of the banality problem arises. It is not clear how
further study or data would assist the court in making its determination.
A devout pragmatist might say that the court could then look to the
likely effects on police investigation and crime control of setting the
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probability bar at one level or another. How many arrests would be
thwarted? What will be the effect on the privacy interests of the suspect
or the suspect's cohabitants? Perhaps further study would be warranted
to address these questions. But this merely defers the inevitable judicial
quandary. Eventually, the courts must step up to the plate and set the
standard for home arrests. A court must be willing to explicitly hold
what level of certainty is required to satisfy Payton. Empirical study will
not answer this question, but it can force the court to acknowledge
whether particular facts satisfy the standard without shrouding its
judgment in a recitation of legal doctrine or a laundry list of factors
suggesting suspect presence.
This is the value of transparent adjudication-the court will have to
state flat out what suffices under Payton. If a court says that a 25%
likelihood of suspect presence satisfies Payton, we can get on with the
business of arguing whether we are comfortable with that standard as a
matter of policy. The normative battle can be joined-which requires an
honest discussion of how much we value privacy and how much latitude
we wish to give police who seek to arrest suspects at home. Until the
courts step up, we cannot have a proper normative debate. As Meares
and Harcourt explain:
The relevant empirical facts, we claim, are not outcome
determinative. They do not compel particular resolutions, nor do
they guarantee right answers. The resolution of criminal procedure
cases calls for normative judgments-in particular, for a balancing
of liberty and order-and is not dictated by empirical evidence.
When taken together, an emphasis on the use of relevant empirical
facts in the context of a pragmatic balancing approach to criminal
procedure decisionmaking, we believe, holds out the greatest
promise of increasing the transparency of these constitutional
decisions and, therefore, potentially increasing the accountability
of the Court to the public.4"3
b. The Contingent Nature of Empirically-Based Judgments
Establishing a standard under Payton would not be set in stone
forever-it must be contingent on further empirical findings. The best
example of an empirically-contingent rule in the constitutional criminal
403. Meares & Harcourt, supra note 8, at 744.
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procedure arena is the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
created by the Supreme Court in United States v. Leon.4 In Leon, the
Court held that the exclusionary rule would not apply to evidence
obtained by police in the execution of a facially valid search warrant,
even if the warrant was later found to be lacking in probable cause.4"'
The Court largely based its reasoning on the empirical judgment that
punishing police who act in good faith would not serve any deterrent
effect.0 6 Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, wrote convincingly about
the necessarily contingent nature of any legal holding based on an
empirical foundation, and how courts that base their legal judgments on
conclusions regarding empirical matters must be willing to re-examine
their holdings as new evidence comes to light.
40 7
404. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Scholars often cite Leon as an opinion where the Court showed
sensitivity to the empirical backdrop of the case. See Meares & Harcourt, supra note 8, at 746-48;
Monahan & Walker, Empirical Questions, supra note 362, at 580-81; Walker & Monahan, Social
Frameworks, supra note 120, at 562, 568. Other scholars hold a less charitable view towards Leon.
See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 90, at 157-58 (criticizing the Court's approach in Leon as a pseudo-
scientific cost-benefit method that will systematically devalue the interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment).
405. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 ("We conclude that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated
search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.").
406. Il at 918-21.
407. Justice Blackmun stated:
I write separately. . . to underscore what I regard as the unavoidably provisional nature of
today's decisions.
As the Court's opinion in this case makes clear, the Court has narrowed the scope of the
exclusionary rule because of an empirical judgment that the rule has little appreciable effect in
cases where officers act in objectively reasonable reliance on search warrants.... Because I
share the view that the exclusionary rule is not a constitutionally compelled corollary of the
Fourth Amendment itself... I see no way to avoid making an empirical judgment of this sort,
and I am satisfied that the Court has made the correct one on the information before it. Like all
courts, we face institutional limitations on our ability to gather information about "legislative
facts," and the exclusionary rule itself has exacerbated the shortage of hard data concerning the
behavior of police officers in the absence of such a rule.... Nonetheless, we cannot escape the
responsibility to decide the question before us, however imperfect our information may be, and
I am prepared to join the Court on the information now at hand.
What must be stressed, however, is that any empirical judgment about the effect of the
exclusionary rule in a particular class of cases necessarily is a provisional one. By their very
nature, the assumptions on which we proceed today cannot be cast in stone. To the contrary,
they now vill be tested in the real world of state and federal law enforcement, and this Court
will attend to the results. If it should emerge from experience that, contrary to our expectations,
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule results in a material change in police
compliance with the Fourth Amendment, we shall have to reconsider what we have undertaken
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Blackmun's observations in Leon would apply equally in the Payton
realm. If further experience and empirical study began to tell a different
story regarding suspect behavior, then courts would have to incorporate
this understanding into Payton case law. This willingness to adapt
reflects a strength, not a weakness, in empiricism 408 It represents the
acknowledgment that any time a legal rule is predicated upon a certain
understanding of the world, the rule makers must be willing to alter the
rule as a different understanding of the world emerges. So, in the Payton
context, we apply rules based upon an understanding of suspect behavior
and the subsequent effect on privacy and law enforcement efforts. If our
understandings of the world change, the rules would adapt will change
as well.
D. Pragmatism and Payton in Sum
No matter how accurate and comprehensive a study of home arrests
is, facts about suspect behavior will not answer the question of what the
Payton standard should mean. The factual inquiry, however, serves a
valuable function-it forces Payton decisionmaking into the open,
creating a process of transparent adjudication. Only by understanding the
facts of home arrests can we engage in a productive normative debate
over whether the Payton standard, as applied by the courts, satisfies our
societal preferences. How often are homes entered? How successful are
these entries? What are the effects on co-residents? Are different types
of homes entered at different rates?4 9 How often does a Payton entry
result not in the arrest of a subject but in the seizure of contraband while
police search for the suspect? How much privacy should suspects have?
How much freedom do we wish to give police? Does the type of offense
affect our reasoning? These are all interesting questions that can lead to
a productive dialogue about the relationship between privacy in the
here. The logic of a decision that rests on untested predictions about police conduct demands no
less.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
408. Monahan & Walker, Empirical Questions, supra note 362, at 581 ("The great advantage of
judicial candor about the role of empirical assumptions and the speculative nature of their
resolution, then, is that the common law is left open to change as new social authority bearing on
those assumptions becomes available.").
409. Would it surprise anyone to find out that a trailer home is more likely to be stormed by
police than a mansion?
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home and the legitimate needs of law enforcement. Until the facts are in,
though, the debate cannot be joined.
CONCLUSION
With the publication of The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory,
Richard Posner solidified his reputation as the leading scholarly and
judicial advocate of the application of pragmatism to law. According to
Posner, legal decisionmakers, including judges, should use every tool at
their disposal, especially the social sciences, to render decisions that will
best serve our society's needs. Judges can accomplish this goal only if
they understand the factual contexts in which legal issues arise and are
capable of determining the practical effects of their decisions.
Aside from the baggage that comes with appropriating a controversial
philosophical term such as "pragmatism," we have seen that Posner's
prescription for the U.S. legal system is both modest and radical.
Posner's pragmatic prescription is modest because, for almost one
hundred years, scholars from all across the ideological spectrum have
urged the courts to be more cognizant of the real world, less wedded to
theory or doctrine unconnected to reality, and more willing to utilize
non-legal materials such as social science data in the legal
decisionmaking process. Although some of these scholars have marched
under the banner of pragmatism, others have called for a more
empirically grounded form of legal decisionmaking without affiliating
themselves with a particular philosophical school of thought.
On the other hand, Posner's pragmatic prescription is radical because
the U.S. legal system has proved itself remarkably resilient against
pragmatic or empirical calls to action. As this Article has shown, there
are several related reasons for this resistance. First, there are questions
whether social science can capture the essence of complex social
phenomena at issue in most legal disputes. Second, the judiciary may be
institutionally incapable of properly considering non-legal materials.
Third, law professors and others in the profession have not provided the
courts with the necessary social science data to supplement their
decisionmaking-and many question whether lawyers are capable of
providing this support. Moreover, powerful and persuasive philosophical
critics-led by Ronald Dworkin-have questioned whether empirical
inquiry can help courts settle the type of hotly-contested normative
debates that arise in legal disputes. These critics argue that courts and
other legal decisionmakers must decide on the ends that our society
wishes to pursue, not merely on the most effective methods for achieving
Washington Law Review
these ends. According to these critics, pragmatism's exhortation to
experiment, proceed empirically, and to try and do what works best,
cannot help legal decisionmakers make the tough normative, moral, and
ethical policy judgments that are required of them.
Against this daunting backdrop, the purpose of this Article has been
to demonstrate, in practical terms, how empirical inquiry could help
resolve an important issue in constitutional criminal procedure. For this
exercise in what might be termed "applied pragmatism," we have
focused on judicial review of police entries into suspects' homes to
execute arrest warrants made pursuant to the authority granted by Payton
v. New York. As this Article has endeavored to show, the Payton realm is
a particularly rich environment to study the value of empirical
pragmatism. Payton permits police officers armed with an arrest warrant
to enter a suspect's residence when there is "reason to believe" the
suspect will be present. Yet, for the last two decades, courts applying
Payton's reason to believe standard have constructed a legal regime
under which police entries under Payton are rarely held to be
unconstitutional, no matter what evidence is adduced that the suspect
would be present. Courts have validated police entries into private
residences by accepting potentially empirically unsupported assumptions
regarding citizen and suspect conduct. Even worse, courts occasionally
attempt to give Payton's reason to believe standard meaning by
comparing it to probable cause. This entails a mystifying formalist
exercise, because probable cause itself has little discernable meaning in
the context of home arrests.
Empirical pragmatism points a partial way out of the Payton
quagmire. The United States Marshals Service, the pre-eminent U.S.
fugitive-apprehension force, should generate sound social science
evidence regarding home arrests to determine how likely it is that a
suspect will be found at home in light of certain recurring evidentiary
factors. Courts would then have access to this information when they
review Payton home entries to determine whether it was reasonable for
the police to have believed that the suspect would be home. Therefore,
instead of engaging in unsupported judicial musing regarding how
suspects behave, or meaningless comparisons of probable cause and
reason to believe, judges could base their decisions on reliable data
regarding home arrests and suspect conduct.
Unfortunately, social science data regarding suspect conduct cannot
fully resolve the problems posed by Payton. Such are the limitations of
empirical pragmatism-it illuminates the interests at stake and
encourages a healthy process of transparent adjudication, but it cannot
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resolve our normative policy debates over privacy and police action. For
example, a study of home arrests may tell us that there is a 25% chance
that the suspect will be at home given certain evidence, but the study
cannot tell us whether we should be satisfied enough with this level of
likelihood to permit law enforcement officers to enter the residence. This
final inquiry requires courts and society to engage in a normative debate
regarding privacy and law enforcement needs. Far from being banal or
useless, however, the empirical inquiry is a necessary first step because
important normative debates cannot be properly joined until we have a
clear sense of the interests at stake. This is the value of Posner's
pragmatism-it forces courts in the Payton realm (or any legal context)
to explicitly question the factual bases underlying their reasoning and to
acknowledge that their decisions have real world effects. To be sure,
pragmatism cannot tell us what type of lives we wish to lead or what
type of society we wish to build-but it can help us avoid basing our
policy judgments regarding constitutional criminal procedure on
empirically unsound foundations.
396
